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Value-theory & the Good Life. Section 4 The Good Life, Needs, Virtue & Morality. Needs. Needs can be distinguished from wants. Contingent needs can be distinguished from needs that are constituents of well-being. Basic needs can be distinguished from less basic needs, as well as from wants.
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Value-theory & the Good Life Section 4 The Good Life, Needs, Virtue & Morality
Needs • Needs can be distinguished from wants. • Contingent needs can be distinguished from needs that are constituents of well-being. • Basic needs can be distinguished from less basic needs, as well as from wants.
To Consider… • How might we plausibly argue against the claim that strongly felt wants are needs?
Universality of Certain Needs • The universality of certain human needs can be defended against objections that relativize needs to different social contexts.
Morality, Reasons & Needs • Are there reasons for being moral, & how is morality related to a worthwhile life, & to human needs?
Morality, Reasons & Needs Hobbes: • Whatever we ought to do advances our own interests & thus satisfies our needs. • But there were (as we saw in the Chapter on the History of Ethics) good grounds to reject that view; for morality seemed not always to tally with the pursuit of personal advantage, & is oriented to satisfying the various needs of other people & creatures, & not only those of the moral agent.
Morality • Morality does not always benefit the individual agent. • For example, self-sacrifice may be both moral & harmful to the agent.
But… • In the absence of moral behaviour being displayed, many needs would not be satisfied, & everyone benefits from morality at some time or other.
Virtue • Being virtuous contributes to living a worthwhile life in several ways, through rewards including self-respect.
Virtue • Much depends on what kind of person an individual wants to be; if we want to be reliable, generous & honest, we need to make corresponding choices over a long period, & not prioritize self-interest as we do so.
Virtue • Just as happiness is seldom to be attained by aiming to be happy, so aiming to be virtuous on a basis of self-interest is not likely to generate sincere forms of virtue such as kindness & generosity.
Consider… • Is it possible to attain such forms of virtue as kindness & generosity on a basis of self-interest?