2-Factor Authentication & WiFi Security at PNNL ESCC Meeting, July 21-22, 2004

1. 2-Factor Authentication &WiFi Security at PNNL ESCC Meeting, July 21-22, 2004 Presentation Outline: 2-Factor Authentication at PNNL Drivers Enclave Design Multiple Sites WiFi Security at PNNL Threats and Risk Mitigation 2nd Generation Architecture (Wireless Enclaves) Rogue Detection and Wireless IDS Future Directions Presented by Jeffery Mauth Pacific Northwest National Laboratory jeff.mauth@pnl.gov

2. 2-Factor Authentication at PNNL Drivers Enclave Design Multiple Sites

3. 2-Factor Authentication -- DriversUsernames and Passwords • DOE passwords have a lifetime of no more than 6 months • Keystroke capture tools are being used more and more by the bad guy’s • 6 months is a lifetime for a bad guy to do bad things • Difficult to detect since username/password is real • Shared resources across DOE exacerbate the problem • 2-Factor one time passwords solve this problem … almost • Automated functions requiring authentication are more difficult • Replay attacks *MAY* be possible in some circumstances • Multi-site access with a single token challenging • The PNNL enclave design required 2-Factor OTP

4. 2-Factor Authentication -- Enclave DesignMulti-Program Labs requireMultiple Security Policies • PNNL is an Office of Science Laboratory with a significant National Security mission • Office of Science programs generally have many visitors both on-site and remote from around the world, security policy must accommodate • National Security programs generally require security policies that are much more restrictive • Business and financial systems also require protection but all PNNL staff need access to these systems • Wireless networks have unique issues • PNNL evaluated different strategies to solve these problems and determined that an enclave solution was best for PNNL

5. 2-Factor Authentication -- Enclave DesignMulti-Program Labs requireMultiple Security Policies • Enclave Solution implemented at PNNL • 2-Factor OTP a critical part of the enclave design • Multiple enclaves with different security policies • Programmatic requirements determine which enclave • Each enclave isolated from others by firewall • Results we have seen at PNNL • Prior to implementation, gnashing of teeth, wails, the world is ending as we know it … • After implementation most staff not seriously impacted, the gnashing has stopped, we are still here, there are still some quiet wails though • Benefit: Lower risk associated with external access into the lab and improved access control to meet programmatic needs • Still a work in progress

6. 2-Factor Authentication -- Multiple SitesHow to work with Others • 2-Factor OTP solutions for a single site are relatively straight forward • Single management policy and funding stream • Risk management and acceptance by site • Integration between sites becomes more challenging • Multiple management policies and funding streams • Risk management and acceptance more difficult • Who trusts who, and how much to trust them? • Changes in risk profile at a single site affects other sites • Questions on implementation • One token or many • How willing will the user base be • Will it harm scientific productivity

8. WiFi Security at PNNL Threats and Risk Mitigation 2nd Generation Architecture (Wireless Enclaves) Rogue Detection and Wireless IDS Future Directions

9. Goal: Flexible Network Access Multiple, Adaptable Wireless Networks Different security policies, authentication methods, and users Reliable, Scalable Coverage High-density 802.11b/g High-performance 802.11a “hotspots”, as needed Integration with wired networks, target key business applications Staff productivity, extend network resources, and new mobility applications WiFi Security -- Overall Network Goals and ObjectivesScalable, Secure, and Flexible Wireless Access • Goal: Multi-Layered Security • Basic, low-cost detection and location of “rogue” devices • Sensor functions built in to standard Cisco AP • Advanced Wireless IDS functions • AirDefense, wireline methods • Dedicated, specialized sensors, as needed (open source & proprietary) • LAIs, sensitive areas, outdoors • Campuses and buildings in different locations across the US (rural to metro)

10. WiFi Security -- Threats and Risk MitigationSecurity Policy SeparatesWireless and Wired Networks Internet PNNL Networks (Building Access Control) Wireless Networks (Enclave Access Control) Mitigation • Staff Remote Access / VPN / 2-factor / FW • IDS outbound traffic monitoring • “Wireline” tools • Deploying Wireless IDS campus coverage Threat DMZ Wireless Device Firewall Firewall Building A Building A Primary Rogue Threat Threat Campus Primary risk is that an outside attacker will bypass enterprise firewall via rogue. Note: “Airspace DMZ” covers entire campus. Different than wired DMZ.

11. WiFi Security -- 2nd Generation ArchitectureWireless Enclaves AddFlexibility and Security

12. Primary Goals Achieve Acceptable Risk Mitigate risks “sufficiently” Cover Full Campus (Inside Buildings) Mitigate primary threat of rogue “open doors” in ~60 buildings with network connections Efficient 24x7 Operations Cost-effective integration with overall network security systems, procedures and staff WiFi Security -- Rogue Detection and Wireless IDSGoals and Challenges • The Challenges (changing…) • Wide Area Network (2G, 2.5G, 3G ) • Pagers, cell phones, Blackberries, “smart phones” • Metro Area Network (IEEE 802.16) • Local Area Network (IEEE 802.11b/g/a or Wi-Fi* • Solid rogue coverage for these popular products and protocols • Personal Area Network (IEEE 802.15) • Bluetooth (growing fast); • Zigbee, Ultra Wideband (UWB) * Target popular unlicensed protocols, but address new DOE orders as needed

13. WiFi Security -- Rogue Detection and Wireless IDS Combined Solution is Best forPNNL Environment • Combined AirDefense-Cisco solution provides “sufficient mitigation” with the best functional capability, the most flexibility, at the least cost. • See figure below for multi-layered approach to wireless security and IDS. • PNNL has evaluated 5 different products against detailed evaluation criteria (ISS, AirWave, Open Source, AirDefense, and Cisco) • Rapidly changing wireless arena (both threats and opportunities) Basic Rogue Detection/Location Advanced Detection Combined Access / Sensor(Buildings w/ Cisco APs) Sensor Only (LAIs, mobile) In the Air On the Wire Wireline Tools (Covers Entire Network)

14. WiFi Security -- Future DirectionsRapid Growth in Use ofWireless Products and Services • Wireless rogue detection is essential whether wireless is authorized or not for use in an enterprise. • Easy to install wireless that bypass firewalls, either knowingly or not. • Wireless enclaves provide good solution for providing flexible architectures and levels of security. • Technology is moving rapidly; more alternatives soon. • Industry direction and investments will drive strong adoption of wireless in the marketplace. • Wireless “on ramp” to networks for many devices. • How will this affect DOE and other government agencies? • DOE N 205.8 and other directives

15. Questions? Contact Information Dave Hostetler Wireless LAN Project Manager dave.hostetler@pnl.gov 509-375-2293 Jeffery Mauth jeff.mauth@pnl.gov 509-375-2511