STARDUST Project CRITICAL EVENTS READINESS REVIEW COMET P/WILD 2 ENCOUNTER ISA Status Charles Love

1. STARDUST Project CRITICAL EVENTS READINESS REVIEW COMET P/WILD 2 ENCOUNTER ISA Status Charles Love JPL: 303-411 AM / 301-427 PM LMA: MSA +1 818 354-1275 08:00 AM - 05:00 PM PST 20 Nov 2003 CERR - Charles Love

2. ISA SUMMARY • Total ISA’s 196 • Crit 1: Represents High Effect on Achieving Full Mission Success. • 5 Total - All Closed, None Impact Successful Encounter • FSW Corrections Identified for 4 to Preclude Recurrence of Issue • 1 Documents NAVCAM Contamination Issue • Crit 2: Represents Significant Effect on Achieving Full Mission Success. • 56 Total - 55 Closed, None Impact Successful Encounter • Z82232, Safe Mode Entry on 10/22/03 • Spacecraft Successfully Recovered per SM Recovery Procedure • Cause Investigation Continuing • Rapid SM Recovery Possible Up To E–17 Hours • Crit 3 & 4: Represents No Significant or No Effect on Achieving Full Mission Success. • 135 Total - 134 Closed, None Impact Successful Encounter • Z82341, NAVCAM Cal Lamp Inoperable • No Impact to Mission Objectives • Shutter Operation Verified • Cause Investigation Continuing CERR - Charles Love

3. ISA SUMMARY (Continued) • ISA’s With Possible Wild 2 Encounter Ramifications • SSPA 3dB Power Drop (Z70033, Z50509, Z50525) • Data Rates Adjusted to Account for Power Decrease • Sufficient Link Margin Exists for Comm Through MGA and No Additional Degradation in SSPA Performance Noted. (Trending Continues) • PACI Resets (Z69809) • FSW Patch Installed to Monitor & Account for Internal Resets • Temperature Range of Concern will not be Breeched During Encounter • Safe Mode Entry November 2000 (Z70478) • Most Likely Caused by a Large Solar Flare Resulting in a Star Camera Outage or SEU • Solar Flare Contingency Plan Previously Considered, However, Risk of Plan Action (Due to an Imminent Solar Flare Hit) Potentially Greater than Doing Nothing • LGA 2 Antenna Pattern Dead Zone (Z51876, Z51353) • Represents a 3dB to 6dB Loss in Performance • Sufficient Uplink Margin Exists and No Additional Degradation in Performance Noted CERR - Charles Love

4. ISA SUMMARY (Continued) • ISA’s with Possible Wild 2 Encounter Ramifications (Continued) • Limited Dust Flux Monitor Operation Time (Z50845) • Most Likely Cause Attributed to Internal Power Circuitry • Planned Operation at Encounter Limited to ~33 Minutes • Unexpected NAVCAM Mirror Offset (Z78279) • Caused by Large Attitude Knowledge Errors Due to Rate Biases • Mitigation Technique (Enabling Star Camera Processing Post Slew) not Possible at Encounter • Risk of Losing Closest Approach Images Accepted by Project Since No Other Workarounds are Possible • Stuck Filter Wheel (Z71028) • Cause is Unknown • Commanding Suspended Since Filter is Stuck in a Favorable Position • LOS LOCK Errors Result in Uplinks Not Being Received (Z78164, Z71700, Z70268, Z71803, Z71942, Z75486) • Operational Workaround In Place (NOOP is Sent Prior to Every Uplink Session) • FSW Patch to Correct this Nuisance was Rejected Since STL Verification of Patch Performance is not Possible CERR - Charles Love

5. OTHER ANOMALIES • Red Flag Problem/Failure Reports (6 of 69 Total P/FRs) • All Resolved Pre-Launch (Reworked, Replaced or Repaired) • No Recurrences of Any Related Failures In Flight • Unverified Failures (5 Total UVFs) • All Resolved Pre-Launch (Replaced or Designated Non-Critical to Mission) • No Recurrences of Any Related Failures In Flight • EEPROM Single Bit Failures on Genesis Spacecraft C&DH • Has Occurred Twice on Genesis but Never on Stardust • Cause Attributed to “Weak Cells” Due to Process-Induced Defective Cells or Poorly Programmed Cells • Genesis Implemented Contingency Process to Maintain Side-A Reboot Capability (Overwriting EEPROM via FSW Patch) • Similar Process Could be Applied to Stardust Should it Occur • Stardust EEPROM Image Monitored Each Week CERR - Charles Love

6. SINGLE POINT FAILURES & WAIVERS • All Approved Pre-Launch • No Failures Nor Degradation of Performance Detected During 4.7 Years of Flight • Single Point Failures Include: • “Standard” • Structure, Cables, Connectors, Passive RF, Prop Tanks and Lines, Thermal Blankets • Coax Transfer Switch • Failure at “In Between” Position • Unlikely Due to Heritage Experience • Single Prop Filter • Order of Magnitude Design Margin • Single Battery • Single Cell Short Failure Tolerant • Extensive Flight and Test Data Indicates Minimal Risk of Cell Open Failure • Pyro Initiation Unit FPGA • Low Risk Due to Radiation Tolerance vs. Total Dose • Fifty (50) Total Waivers • 18 Major (Class 1) Waivers Against Contract Requirements Documents, ICDs, Etc. • 32 Minor (Class 2) Waivers Against Internal LMA or Stardust Derived Documents • No Single Point Failure Items or Waivers Impact Successful Encounter CERR - Charles Love

7. READINESS ASSESSMENT • Stardust Encounter is Ready to Proceed • Risks have been Identified, Evaluated, Mitigated and Accepted • All ISAs Are Sufficiently Understood and/or Mitigated • All Red Flag PFRs Are Closed • All UVFs Are Closed • All Single Point Failures have been Identified, Evaluated and Accepted • All Waivers have been Identified, Evaluated and Accepted • No Waivers to Flight Rules and Constraints for Encounter • Encounter Test Program and Anomalies Well Documented and Completion On Track CERR - Charles Love