Exploring Fichte's Perspectives on Thing-in-Itself and Being

1. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • Thing in itself and Being • Yukio Irie (Osaka, Japan) • The first draft of my summary of this presentation presented the following argument: • “Fichte refuted the thing-in-itself in his Jenaerperiod. He argued that knowledge (or presentation, Vorstellung) does not arise from the thing-in- itself, but from the I (or self) itself. • However, during his Berliner period, Fichte believed that the Being exists as only what exists and that the knowledge does not exist outside of Being. Knowledge is the concept or ‘Bild’ or ‘Erscheinung’ of Being. • Fichte rejected the existence of the thing-in-itself on the one hand and admitted the Being behind the ‘Erscheinung’ or ‘Bild’ on the other. Why did Fichte come to these conclusions? I will investigate this question from the semantic perspective.”

2. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • After writing this, I realized it was inaccurate. • I now understand that Fichte could not completelyrefute the existence of the thing-in-itself during the Jena Period. • Andtheproblemofthing-in-itselfandtheproblemofBeingarenotquitesame,butcontinuous problems, • because they are relating to his main problem; • what is the critical idealism as a middle between dogmatism and idealism? • I would like to explain this interpretation today.

3. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • I . Thing-in-itself in Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschftslehre • (1) A circulation in argument about thing in itself • First, I would like to confirm that Fichte did not refute completely the thing in itself in Grundlage der gesamtenWissenschftslehre (1794): • “This fact, that the finite spirit must necessarily posit something absolute outside itself (as a thing-in-itself), and yet must recognize, from the other side, that the latter exists only for it (as a necessary noumenon), is that circle which it is able to extend into infinity, but can never escape. A system that pays no attention at all to this circle, is a dogmatic idealism.” (SW I, 281; FEW, 247.) • “The thing-in-itself is something for the self, and consequently in the self, though it ought not to be in the self: it is thus a contradiction, though as the object of a necessary idea it [the thing-in-itself]must be the set at the foundation of all our philosophizing.” (SW I, 281; FEW, 249.) • (FEW: Fichte, Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), with First and Second Introductions, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge University Press, 1982.)

4. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 (2) Division of Realism and Idealism in GGW Dogmatic realism = a claim that the not-self (Nicht-Ich) is the cause of presentation (Vorstellung) and the presentation is an effect of the not-self; thus, the not-self is the real ground of everything, and the self (Ich) is a mere accident of the not-selfand not a substance at all.(Cf. SWI, 155; FEW, 146.) • Dogmatic idealism = a claim that the self is the substance of presentation and the presentation is an accident of the self, and that the not-self is merely an accident of the self. (Cf. ibid.) • Critical idealism = the middle of the two systems, ‘Real–ldealism’, or ‘Ideal-Realism’ (SW I, 281; FEW, 247.). • However, he does not seem to have described explicitly what the middle is in this book.

5. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • 2 Fichte’s refutation of the thing-in-itself in the two Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre (1797) • (1) Fichte’s Interpretation of Kant • In First Introduction to the WissenschaftslehreFichte criticized dogmatism as follows: • “The dogmatists were supposed to establish the transition from being to representing. They have not done this, nor can they, for their principle contains within itself only the ground of a being. It does not contain within itself the ground of what is directly opposed to being, viz. representing (Vorstellen).” (SWI, 437; IW, 22.) • (IW: J. G. Fichte, Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994.)

6. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • In Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre(1797), Fichte refuted dogmatism and the thing-in-itself by explaining his interpretation of Kant’s epistemology in detail. • According to ordinary interpretations, the manifold of intuition (Mannigfaltigkeit der Anschauung) was explained by things-in-themselves. A causal relationship between the manifold of intuition and the thing-in-itself can be hypothesized. However, as Kant claimed, the category of ‘causality’ would be valid only in the phenomenal world. Thus, we cannot suppose that the causal relationship holds between them. Therefore, Fichte interpreted Kant to be rejecting the assumption that things in themselves exist outside of phenomenal world.

7. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • Nevertheless, if we admit the existence of the thing-in-itself, we must suppose the thing-in-itself is a kind of cause that differs from causality as a category. In this case, the thing-in-itself would be understood as a ground of sensation and a ‘noumenon’. Fichte noted that if Kant talked about the thing-in-itself, he talked about it as a ‘noumenon’ (Cf. SWI, 482; IW. 67). • However,Fichtecriticizedthisinterpretation, because it led to a circular explanation: • “Accordingly, it [noumenon] is something that exists only for our thinking and is present only for us as thinking beings. But what additional use do these interpreters of Kant wish to make of this “noumenon” or “thing in itself”? The thought [Gedanke] of a thing in itself is based upon sensation; but then, in turn, they want sensation to be based upon the thought of a thing in itself. […] Their thing in itself, which is nothing more than a mere thought, is supposed to have an effect upon the I!”(SWII, 483; IW, 69.)

8. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • Fichte pointed out the circularity of explanation.But his objection is not correct. Indeed, other interpreters believed that the thing-in-itselfis a ground of a sensation, and they thought that sensation is based on the thing-in-itself. However, they did not think that a sensation is based on the thought of the thing-in-itself. If we distinguish the thing-in-itself from the thought of it, then the circularity will disappear. Thus, Fichte’s objection here is not correct, or at least not sufficient.

9. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • (2) Fichte’s negation of the thing-in-itself is not complete. • As is generally known, in his First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre (1797), Fichte said that “These two philosophical systems [idealism and dogmatism]are only ones possible. (Cf. SWI, 426; IW, 11.) • According to Fichte, the differences between these systems render it impossible for communication between them to occur, which is consistent with Thomas Kuhn’s views about the incommensurability of different paradigms. • “Neither of these two systems can directly refute the opposing one; for the dispute between them is a dispute concerning the first principle, i.e., concerning a principle that cannot be derived from any higher principle. “ (SWI, 430; IW, 15.)

10. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • In Second Introduction to the WissenschaftslehreFichte expressed a similar opinion : • “How […] could the Wissenschaftslehre communicate itself to a dogmatist, since it simply does not agree with him upon a single point concerning the material of cognition, and thus there exists no common ground from which they could jointly proceed?” (SWI, 509; IW, 94.) • “We do not wish to refute their system for them, because we are unable to do this. We certainly can refute their systemfor us, […] But we cannot refute it for them.” (SWI, 510; IW, 95.) • Fichte denied the existence of a thing in itself from the perspective of idealism. However, if idealism cannotcriticize dogmatismnot from the perspective of idealism but in principle, then the negation of thething-in-itself cannot be proved theoretically. Fichte should have said that the claim of the existence of thing-in-itself is possible.

11. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • 3Beyond indisputability between dogmatism and idealism • The indisputability (incommensurability) between idealism and dogmatism was asserted until at least 1804. Fichte gave three series of lectures on Wissenschaftslehre in 1804. In the second series, Fichte described the indisputability between idealism and realism again. • However Fichte did not argue that the indisputability between systemsleads us to the selection of one system over another rested merely on one’s interests as discussed in First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre,nor did he argue that one perspective can criticize another only for its own standpoint as in Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre. • He proposed here to fight against realism on the standpoint of realism by catching it in self-contradictions.

12. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • “We must therefore attend to realism, temporarily abstracting in every way from idealism; since[…] we cannot let realism be absolutely valid, but rather want to correct it, and since we cannot combat it from the perspective of idealism, we must fight against it on its own grounds: catch it in self-contradiction. Throughthis very contradiction,[…]realism’s empirical principle would become genetic, and in this genesis, perhaps it will become the principle of a higher realism and idealism [united] into one.”(GA II/8, 182; SW X, 182; SK, 97.) • (SK: J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowing J. G. Fichte’s 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, translated by W. E. Wright, State University of New York Press, 2005.) • What kind of contradiction arises here? Fichte tried to construct facts and representations based on ‘in-itself’’ (Ansich) from the perspective of realism. This construction should be made by in-itself, but it is actually made by a philosopher. Because this process began with a request, “Think an in-itself (An sich),” it depends on our consciousness. This consciousness cannot be yet constructed by in-itself at the beginning. Thus, this process can hold only from the perspective of idealism. Therefore this attempt to seek the possibility of realism ends in a self-contradiction.

13. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • “Think an in-itself (An sich)” it began, and this thinking, or consciousness was possible. And this possibility has shaped our entire investigation to date; thus we have supported ourselves on consciousness, […] Hence, our highest realism, i.e., the highest standpoint of our own speculation, is itself revealed here as an idealism” (GA224, SK, 113f.) • He explained why realism leads to a self-contradiction from a different point of view as follows. • “Why should it [realism] be given up? What was the true source of the error which we discovered in it? Being in-itself [was discovered] as a negation and a relational term.”(GA II/8, 224; SW X, 203; SK 114.) • We qualified in-itselfonly as ‘a Not-not in-itself’(Nicht-nichtansich) (GA II/8, 223.), viz. as a negation of a relationship to ‘a Not in-itself’. This relationship is predicated to the in-itself, therefore it is based on our thinking. If we remove all predicates from the in-itself,then only being in-itself remains. • As a result, the realism can claim only the being in-itself. • Fichte referred to such realism as ‘higher realism’(GA II/8, 182; SW X, 182; SK, 97.) or ‘highest realism’ (GA II/8, 224; SW X, 203; SK 113).

14. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • If we remove all predicates from the in-itself,then what remains? • “But something is still left over for us. I affirm this and instruct you to find it with me: being and existence […]”(GA II/8, 224; SW X, 203; SK 114.) • As a result, the realism can claim only the being. • Fichte referred to such realism as ‘higher realism’ (GA II/8, 182; SW X, 182; SK, 97.) or ‘highest realism’ (GA II/8, 224; SW X, 203; SK 113).

15. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • 4  Toward the critical idealism • （１）Beyond incompatibility of realism and idealism • Dogmatic realism =a claim that the self is an accident (i.e. a supervenient) deriving from the thing-in-itself, which thereby contradicts all kinds of idealism. • The highest realism = a claim that only the in-itself exists and nothing else exists, which does not claim that our representations or knowledge are caused by the in-itself. • Dogmatic idealism =a claim that the self (Ich)is a substance and that the not-self （Nicht-Ich) is not real apart from its representation, which thereby contradicts all kinds of realism. • The higher Idealism: If idealism claims that the self is the Tathandlung and the existence of the self consists of being conscious and the existence of knowledge is being known, then let us call it ‘higher idealism’. Such idealism is compatible with the highest realism. • Only the highest realism and the higher idealism are compatible.

16. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • (2) Two options. • When we accept the possibility of the highest realism, we are faced with two options: • Option 1: To accept both the highest realism and higher • idealism. • Option 2: To refute the highest realism and accept only higher • idealism. • Fichte selected option 1. • Why did he select option 1? Because he had tried to consider the possibility that critical idealism could overcome the contradiction between dogmatic realism and dogmatic idealism. • Why did Fichte try not only to defend idealism but also to overcome the contradiction between realism and idealism? Because the self or knowledge needs what limits the self or the knowledge. If there is no such limit, there can be no content to the self or knowledge.

17. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • (3) Knowledge needs necessary laws • In First Introduction to the WissenschaftslehreFichte distinguished ‘the transcendent idealism’ from ‘the transcendental idealism’. • The task of Wissenschaftslehre is to explain the representation accompanying the feeling of necessity, which it did so in terms of the necessary laws of the intellect. • “Transcendent idealism would be one that purports to derive determinate representations from the free and completely lawless acting of the intellect.”(SW I, 441; IW, 27.) • This is self-contradictory, because according to Fichte ‘the principle of sufficient reason’ cannot be applied to such intellect to explain the necessary representations. • ‘Transcendental idealism’ or ‘critical idealism’ is such that ‘presupposes the existence of such necessary laws of the intellect’. (Cf. ibid.)

18. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • Fichte distinguished two types oftranscendental idealism. • The one refers to the laws of intellect, such as the law of substantiality and the law of causality from experience. Thus, it cannot confirm whether the law one discovered is really the law of intellect. (According to Fichte this is J. S. Beck’s idealism.) • The other, ‘a complete transcendental idealism’(SW I, 445; IW, 30), derives the laws of intellect from the nature of intellect. It derives the law of substantiality and the law of causality from the fundamental law, which can be derived from still higher laws. • Fichte claimed that this idealism derives all laws from ‘a single basic law of reason.’ (SW I, 445; IW, 30.) • This law is the first fundamental principle in GGW. • But how can thisprinciple be given?

19. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • In the lecture The Facts of Consciousness（Die Tatsachendes Bewußtseins (1810), Fichte said that mere knowledge would dissolve in itself; therefore, knowledge must be knowledge of One Being or God. However, the knowledge of One Being does not appear as itself in actual knowledge. It appears separately in necessary forms. • “The knowledge is not a mere knowledge of itself which would dissolve in itself and pass out of existence, without any continuance and sustention, rather it is a knowledge of a Being, namely of the One Being which exists really, […]. This only one possible object of knowledge does not purely come into the actual knowledge, rather [it] always appears separately in the necessary forms whose necessity should be proved. The proof of the necessity of these forms is the philosophy or Wissenschaftslehre.”(TB1810, SW 685.)

20. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015 • 5 Conclusion • Dogmatism and the claim of thing-in-itself are combined. • So, as far as we accept the indisputability between dogmatism and idealism, we can not refute completely the thing-in-itself. • Fichte examined the possibility of realism from the realist point of view in 1804 and found its self-contradiction and the Being remained. We could say it a purified thing-in-itself. So called thing-in-itself is a predicated thing-in-itself e.g. as a cause of sensation, thereby it is only our thought or representation and should be rejected. • The highest realism can be compatible with higher idealism. • So the problem of thing-in-itself and the problem of Being are continuous problems. • Thank you!

21. IX. Kongress der International J. G. Fichte-Gesellschaft, Madrid, September2015