Beyond Reciprocal Altruism: Friends, Reputation and Punishment Evolutionary Psychology

1. Beyond Reciprocal Altruism: Friends, Reputation and Punishment Evolutionary Psychology Spring 2019 DrChapman

2. Psychology of Friendship • Friendship: • Humans form social ties to individuals who are neither kin nor mates • Friendships are not based only on reciprocation • Why do we help our friends? • Give a friend a ride to the grocery store • Friend benefits • No additional cost to you • You enjoy their company • Role of Limited Resources on Friendship • The Banker's Paradox • those who need help most are least likely to reciprocate: • is it the best utilization of resources? • would others benefit more in the long-run? • must be able to evaluate risk • evolutionary pressure for abandonment at worst time

3. Psychology of Friendship • A solution to the problem of the Bankers Paradox • Evolutionary pressure to become irreplaceable (Tooby and Cosmides 1996) • 1. Promote a reputation that highlights unique characteristics • 2. Recognize the attributes that others value but have difficulty getting from others • 3. Cultivate special skills that increases irreplaceability • 4. Affiliate with those who value your attributes but do not Possess them • 5. Avoid social groups that do not value your attributes • 6. Drive off rivals with similar attributes

4. Friend Selection • Fair-Weather Friends • Many friends when times are good • Are they "true" friends that can be relied upon when you really need help? • Limited Niches for “True” Friendship: limited number of possible friendships • 1. Number of slots already filled • 2. Evaluate who emits Positive Externalities: • Behaviors or Attributes which are of incidental value to you • 3. Friends who are good at reading your mind • 4. Friends who consider you irreplaceable • 5. Friends with common goals

5. Friend Selection • Friendship tends to be with similar people (Christakis 2014) • friends’ genotypes tend to be positively correlated similar to the level of fourth cousins • Friends may be a kind of “functional kin.” • Deep Engagement: role of emotions in "true" friendship • pleasure in the company of a "true" friend • pleasure not envy when they are successful • shared values and common views • want to help them without explicit expectations of reciprocation

6. Friendships: Costs and Benefits • Sex of friend • Same-sex friends (SSF) may become competitors; Intra-Sexual Rivalry • Opposite-sex friends (OSF) may increase opportunity for mating • Friends with benefits • Bleske and Buss (1997), Cost/Benefits of friendship: see Figures 9.3 and 9.4 • perceptions of how beneficial or costly certain items received from a friend • how often did they receive these benefits or costs • Hypothesis 1: Men > Women for S-T sexual access • Confirmed: 2X higher rating • Men report more unreciprocated attraction • Women report receiving more romantic attention which was not reciprocated • Men report being denied sex more often • Hypothesis 2: Women have an evolved preference for male friends who can offer Protection and Resources Confirmed: 3.06 vs. 1.68 • Hypothesis 3: Opposite-sex friendships serve to provide information concerning opposite sex Confirmed: • Quantity of Information: for men and women OSF (2.84) vs. SSF (1.86) • Quality of Information: for men and women OSF (4.15) vs. SSF (3.12) • Hypothesis 4: Same-sex friends will be perceived as intra-sexual rivals: • Rate of Competition: SSF 1.03 vs. OSF 0.14 • Potential Cost: SSF 2.12 vs. OSF 0.71

7. Friendships: Costs and Benefits • Benefits vs Functions of Friendship • Functions solve an adaptive problem • Benefits could be secondary to the adaptations • There are many benefits to friendship but what is the function of friendship? • How did the original relationships we call friendship evolve? • Another interesting example is romantic partners. Would you explain that type of relationship with reciprocal altruism?

8. Indirect Reciprocity Theory • Indirect because it is not from direct interaction with others • Helping behavior in public identifies you as generous and willing to cooperate • can be from direct observation by others • through word-of-mouth, such as gossip • this is part of your reputation • Those with a reputation for helping are more likely to be helped by others • see The Role of Reputations in the Evolution of Human Cooperation Karolina Sylwester (2010) • similar to costly-signaling theory, although costly signaling usually focuses on giving expensive gifts, donating large amounts to charity or hosting large parties (see below)

9. Costly-Signaling (MacAndrew, 2002) • Costly behavior that "honestly" signals one's quality as a coalition ally or potential mate • easily observable costly helping behavior that are reliable indicator of social status • provide some advantage for the signaler "altruist" • others are more likely to cooperate with you • increased levels of cooperation • higher status and reputation within the group • Common examples such as • large scale food sharing • philanthropic gifts • risky behavior such as rescuing someone from a burning building • figure 9.2

10. Costly-Signaling (MacAndrew, 2002) • Carnegie Hero Fund • Latest Carnegie Medal Awardees "The medal is given throughout the United States and Canada to those who risk their lives to an extraordinary degree while saving or attempting to save the lives of others." • "The candidate for an award must be a civilian who voluntarily risks his or her life to an extraordinary degree while saving or attempting to save the life of another person. The rescuer must have no full measure of responsibility for the safety of the victim." • Most of the these examples are not kin related examples of rescue. Why would individuals put themselves at risk to rescue unrelated people in need of help? • Because "Life is therefore not just a struggle for survival—it is also, one might say, a snuggle for survival." Nowak 2012

11. Multi-level selection theory (Bowles 2003 p. 434) • 1. within-group "individual level" selection • operates on individual differences within the species • adaptations help the individual survive and reproduce • because of competition between individuals within the same group • 2. between-group "group level" selection • adaptations that evolved for the benefit of the group • based on competition between individuals in different groups • selection for altruistic behaviors toward in-group members including nonkin • Source of in-group bias • "individual level" plus “group level" selection overlap to produce Multi-level selection • Adaptation that help an individual and also help the group

12. Multi-level selection theory (Bowles 2003 p. 434) • "Group level" selection • when two groups are in direct competition with each other • adaptations that benefit your group, i.e. helping others in your group • your group has high level of cooperation • your group can out compete groups with low level of cooperation • individuals in the highly cooperative group are more likely to survive and reproduce • genes for cooperation in the highly cooperative group will be passed on to the offspring • Problems: • how strong is selection for adaptations that improve group survival? • what conditions are required to make group selection useful? • Some level of intergroup competition “fighting”

13. Cooperative Coalitions • Cooperative coalitions are alliances of more then two individuals for the purpose of collective action • Examples: • Building shelter • Food sharing • Hunting groups • War party • Provides benefits through gain in trade • Group level selection: for traits that improve group cooperation • individuals will help other group members without reciprocation • benefit to the individual derived from success of the group • this is not "acting for the good of the species"

14. Cooperative Coalitions • Problems with cheating • Defection and Free-riding • If cheating is unchecked cooperative coalitions can not be maintained • "Altruistic Punishment" Use of punishment to keep cheating in check increases the level of cooperation • punishment will reduce the benefits of cheaters • cost of punishment: time, energy, resources involved in carrying out the punishment plus possible retribution • Related to a punitive sentiment, a willingness to punish • Figure 9.5 • motivates the use of punishment • strongest in those committed to the coalition

15. Cooperative Coalitions • Evolution of "altruistic punishment" • substantial cooperation can evolve, even among non-kin, in situations devoid of reputation or repeat interaction if cooperators also engage in the costly punishment of non-cooperative norm violators • members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to social norms • altruistic punishers obey the norms and punish the violators • even though as a result they receive lower payoffs than other group members • such as selfish individuals who violate the norm and do not punish • pure cooperators who adhere to the norm but free-ride by never punishing • see The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations(2003) by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis

16. Cooperative Coalitions • Evolution of "altruistic punishment" • Selection for punitive sentiment mechanisms • group level selection • cultural group selection • supported by cultural norms • "it is good to cooperate" • "cheaters should be punished" • directly benefits the punishers through enhanced reputation see Figure 9.5 • similar to costly signaling • altruistic punishers are seen as more trustworthy, group-focused, worthy of respect • Use of shunning or ostracizing which does not carry the same costs as using punishment • Role of emotional response such as guilt and shame

17. Costly Punishment Across Human Societies (Henrich, 2006) • Field experiments using the ultimatum and third party punishment games in 15 diverse societies • Evidence of cross-cultural human universals • Procedures • ultimatum game with two anonymous platers in a one-shot interaction • allotted a sum of real money the first player can offer a portion of this sum to a second player whom can accept or reject each of the possible offers • A form of costly punishment, termed second-party punishment • third party punishment • Same as ultimatum except a third person can punish player one • at a cost to the third person • A form of altruistic punishment • Use of costly punishment was common • a willingness to engage in costly punishment • However, variation in amount of punishment across cultures • Altruistic behavior (based on the dictator game) and costly punishment are positively correlated • Explained by gene-culture coevolution of human altruism

18. Evolution of strong reciprocity • see The Origins of Human Cooperation (Bowles and Gintis, 2003) • Prosocial Emotions and Strong Reciprocity • Prosocial emotions encourage people to engage in cooperative behaviors • Strong reciprocity: key individual behavioral traits that account for much of human cooperation • conditionally altruistic cooperator: predisposed to respond to cooperative behavior • conditionally altruistic punisher • responds to free-riding behavior • retaliating against the offenders at cost to themselves • cannot not reasonably expect future personal gains from such retaliation.

19. Evolution of strong reciprocity • Understanding cooperation and punishment in small-scale societies is crucial for explaining the origins of human cooperation (Sarah Mathew and Robert Boyd 2011) • when survival of the group is threatened by war, pestilence, or famine • For example: warfare among the Turkana, a prestate society in East Africa • maintain costly cooperation in combat through punishment of free-riders • More then a hundred warriors in the raiding parties many of whom are not kin • desertions occur because there is risk of death or injury • deserters are punished by community-imposed sanctions such as collective corporal punishment and fines • warfare benefits the Turkana population at the expense of smaller social groupings • Demonstrates that punishment is important in small-scale societies to enforce cooperation • suggests that cooperation at the larger scale of ethnolinguistic units enforced by third-party sanctions could have a deep evolutionary history in the human species

20. Role of culture in evolution of human social behavior • seeCulture and the evolution of human cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 2009) • modern humans have large cooperative societies • Requires special social cognitive and emotional mechanisms • emotional closeness such as empathy and social emotions of shame and guilt • cultural adaptation • social learning producing cumulative, cultural evolution • quickly evolve solutions to local environments • differences between local social groups • competition between groups • spread of behaviors that enhance their competitive ability cooperative social environments • natural selection within groups • favored genes that gave rise to new, more pro-social emotions and motives • Moral systems enforced by systems of sanctions and rewards