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Views of a global operator on dispute settlement processes. Gordon Moir, Vice President and Chief Counsel BT Global Services June 2005. British Telecommunications plc. BT Global Services about 30,000 people revenues about £ 10 billion half of all BT plc revenues
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Views of a global operator on dispute settlement processes Gordon Moir, Vice President and Chief Counsel BT Global Services June 2005
British Telecommunications plc • BT Global Services • about 30,000 people • revenues about £10 billion • half of all BT plc revenues • Presence in 134 countries worldwide • Recent contract wins take our service offering to more than 200 countries • Customers include the worlds biggest, including Reuters, Visa & Novartis
CONTENT OF PRESENTATION • Why Dispute Resolution matters • Investment and regulatory certainty • Models of dispute settlement and core principles of a successful regime
What matters to international operators? • Cost - in particular access costs and service levels • Bottleneck access elements key – can be almost 45-60% of cost of bid • Need is for cost oriented monopoly input elements AND effective non-discrimination principles • Dispute resolution is the key to ensure that above principle is applied
Scorecard Result NRA General Powers Dispute SettlementBody Access Regulation Key Access Products Speed of process Speed of process Cost models Voice Interconnect Transparency Transparency Account Separation Leased lines and PPC Sanctions Sanctions Availability of Information LLU Appeals Appeals Negotiating RO Wholesale DSL Independence Rights of Way
Investment flows to effective regimes – dispute resolution is key
Models of Dispute Settlement - Core Principles • Transparency • Speed • Clear and effective rights of recourse • Consistency • Certainty • Expertise • Focus on core bottlenecks but technology neutral • Turning to each of above…
Transparency • Need effective and speedy consultation process • Third party inputs key • Business secrets respected but not to detriment of process • Clear policy goals set out in advance – e.g. infrastructure investment v service level competition
Speed • Critical – investment dampening impact of delay • EC rules on interconnection disputes and mandated time frame welcome • National procedural rules on appeals must NOT render ineffective the process • Interim remedies – presumption on remaining in force unless material risk of error
Clear and Effective Rights of Recourse • Single body with clear powers and if more than one body, e.g. anti-trust and regulatory agency – strong co-operation – ideally similar legal base • Clear rules on when dispute will be deemed worthy of remedy by regulator – ensure one party cannot prevent reference
Consistency • Investment is driven on this key criteria • No material change in policy without material impact assessment • If more than one body or if mediation in place in individual disputes – mechanisms in place to determine conflicts
Certainty • Core principles are set out in advance • No movement from clear policy objective without material assessment of impact eg infrastructure v service • Ideally focus only on access bottlenecks and in technology neutral fashion • Look at bottlenecks through competition law eyes • Consumer policy objectives identified as such and total clarity on same
Expertise • Increasingly complex issues have to be determined by regulator • Discrimination, price squeeze, cost allocation methodology – need hugely skilled people • Mesh with consultation of interested parties and have effective regime
Mandatory Settlement • ADR mechanisms can be appropriate – however need clear and effective fall back • If pass disputes to alternative body, e.g. arbitrator, need to very clearly map distinctions from normal interconnection dispute process • Both parties must agree • Thresholds to alternative mechanisms clearly articulated and all principles above adhered to – including transparency and consistency
Pending Change in UK • Despite the effect of the UK regime and the scores for effectiveness • Further development of the regime in the UK • Access services division proposed • Ring fence the monopoly local network assets • Requirement that provided on “equivalent” terms to all comers • Much strengthened version of non-discrimination