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Kerberos Underworld. Ondrej Sevecek | MCM: Directory | MVP: Security ondrej@sevecek.com | www.sevecek.com . Kerberos Underworld. An Introduction. The topics. The hell of windows authentication mechanisms Basic, NTLM, Kerberos Certificates and smart cards or tokens
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Kerberos Underworld Ondrej Sevecek | MCM: Directory | MVP: Security ondrej@sevecek.com | www.sevecek.com
Kerberos Underworld An Introduction
The topics • The hell of windows authentication mechanisms • Basic, NTLM, Kerberos • Certificates and smart cards or tokens • How they work differently • What is better or worse • Weird and weirder things that you may not know
And the environment • Windows 2000 and newer • Active Directory domains • Maybe some trusts or multidomain forests • Connections to SMB, LDAP, Exchange, SQL, HTTP, WMI, remote administration, RDP and other servers
Kerberos Underworld Network Interactions
Local Logon Client 2000+ TGT: User Kerberos LDAP SMB TGS: LDAP, CIFS GPO List GPO Download DC2000+
CTRL-ALT-DEL Password • Password is stored in memory only • LSASS process • In the form of MD4 hash • never given out
Authentication Interactions in General App Traffic Client 2000+ Server2000+ In-band TGS: Server NTLM Occasional PAC Validation Kerberos SMB D/COM TGT: User NTLMPass-through TGS: Server D/COM Dynamic TCP DC2000+ DC2000+
The three authentication methods • Basic • plain-text password • results in Kerberos authentication • NTLM • hashed password (MD4) method from the past • LM (DES), NTLM (DES), NTLMv2 (MD5) • Kerberos • hashed password (MD4)plus RC4/DES or AES • mutual authentication and delegation • can use certificates instead of passwords
Basic and RDP Network Logon App Traffic Client 2000+ Server2000+ In-band clear text Kerberos TGT: User DC2000+ DC2000+
NTLM Network Logon App Traffic Client 2000+ Server2000+ In-band NTLM hash SMB D/COM Pass-through NTLM hash D/COM Dynamic TCP DC2000+ DC2000+
Kerberos Network Logon (basic principle) App Traffic Client 2000+ Server2000+ In-band TGS: Server Kerberos TGT: User TGS: Server DC2000+
Kerberos Network Logon (complete) App Traffic Client 2000+ Server2000+ In-band TGS: Server Kerberos SMB D/COM Occasional PAC Validation TGT: User TGS: Server D/COM Dynamic TCP DC2000+ DC2000+
Kerberos Underworld Performance Comparison
NTLM Network Logon Client 2000+ Server2000+ 60 % CPU 55 % CPU DC2000+ DC2000+
Kerberos Network Logon, no PAC Validation Client 2000+ Server2000+ 60 % CPU 0 % CPU DC2000+ DC2000+
Kerberos Network Logon with PAC Validation Client 2000+ Server2000+ 60 % CPU 14 % CPU 0 % CPU DC2000+ DC2000+
Basic Authentication Client 2000+ Server2000+ 5 % CPU 0 % CPU DC2000+ DC2000+
NTLM Performance Issues Client Client Server Client Client Client Client Client 7 concurrent 40 sec. DC
NTLM Trusts D\User A\Server DC A DC D DC C DC B
Kerberos Trusts D\User A\Server DC A DC D DC C DC B
Kerberos Underworld We Want Kerberos, so what?
Basic Facts • Do not use IP addresses • Configure SPN (service principal name) • Have time in sync • Use trusted identities to run services on Windows 2008 and newer • instead of AD user accounts • no PAC validation • Enable AES with Windows 2008 DFL
Kerberos Underworld Identity Isolation FOR Services
Identity Isolation • Services on a single machine • Services that access other back-end services
Kerberos Underworld Smart Card Logon
Smart Card Logon App Traffic Client 2000+ Server2000+ Kerberos PKINIT TGT: User TGS: Server DC2000+ DC2000+
Smart Card Logon and NTLM Client 2000+ Server2000+ NTLM Hash TGT: User NTLM Hash TGS: Server DC2000+ DC2000+
Smart Card Logon and NTLM Client 2000+ Server2000+ NTLM Hash TGT: User NTLM Hash TGS: Server NTLM Hash DC2000+ DC2000+
Kerberos Underworld Delegation
Basic Delegation Front-End Server Back-End Server Client Password TGT: User TGS: Back-End DC
Kerberos Delegation (Simplified) Front-End Server Back-End Server Client TGS: Front-End TGT: User TGS: Back-End TGS: Front-End DC DC
Protocol Transition Front-End Server Back-End Server Client Nothing Kamil TGS: Back-End DC
Kerberos Underworld Group Membership
Group Membership Limits • AD Group in forest with 2000 FFL • 5000 direct members limit • AD Group in forest with 2003+ FFL • unlimited membership • Kerberos Ticket • network transport • limited to 8 kB on 2000 and XP • up to 12 kB on 2003+ • HTTP.SYS header limits • 16 kB of Base-64 encoded tickets • Access Token • local representation of a logon • up to 1025 groups including local and system
Kerberos Underworld Takeaway
Takeaway • Kerberos is most secure, flexible and performance efficient • Don’t be afraid and play with them! Ondrej Sevecek | MCM: Directory | MVP: Security ondrej@sevecek.com | www.sevecek.com
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