Enhancing Proliferation Resistance of Nuclear Power Systems

1. FESSP Fission Energy and Systems Safety Program Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Introduction Technical Opportunities forIncreasing Proliferation Resistanceof Nuclear Power Systems Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons:Can We Have One Without the Other? Nuclear Control InstituteApril 9, 2001 J. A. Hassberger This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-Eng-48.

2. TOPS Special NERAC task force to: identify and recommend Near-term and Long-term technical opportunities to enhance the proliferation resistance of global civilian nuclear energy systems Cover from Barriers Annex Cover from TOPS Report

3. Tops Membership John J. Taylor, Chair, EPRI Robert N. Schock, Vice Chair, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory John F. Ahearne, Sigma Xi, Duke University Edward D. Arthur, Los Alamos National Laboratory Harold Bengelsdorf, Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC Matthew Bunn, Harvard University Thomas Cochran, Natural Resources Defense Council Michael Golay, Massachusetts Institute of Technology David Hill, Argonne National Laboratory Kazuaki Matsui, Institute of Applied Energy, Japan Jean Louis Nigon, COGEMA, France Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Stanford University Per Peterson, University of California, Berkeley Mark Strauch, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Masao Suzuki, JNC, Japan James Tape, Los Alamos National Laboratory

4. TOPS - An Inclusive Process CGRS Workshop: • Issues • Technology roles • Needs • Status • Challenges TOPS Workshops: • Broad involvement • International participation Cover from CGSR Workshop report Cover from TOPS Workshop

5. TOPS Consensus: • Potential and Need: There are a number of promising areas of R&D that can be, and should be, pursued that are likely to enhance proliferation resistance. • Broader Context: Proliferation resistance is only one of the important components of complete nuclear power systems that are in need of further research and development; others are steps that will advance economy, safety and waste disposal. • Importance of Other Opportunities: Reduce the risk of theft of weapons-useable materials Strengthen the international safeguards systems Strengthen efforts to control the export of technologies

6. Important R&D Objectives • Systematic evaluation of nonproliferation implications • Exploration and Development of: • Increase effectiveness and efficiency of institutional measures • Make weapons-useable material highly inaccessible • Reduce the weapons attractiveness of nuclear materials • Reduce the quantities of directly weapons-usable material • Limit the spread of weapons-useable knowledge and skills • Evaluate a range of technical options and fuel cycles to meet these objectives • International participation • Must maintain safety, economic and environmental performance

7. Recommended R&D Program Areas • Development of improved methodologies for assessing proliferation resistance • Development and adaptation of technologies to further strengthen the application of extrinsic barriers • Exploration and further pursuit of the development of new technologies to enhance the intrinsic barriers against proliferation

8. Civilian FuelCycle Barriers Covert Activities Threats Materials Expertise Weapons Barriers Barriers to Proliferation Material qualities Technical impediments Institutional arrangements that impede exploitation of the nuclear fuel cycle to weapons development activities • Materials are key to the development of nuclear weapons • Civil technologies can support materials procurement, processing and utilization • Historically, civilian nuclear power has not been the path of choice

9. Barriers are Intrinsic or Extrinsic • Intrinsic barriers: • Inherent to the fuel cycle. • Material barriers: Depend on the intrinsic physical qualities of the materials. • Technical barriers: inherent to technical and related elements of a fuel cycle, its facilities and equipment. • Extrinsic barriers (Institutional barriers): • Imposed on the fuel cycle. • Compensate for weaknesses in the intrinsic barriers. • Depend on implementation details.

10. Material Barriers* • Isotopic • attractiveness of a material for weapons • Chemical • difficulty of processing a source material to a weapons-useable form • Radiological Barrier • complexity in handling &/or processing imposed by radiological hazards • Detectability • extent to which a material is intrinsically detectable • Mass and Bulk • difficulty associated with obtaining sufficient material Utilization Procurement *Material barriers based substantially on NAS work for Pu disposition

11. ???? Covert Activities Technical Barriers • Facility Attractiveness • weapons development applicability • Facility Accessibility • access to materials and technology • Available Mass • enough for an attractive target? • Diversion Detectability • intrinsic features that support detection and accountability • Skills, Expertise and Knowledge • extent that knowledge directly supports weapons developed • Time • balance between time materials or technologies are at risk to time required to obtain or exploit

12. Extrinsic (Institutional) Barriers Those extrinsic barriers that technological innovation can impact • Safeguards • monitoring, detection, and deterrence of facility misuse and/or of material diversion or theft • Access Control & Security • administrative control, physical protection and effective backup Other institutional arrangements will continue to play major roles in deterring proliferation

13. Three R&D Time Frames • Near-Term (5 years) • Develop and improve assessment methodologies • Pursue technology to enhance the extrinsic barriers • Assess effectiveness of technical improvements to the intrinsic barriers • Intermediate Term (15 years) • Develop technologies to improve the intrinsic barriers • Focus on improving existing systems and those approaching deployability • Long Term (beyond 15 years) • Develop new fuel cycles and technologies that address PR and other issues from a more fundamental approach

14. Near-Term Opportunities* Focus on Improving the Extrinsic Barriers • Implementation of improved information technologies • integration of sensors and data systems • expert systems for data analysis • real-time surveillance • Development of enhanced material tagging and monitoring • Improved wide-area monitoring • remote surveillance * a brief sample of TOPS recommended R&D thrusts

15. Intermediate, Long-Term Opportunities* Focus on Enhancing Intrinsic Barriers • Light Water Reactors • Extending burnup to reduce Pu quantity and quality • Thorium cycles to further reduce Pu quantity and quality • High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors • Feature low fissile loadings, very high burnup and low Pu production • Fast Reactors • Recycle-in-place systems that eliminate reprocessing • Ultra long-life fuels • Small Reactor Systems • Fueled-for-life cores, eliminating all on-site fuel handling • Advanced Recycle Systems • Recycle systems eliminating separable weapons-useable materials for both closed and transmuted fuel cycles * a brief sample of TOPS recommended R&D thrusts

16. Principal Conclusions: • There are promising technology opportunities for enhancing proliferation resistance. • Early evaluation of the wide range of proposed fuel cycles and options is critical to developing an R&D plan that is both affordable and realizable. • Proliferation resistance enhancements can only be accomplished if economic, safety and environmental objectives are also achieved. • Credible R&D must be done to establish the potential value of the various options.