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CONFERENCE ON RFID SECURITY-07. A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme. Divyan M. Konidala, Zeen Kim, Kwangjo Kim {divyan, zeenkim, kkj}@icu.ac.kr. International Research Center for Information Security. Introduction - EPCglobal. EPCglobal Inc™
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CONFERENCE ON RFID SECURITY-07 A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme Divyan M. Konidala, Zeen Kim, Kwangjo Kim {divyan, zeenkim, kkj}@icu.ac.kr International Research Center for Information Security
Introduction - EPCglobal • EPCglobal Inc™ • Industry-driven standards • RFID in supply chain management • We consider • EPCglobal Architecture Framework • EPCglobal Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID Protocol A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Contents • Introduction • RFID-based supply chain management system • EPCglobal Architecture Framework • Security Threats and Requirements • Security Assessment of Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID Protocol • Proposed Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme • Scheme • Analysis • Conclusion and Future Work A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
EPCglobal Architecture Framework EPC-IS A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Introduction - Tag’s 4 Memory Blocks • **We Focus on RESERVED memory Block** • RESERVED memory Block has…. • Access Password (APwd) • Kill Password (KPwd) A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Introduction - RESERVED Memory Block • Manufacturer of the product stores APwd and KPwd in the Reserved Memory Bank • Reserved Memory Bank is R/W LOCKED, • Cannot be Read • Cannot be Re-Written A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Security Threats and Requirements • Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication • Malicious RFID Readers • Snoop, corrupt, manipulate • Cloned Fake RFID Tags • Counterfeit products • Man-in-the-Middle Attack • Eavesdrop and impersonate • Tamperproof Tags • RFID Tag Snatching A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
One-Way Reader to Tag Authentication Proposed by EPCglobal • Proposed by EPCglobal Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID Protocol • Not Secure • Un-encrypted openly sent random numbers used as pads to cover-code tag’s APwd • Tag’s Access Password easily exposed to disgruntled employee managing hand-held reader A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Security Weakness – EPCglobal Schheme – Exposed APwd Manufacturer Malicious, Compromised Reader Disgruntled Employee APwd Reader APwd Apwd (Exposed) Tag Only one-way Reader-to-Tag Authentication Unauthorized Access Fake Cloned Tags A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Goals • Tag-Reader mutual authentication • simple, light-weight, practically secure (supply chain) • A better cover-code or obscure tag APwd • Secure distribution of obscured tags' APwd to stakeholder's RFID readers • The manufacturer: implicitly keep track on the whereabouts of its products. • Our scheme adheres to EPCglobal standards A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Goals • NO cryptographic (hash) functions/keys within the tag • NO tag - reader synchronization security keys/hash values. • We improve scheme proposed by EPCglobal to accommodate tag-reader mutual authentication. • Our scheme utilizes tag's already existing, • 16-bit random number generator, • XOR function, • Access & Kill Passwords. A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Proposed Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme • Emphasis on Tag’s Access & Kill Password • Manufacturer of the product is involved in the mutual authentication process • Scenario: • A pallet has reached the distributor • Distributor’s reader query tag on pallet • Reader and Tag must authenticate each other • Reader does not know tag’s Apwd • Reader contact manufacturer and follow this procedure A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Proposed Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Pad Generation Function: PadGen(.) [1/3] A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Pad Generation Function: PadGen(.) [2/3] Random Numbers from Tag and Manufacturer A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Pad Generation Function: PadGen(.) [3/3] A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Tag’s Logical Memory & Access Password Map A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Security Analysis [1/4] • Possible Attacks • APwd & KPwd are only 32-bits • Brute-force attack or ciphertext-only attack • Practically Secure • An enclosure (warehouse) that is sealed from external noise and radio signals from malicious readers. • RFID supply chain processing environment • Extremely fast paced • Not feasible to continuously eavesdrop on one particular tag-reader communication channel • Several bulks of items pass through several readers with in a very short interval of time. A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Security Analysis [2/4] • Reader Impersonation Attack: • Reader to authenticate first to tag • A malicious reader • Does not posses both the APwd and KPwd • cannot access manufacturer (EPC-IS) due to lack credentials. • Cloned Fake Tags and Tag Impersonation Attack: • Tag to authenticate to the manufacturer. • A malicious tag or a cloned fake tag • Do not posses both the APwd and KPwd, • Manufacturer must detect and terminate the communication, • if a tag emulator using the same or weak random numbers • if tag is not moving through the supply chain processing A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Security Analysis [3/4] • Tag's Access Password Never Exposed: • Does not use random numbers sent in an un-encrypted form as pads • Generated pads are known only to tag and manufacturer • Secure against Insider Attacks: • Does not deliver the tag's APwd to any of the stakeholder's reader. • The reader relays only the cover-coded APwd • RFID “system level check", • A compromised reader is continuously trying to interrogate only one particular tag A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Security Analysis [4/4] • Secure against Replay Attacks: • We use two random numbers each, generated by both the tag and the manufacturer. • As unique random numbers generate unique pads • Password Scalability: • We adhered to the 32-bit passwords • Our scheme can still be applicable, and more strengthened, when the length of the APwd and KPwd is extended A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Implementation Analysis [1/2] • Overhead Analysis • Secure channel between tag and manufacturer • PKI-based certificate, encryption and signature schemes – may be expensive • Reader communicate with manufacturer to authenticate every tag • To reduce this overhead, • The manufacturer can setup a secure server at every stakeholder's supply chain processing facility • Only, the manufacturer can remotely access, monitor, and manage this server and also update the server with tags' Access & Kill passwords • We can also assume that the manufacturer's EPC-IS is a highly resource rich entity, which is designed to take heavy computational and storage load. • Secure channel with only Keyed-Message Authentication Code (MAC) A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Implementation Analysis [2/2] • Light-Weight Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication: • Our scheme does not use any special cryptographic functions. • Tag already has capability • XOR operations, • Generate random numbers, • Temporarily store random numbers • Fetch the APwd and KPwd • Our scheme just needs an additional • Five 16-bit temporary storage memory slots • four random numbers from the manufacturer and one for PadGen(.) function. • Class-1 Gen-2 tags can have a 512-bit memory capacity or more (depending on the manufacturer) A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Conclusion • Our scheme • Not fully secure • Simple, cost-effective, light-weight to be implemented on tag • Practically secure, • Highly suitable to the RFID-based supply chain processing scenario • Adhere to EPCglobal standard • Our scheme provides considerable challenges to thwart • Cloned fake tags • Malicious readers • Disgruntled employees or compromised readers • Tag’s APwd leakage • Man-in-the-middle attacks A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
Thank you! Q&A International Research Center for Information Security