Safely Delivering the Department of Energy’s Vision for the East Tennessee Technology Park Mission

1. Safely Delivering the Department of Energy’s Vision for the East Tennessee Technology Park Mission Dynamic Radiological Inventory Control at the Tank W-1A Remediation Project Presented by: Gary Coleman Jr., M.S., Nuclear Safety Engineer Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) Safety Analysis Workshop May 4-10, 2012, Santa Fe, New Mexico WM-2012-0026

2. Dynamic Radiological Inventory Control at the Tank W-1A Remediation Project • Presented by Gary Coleman Jr. M.S., Staff Augmentation Nuclear Safety Engineering support to UCOR Oak Ridge via Energy Solutions • Co-Authored by Jerry Gnoose, M.S., Staff Augmentation Waste Coordinator support to UCOR Oak Ridge via Energy Solutions • Special Thanks to Jimmy Massey, UCOR Project Manager for the Tank W-1 A Remediation Project, and Karen Balo, UCOR Deployed Nuclear Safety Manager for the Tank W-1A Remediation Project

3. Background information on Tank W-1A • Tank W-1A is located within the main campus of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) • Tank W-1A was installed in the 1950’s, and removed from service in 1986 • While in service, Tank W-1A collected wastes from several high radiation analytical facilities at ORNL

4. Background information on Tank W-1A • During it’s operation, transfer lines to the tank leaked causing soil and groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the tank • Remediation has been completed, and included removal of contaminated soil, the tank, and the concrete saddles and pad that supported the tank

5. The Tank W-1 A Location

6. The Tank W-1 A Facility

7. Methodology • Due to the close proximity of the project to other working facilities and personnel, there is a need for strict inventory control at the facility footprint • The Tank W-1A Detailed Inventory Spreadsheet (TWDIS) was constructed to control and track dynamic inventory of Tank W-1A boxes of soil and waste staged within the Tank W-1A footprint

8. Methodology • ALARA concerns for workers on the site - footprint limited the number of filled containers to 24 • A maximum of 6 boxes that had not been through confirmatory NDA were allowed to be on site

9. Methodology • The initial condition (IC) for inventory control was derived from the ALARA Design Plan, which formed the Specific Administrative Control (SAC) for inventory control • Because of the high radiation levels from the soil, it was necessary to limit the number of containers on site to prevent unacceptable exposure at the project site boundary • The Material at Risk (MAR) with the worst case 24 boxes were calculated to support the values used in the Safety Basis Hazard Evaluation (HE)

10. Facility Footprint Processing Plan

11. B-25 Boxes Being Filled Inside the Enclosure

12. Remote Camera View: ALARA at Work

13. B-25 Box Non-destructive Assay Station Onsite

14. B-25 Box Non-destructive Assay Station Onsite

15. Radiological Inventory Juggling

16. The Tank W-1A Detailed Inventory Spreadsheet • The TWDIS Spreadsheet was developed as an aid to control and track the inventory of processed boxes within the project boundary • The spreadsheet was developed and controlled in accordance with company Information Technology (IT) requirements for level 2 “Safety Significant Software” • The spreadsheet was accessed by the Waste Coordinator and two back-up designees. Others were given “Read-Only” access as needed

17. The Tank W-1A Detailed Inventory Spreadsheet

18. The Tank W-1A Detailed Inventory Spreadsheet

19. The Tank W-1A Detailed Inventory Spreadsheet • The TWDIS Spreadsheet contains warning notes for the user when the container count exceeds 80 % of the DSA limit • The user has advanced warning to prevent inadvertent exceedance of the respective DSA limit • There were several other warning parameters loaded into the spreadsheet, to manage inventories inside the Weather Enclosure, and outside on the facility footprint

20. The Tank Being Removed Inside the Enclosure

21. Results • Excavation operations began in September of 2011 and concluded in April of 2012 • 316 B-25 boxes were filled, surveyed, characterized, and shipped off-site • There were no inventory control violations, as the operations crew worked very closely with the Waste Coordinator to communicate container movements in accordance with the DSA SAC’s

22. B-25 Boxes Being Loaded for Shipment

23. Conclusion • The TWDIS Spreadsheet is a cost-effective yet rigorous method for protecting the assumptions listed in the project DSA, and flowed into the operating procedures • A search of the DOE Lessons Learned system revealed several examples of radiological inventory control violations that were related to lack of vigorous controls with regards to inventory movement and control • Operations in Category 2 Nuclear Facilities should be held to the highest standards with regards to Conduct of Operations

24. Conclusion • The TWDIS spreadsheet is just one small example of the rigor needed to safely and effectively conclude clean-up operations at a Category 2 Nuclear Facility

25. References • BJC/OR-3420 Removal Action for Tank W-1A at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Project and Facility ALARA Design Review Checklist, Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, May 2010 • DSA-OR-TW1A-0051 Rev.7, Documented Safety Analysis for the Tank W-1A (Corehole 8) Removal Action, URS/CH2M Oak Ridge (UCOR), February 2012

26. Thank you for your attention! • Any Questions? • I can be contacted at : gary.coleman@ettp.doe.gov