1 / 18

Political Economy Constraints in implementing Competition Regimes

Political Economy Constraints in implementing Competition Regimes. Experience from Mauritius Mosadeq Sahebdin. Understanding the present trade environment.

donkor
Download Presentation

Political Economy Constraints in implementing Competition Regimes

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Political Economy Constraints in implementing Competition Regimes Experience from Mauritius Mosadeq Sahebdin.

  2. Understanding the present trade environment. 1. In spite of Government’s rhetoric on the need for a Competition law, we do not have a Competition Act yet. The law adopted by Parliament in 2003 has been set aside, for reasons of paternity.

  3. Anti-competitive practices flourish • The iron bars market is the most vivid example, where Desbro International, making an abuse of its dominant position to press for a price increase, effected a lock out for several days, interrupted supply, and took the construction industry as hostage. No legal action was taken against the lock-out. • After Government’s decision to offer an increase in prices, it was the turn for Consolidated Steel, another supplier, to threaten to close down. • This week Desbro International has laid down all its workers, while its assets will be bought by Murray and Roberts, a South African company associated with local partners..

  4. Lock out by the cement distributors • 3. The two main importers and distributors, Lafarge and Holcim connived to put a stop to the supply of cement on the market. They were also pressing for a price increase. • They also clearly made the most out of the absence of competition legislation. The situation came back to normal a few weeks ago, after the State Trading Corporation failed lamentably in its attempt to break the cartel, losing some Rs 110 million in the process

  5. Dominance on the milk powder market Fonterra Mtius Limited, which occupied more than 80% of the market abused of its dominant position to dictate excessive prices for milk powder. After Government’s intervention to impose a maximum mark up, prices stabilized for some time. The STC’s lack of experience in marketing and consumers’ strong brand loyalty put an end to what is now called the Amul Saga.

  6. Unfair dealing by departmental stores Huge departmental stores are making an abuse of their capacity to sell below cost price to push the retail shops out of the market. Exclusive dealing, predative pricing, unfair trading practices such as misleading advertisements are some of the characteristics of this market.

  7. Lack of political will and private sector influence • Lack of political will and private sector influence are the main cause for the considerable delay in the implementation of Competition legislation. • As far back as 2001, the Government announced its decision to adopt a Competition law. Government took two years to present the law in Parliament. • The loose definition of a monopoly situation, in the Competition Act 2003, for example, seems to have been suggested by the business community to render the law ineffective.

  8. Change in political power • The second major event that affected the implementation of the Competition Act 2003 was the change in political power in July 2005. • The new Government alliance, now in power, made it known that they would come up with a new Competition legislation. • Observers affirm that the main cause for the setting aside of the 2003 Act was to gain paternity of the law.

  9. Government meanders • In February 2006, the minister of Commerce announced, during the second 7 Up 3 NRG meeting, that the law would come soon. • In March, a new bill was circulated. The provisions of this bill raised a unanimous outcry from the private sector and ICP. • A Commonwealth Secretariat expertise was called in to draft the bill. • A few months later, another expert, attached to the Prime Minister’s office, was called in to revise the recommendations of the Commonwealth experts. • After that, the new recommendations were sent back to the Commonwealth consultants for a new revision.

  10. Utility Regulatory Authority Act delayed • The Utility Regulatory Authority Act 2004, supposed to regulate the water, electricity and wastewater sectors, has never been implemented. • It seems Government wants to come with a new law, which will hence enable them to claim paternity over it.

  11. Dissociation of Consumer protection from Competition policy • Government’s decision to pull the Consumer Protection portfolio away from the ministry of Commerce has led to a dispersion of responsibility, against consumers’ interest. • However, Government seems to have undermined the convergence between the objectives of consumer protection policy and competition policy.

  12. Lack of commitment This dispersion of responsibility has, in turn, led to a lack of commitment on the part of the Consumer Protection Unit, which, while being accountable to the Ministry for Women’s Rights, seems to receive instructions from the Ministry of Commerce.

  13. Political party funding • It is interesting to look into political party funding. • It is a cause for concern that the proximity of the private sector with political parties may influence Government’s policies and, consequently, affect the Competition Authority.

  14. Independence of sector regulators • Independent sectoral regulatory agencies are autonomous public bodies empowered to regulate specific industries. • Independence means that the regulatory agency is protected from undue influences, particularly from short term political interference. Independence from the political establishment is primarily meant as a commitment to provide for a stable regulatory framework over time. • In Mauritius, regulators seem to have been set up to facilitate private sector investment in what used to be Government utilities.

  15. Powers of the Minister • Proposals for Competition legislation have given to the Minister such powers as having to be apprised, by the Competition Authority, before any investigation is initiated. • This provision for political interference in the affairs of the Competition Authority is a matter of concern.

  16. Appointment of political cronies • We should bring to light the fact that the ruling party does not find it unethical to appoint its political cronies at the head of sector regulatory bodies. • As examples, I would to focus on the Director and the Chairman of the Independent Broadcasting Authority, the Chairman of the Information Communications and Technologies Authority and the Executive Chairman of the Financial Services Commission.

  17. Why has the URA been set aside? • This explains why the Utility Regulatory Authority Act 2004 has never been implemented. • Because it is the only legislation that provides for disqualification in case of adherence to a political party. • In fact, the URA Act states in • Section 8 Paragraph (8) Notwithstanding anything contrary to this Act, a person shall not be appointed as Chairperson or Commissioner if- • he is actively involved in politics.

  18. Conclusion • Government is committed to the implementation of a Competition Law. • Mauritius has a long way to go in the elaboration of an effective Competition Policy and the enhancement of Competition Culture. • Government should favour the active participation of consumer organizations in this process.

More Related