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El Gamal and Diffie Hellman

ElGamal Cryptosystem In Practice Diffie-Hellman. El Gamal and Diffie Hellman. CSCI284, 162 Spring 2008 GWU. The ElGamal Cryptosystem is based on the Discrete Log problem:. Given a multiplicative group G, an element  G such that o() = n, and an element  <>

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El Gamal and Diffie Hellman

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  1. ElGamal Cryptosystem • In Practice • Diffie-Hellman El Gamal and Diffie Hellman CSCI284, 162 Spring 2008 GWU

  2. The ElGamal Cryptosystem is based on the Discrete Log problem: • Given a multiplicative group G, an element  G such that o() = n, and an element  <> • Find the unique integer x, 0  x  n-1 such that  = x x denoted as log • Not known to be doable in polynomial time, however exponentiation is. Hence DL is a possible one-way function CS284-162/Spring08/GWU/Vora/Discrete Log

  3. El Gamal Cryptosystem Let p a prime such that DL in Zp* is infeasible Let  Zp* be a primitive element P = Zp*C = Zp* X Zp* and K = {(p, , a, ): =a (mod p)} public key = (p, , ) and private key = a For a secret random number k Zp-1 eK(x, k) = (y1, y2) y1 = k mod p y1 = xk mod p dK (y1, y2) = y2( y1a)-1 mod p CS284-162/Spring08/GWU/Vora/Discrete Log

  4. Example • p = 2579 •  = 2 • a = 1391 • Encrypt message: 2079 CS284-162/Spring08/GWU/Vora/Discrete Log

  5. Practicalities • More efficient attacks possible unless elliptic curve DL, for which these efficient attacks are not known. • Modulus required for security: • 2160 with elliptic curves • 21880 without • DL over elliptic curves very hot problem. CS284-162/Spring08/GWU/Vora/Discrete Log

  6. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange • Protocol for exchanging secret key over public channel. • Select global parameters p, n and . p is prime and  is of order n in Zp*. These parameters are public and known to all. CS284-162/Spring08/GWU/Vora/Discrete Log

  7. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange contd. • Alice privately selects random b and sends to Bob b mod p. • Bob privately selects random c and sends to Alice c mod p. • Alice and Bob privately compute bc mod p which is their shared secret. • An observer Oscar can compute bc if he knows either c or b or can solve the discrete log problem. • This is a key agreement protocol. CS284-162/Spring08/GWU/Vora/Discrete Log

  8. Diffie-Hellman problem • Given a multiplicative group G, an element G of order n and two elements ,   <> • Computational Diffie-Hellman: • Find  such that log   log   log (mod n) • Equivalently, given b, and c find bc • Decision Diffie-Hellman • Given an additional   <> • Determine if log   log   log (mod n) • Equivalently, given b, c, and d determine if d  bc (mod n) CS284-162/Spring08/GWU/Vora/Discrete Log

  9. An attack Diffie-Hellman key exchange is susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack. • Mallory captures b and c in transmission and replaces with own b’ and c’. • Essentially runs two Diffie-Hellman’s. One with Alice and one with Bob. CS284-162/Spring08/GWU/Vora/Discrete Log

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