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Revision of NSS No. 11 - Security of Radioactive Sources

Technical Meeting on Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography: Session on Safety-Security Interface. Revision of NSS No. 11 - Security of Radioactive Sources. Christina George Division of Nuclear Security. Safety-Security Interface.

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Revision of NSS No. 11 - Security of Radioactive Sources

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  1. Technical Meeting on Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography: Session on Safety-Security Interface Revision of NSS No. 11 - Security of Radioactive Sources Christina GeorgeDivision of Nuclear Security

  2. Safety-Security Interface • Safety-security interface is particularly relevant in applications involving users of portable or mobile sources • Industrial radiography is an application where the authorized person typically bears responsibility for safety and security • Knowledge of safety standards and security recommendations/guidance is extremely important

  3. IAEA Guidance for Regulations • IAEA Security of Radioactive Sources Implementing Guide (Nuclear Security Series No. 11) provides guidance to States on developing regulations for the security of radioactive sources • This recommended approach is summarized in the following slides

  4. Three Step Process in NSS No. 11 • Establish graded security levels with corresponding Goals and Objectives for each security level • Specify the security level applicable to given sources • Select and implement a regulatory approach: prescriptive, performance-based, or combined

  5. Step 1: Establish Graded Security Levels • NSS No. 11 recommends the following security levels and associated Goals: • Security Level A: prevent unauthorized removal of a source (timely detection and response) • Security Level B: minimize the likelihood of unauthorized removal of a source (immediate detection of the unauthorized removal, but not requiring a response to interrupt the act) • Security Level C: reduce the likelihood of unauthorized removal of a source

  6. Step 1: Establish Graded Security Levels • NSS No. 11 further recommends establishing a set of Security Objectives • For each of the security functions: Detection, Delay, Response, and Security Management • For each Security Level A, B, and C • These Objectives state the desired outcome from the combination of measures applied to meet the objective • For example, the Delay Objective for Security Level A is: provide delay after detection sufficient to enable response personnel to interrupt the unauthorized removal • The complete set of recommended Security Objectives for each security level is in Table 2 of NSS No. 11

  7. NSS No. 11, Table 2 Security LevelsGoals Objectives for meeting each goal with respect to • Detection • Delay • Response • Security Management

  8. Step 2: Specify the Security Level Applicable to Given Sources • The security level for a given source should correspond to the potential harm the source could cause if used in a malicious act • A starting point is the categorization system used in the Code of Conduct from RS-G-1.9 • The Guide notes that as a default arrangement, the regulatory body could use these categories to assign the security level applicable to a given source, as set forth in Table 5 of NSS No. 11

  9. NSS No. 11, Table 5

  10. Step 2: Specify the Security Level Applicable to Given Sources • NSS No. 11 further recommends that the regulatory body pay special attention to the following factors when assigning security levels to radioactive sources: • Attractiveness (e.g., chemical and physical form, nature of radioactive emissions, ease of handling, collocation, perceived economic value) • Sources in temporary storage • Vulnerability and threat level • Mobile, portable, and remote sources • These considerations could lead to adjustment of the assignment of sources to security levels in Table 5

  11. Step 3: Select and Implement a Regulatory Approach • NSS No. 11 explains that there are three alternative approaches for directing operators how to demonstrate they meet the Security Objectives • Prescriptive approach • Performance-based approach • Combined approach

  12. Step 3: Select and Implement a Regulatory Approach: Prescriptive Approach • Regulatory body establishes specific required security measures for each security level • NSS No. 11 provides recommendations for such required measures using a prescriptive approach in Tables 6, 7, and 8 • Provides simplicity in implementation for both the regulatory body and operator • Limited flexibility to address actual, non-standard situations

  13. NSS No. 11, Table 6, 1 of 2

  14. NSS No. 11, Table 6, 2 of 2

  15. Step 3: Select and Implement a Regulatory Approach: Performance-Based Approach • Regulatory body establishes a required level of security system performance against the threat for each security level (such as the recommended goals in NSS No. 11) • Operator designs a security system that provides that level of performance defined by the regulatory body • Allows each operator to address their own circumstances • Potentially more cost-effective for the operator than the prescriptive approach • Requires both regulatory body and operator to have relatively high levels of security expertise

  16. Step 3: Select and Implement a Regulatory Approach: Combined Approach • Includes elements drawn from both prescriptive and performance based approaches • Allows regulatory body greatest flexibility • For example, the regulatory body might apply performance-based approaches for higher activity sources and a prescriptive approach for lower activity sources

  17. Illustrative Security Measures Security Regulations

  18. Revision of NSS 11 • Priority for 2014 –Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage and of Associated Facilities • In May 2013, the NSGC took the decision that the Secretariat should “develop a DPP for the review and revision of NSS 11. The new DPP should extend the scope to all radioactive material…” • Intended to be the single implementing guide for RAM in use and storage, and to provide more practical guidance on implementation of NSS 11 • Consistent with guidance development for nuclear material and nuclear facilities

  19. Revision of NSS 11 – Where are we? 1. Document Structure • Developed using the structure of NSS 14 • Section 1 – Background, Purpose, Scope, Structure • Section 2 – Objectives of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime • Section 3 – Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime • Elaborates on State, Regulatory Body and Operator functions, security concepts and functions, but at a high level • Section 4 – Detailed guidance on recommendations, keeping to the structure of NSS 14 with the contents of NSS 11 plus new guidance • New Section 5 – To contain the details of the prescriptive regulatory approach • Appendices being reviewed for content, to be bolstered or removed

  20. Revision of NSS 11 – Where are we? 2. Document Contents • Elaboration on elements of a State’s nuclear security regime; • Incorporation of guidance from various cross-cutting guides including IG for NSS 13, Sustaining a NS Regime; • Guidance on the DBT or “Alternative Threat Statement” process and output in Section 3, followed by detailed guidance on how to use the results of the DBT/ATS in Section 4; • More explanatory guidance and examples of application of D-values and categorization to all radioactive material Emphasis on adjustment of security levels and resulting security measures based on considerations such as sources in storage, vulnerability and threat level; mobility/portability and remote sources with examples

  21. Revision of NSS 11 – Where are we? 2. Document Contents (cont’d) • More detailed guidance from draft guide on security management and security to be included, with contents of a security plan in appendix • Input on computer security in the context of radioactive material and associated facilities – high level guidance, plus security measures as part of regulatory requirements?

  22. Revision of NSS 11 – Where are we? 3. Document Development • CM1 – Feb 2014 – Agreement on scope issues; assignment analyses, chapters/sections to working groups or individuals • Sub-working group meeting on security-based categorization – March 2014 • CM2 – April 2014 – Presentation of WG findings and agreement on way forward, detailed review of draft to date; group work on document structure; identification of topics to be developed • Home-based assignments May-July; update to NSGC in June • CM3 –25-29 Aug 2014 to review consolidated draft

  23. Revision of NSS 11 – Where are we going? Document Development (cont’d) • Sep-Oct 2014 – Secretariat review of first draft • Nov 2014 – First draft for circulation • Q1-2015 – TM to obtain feedback from Member States on draft • Q1-2015 - Disposition of all MS comments; submission to Coordination Committee • Q2 - 2015 - Consideration of draft by the NSGC for approval to proceed to 120 day Member State review Publication process to follow!

  24. Transport Security • NSS No. 11 provides guidance only for security of radioactive sources in use and storage • Regulations for security of sources in transport can be based guidance on NSS No.9

  25. In Summary • NSS No. 11 recommends a three-step process for developing a regulatory framework • The assignment of security levels for radioactive material should be adjusted depending on specific considerations Particular attention should be paid to portable and mobile sources given the increased likelihood of loss or theft. • Revision of NSS 11 is intended to provide more detailed guidance and examples for users on how to implement the three-step process

  26. Thank you ! c.george@iaea.orgor ext. 26633 For more information, see: https://nusec.iaea.org/portal/UserGroups/RadioactiveMaterial/tabid/922/Default.aspx Questions?

  27. Nuclear Security Recommendations NSS No. 14 Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities • Defines the main elements of a States security regime; • Provides broad security recommendations for the State, for facilities, for transport: Security Regulations

  28. Security System A security system is the integration of people, procedures, and equipment for the protection of radioactive sources against theft, sabotage, or other malicious acts. Security Regulations

  29. Security Objective: Prevent Theft and Sabotage • Deter the adversary • Implement a security system which adversaries perceive as too difficult to defeat • Problem: deterrence is impossible to measure • Defeat the adversary with security system • Functions required: detection, delay, response • Actions of response force prevent adversary from accomplishing his goal Security Regulations

  30. Graded Approach • The graded approach ensures that the highest consequence sources receive the greatest degree of physical protection • Graded approach is based on: • Evaluation of threat • Relative attractiveness • Nature of the source • Potential consequences of malicious acts Security Regulations

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