Non-UN initiatives within the UN climate deliberations

1. Antto Vihma Non-UN initiatives within the UN climate deliberations

2. ‘global climate governance is made up of an increasing number of international institutional arrangements which differ in their legal character, public-private constituencies, spatial scope and subject matter’

3. The non-UN soft law in climate governance • G8+5 Dialogue, Major Economies Meeting, other high-level political processes • Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (APP), and other partnerships working on implementation

4. Some common characteristics • - not legally binding • avoid timetables and concrete targets • limited amount of participating countries • emphasize the strengthening of the role of private actors through partnerships • consider climate change in the context of other concerns • focus on technological development • many of them are initiated by the US

5. From UN-ity to diversity? • “It is premature to conclude that the availability of a soft steering approach is causing environmental backlash […]” (Van Asselt 2007) • “[…] while Kyoto is not ‘the only game in town, it is premature to say that climate partnerships have lead to a weakening of UN climate diplomacy.” (Bäckstrand 2006) • “Partnership [AP6] may change the utility calculations of actors when they consider whether to participate in targets-and-timetables approach of Kyoto.” (McGee & Taplin 2006)

6. Empty rhetorics? • soft initiatives lack credibility • soft initiatives lack input legitimacy (transparency etc.) • soft initiatives are a US conspiracy

7. Innovative governance? • soft law is way out of the deadlocked UN • soft law is a complement to the implementation of the UNFCCC • soft law is a way to get developing countries on board • soft law is a flexible learning tool

8. Research question • How do the potential institutional overlaps emerge in practise? • Are the non-UN processes discussed in the deliberations of and discourses within the UN negotiations during chosen meetings? • Assumption: if there is overlap/tension, it should feature in the statements of the practioneres (negotiators and stakeholders)

9. Method and data • Three empirical cases • Vienna Intersessional Climate Talks • UNGA High-Level Meeting in NY • Conference of Parties (COP13) in Bali • Participatory observing and notes from Vienna and Bali, deliberations from NY, webcasts and document archives, interviews (10)

10. Positions • US, Japan, Canada, Australia show explicit preference to soft non-UN processes (they contribute to UN) • EU is polite but critical beyond surface (they should serve UN) • G77 prefers the UN but participates in other fora as well (they should serve UN) • NGOs are fiercely critical (they are attempts to sabotage UN)

11. Analysis of the argumentation • The pro-non-UN countries: soft law processes contribute to UN • Possible underlying driver: differentiation between countries, meaning the North vs. South framing in the UN • NGO critisism to soft law: effectiveness and transparency • The G77 position is somewhat schizophrenic

12. Analysis of the argumentation • Two clear and potentially significant overlaps • Setting the mid- and long-term global targets in MEM or in UN • especially US vs EU in Bali • Governance of the multilateral funding • funds created in MEM and G8 -> World Bank • funding of the ’new and enhanced’ finacial mechanism of UN?

13. Conclusion • APP and partnerships were largely absent, but Major Economies Meeting (and G8) was an important topic of discussion, and two overlaps emerged • Argumentation relied on producing specific results and feeding them back to UN process -> legitimizing the non-UN via UN • Effect on post-2012 is still to be seen

14. Concluding remarks • Manuscript in process in International Environmental Agreements • First / second article of the thesis, scetching the empiric starting point • Next episodes • India study • Media study

15. Thank you! • antto.vihma@tse.fi