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Symmetric Key Management. CSIS 5857: Encoding and Encryption. Key Management Problems. Symmetric Key Management How can Alice tell Bob a symmetric key value without Darth finding out? Public Key Management How does Bob know where a public key comes from?. “Here is my public key K PU – Alice”.
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Symmetric Key Management CSIS 5857: Encoding and Encryption
Key Management Problems • Symmetric Key ManagementHow can Alice tell Bob a symmetric key value without Darth finding out? • Public Key ManagementHow does Bob know where a public key comes from? “Here is my public key KPU– Alice” Secure data encrypted with what Bob thinks is Alice’s public key
Trusted Third Party Approach • “Trusted third party” • Known to all users (senders and recipients) • Verifies identities of users • Manages keys for users • Symmetric key management:Key Distribution Center • Public key management:Certificate Authority
Key Distribution Center • Each member has different secret shared key known only to themselves and KDC
Simple KDC Protocol Background: • Alice wants to have confidential communication with Bob • For complete security, want to create one-time session keyKAB • Alice and Bob known to KDC • Alice and KDC share symmetric key KA • Bob and KDC share symmetric key KB
Simple KDC Protocol • Alice sends request to KDC • Contains sender ID (Alice), desired recipient ID (Bob) • KDC creates new session key for Alice and Bob • KDC creates ticket for session • Readable only by Bob since encrypted with KB • Contains session key, ID of sender and recipient
Simple KDC Protocol • KDC sends message to Alice • Encrypted with Alice’s key KAso only Alice can read • Contains session key KAB • Contains ticket (which only Bob can read) • Alice decrypts message to get: • Session key KAB • Encrypted ticket
Simple KDC Protocol • Alice sends encrypted ticket to Bob • Bob decrypts ticket to get: • Identity of sender • Confidential session key KAB • Alice and Bob now both knowKAB • Transmitted securely to both using KA and KB
Needham-Schroeder Protocol • Prevents replay attacks where adversary captures ticket and resends later • Challenge-response protocol to prove sender knows session key • Bob sends nonce RB to Alice, encrypted with session key • Alice decrypts with session key, subtracts 1, re-encrypts with session key, and sends back • Bob decrypts to verify Alice was able to decrypt and compute RB-1