Outline

1. Debating “Political Statistics”Walter Radermacher, Marie Bohata and Klaus Reeh, EurostatRichard Alldritt and Richard LauxUK Statistics Authority

2. Outline • Setting the stage Why a debate about “political statistics” and why now • Walter Radermacher • Key questions around “political statistics” What is the context, what is meant by “political statistics”, what are the consequences and how best to cope with them • Klaus Reeh Why “political statistics” might be a helpful concept • Marie Bohata The part that Ministers play in the production of official statistics – some views from the UK • Richard Alldritt and Richard Laux, UK Statistics Authority • Discussion 2

3. Why a debate about “political statistics” and why now • European policy conduct and statistical indicators: an ever closer link • if statistical indicators are used for political purposes they become political themselves • a lesson learned in course of 20 years of policy usage, but not acknowledged or taken into account • official statisticians are not very much at ease with the consequences • they are becoming increasingly worried as the credibility of their statistical work seems to suffer and so their professional authority • A debate might help to reduce the vulnerability of European statisticians and of the ESS as a whole. 3

4. What is the context • European governance has changed and continues to change a lot • not any more just “la méthode communautaire” but also more intergovernmentalism and quite many mixed forms • This led and will continue to lead to a change in the role of European statistics • not any more just general background or administrative information service but a political service with various functions • agenda relief, eligibility, compliance, target setting, monitoring,... • a multitude of political processes and general political communication draw heavily upon European statistics • Statistics that are used for policy purposes become political themselves 4

5. An attempt to define “political statistics” • Lots of EU decisions are strongly influenced or even driven by indicators derived from European statistics: • contribution to the EU-budget, qualification for EU-funds, EU membership, EU Treaty compliance, … • indicators based on European statistics that (pre-) determine political decisions should be considered as being part of “political statistics” • mainly comparable, adequately adjusted Member States components, only occasionally respective EU aggregates • political does not mean partisan or shaped by interests • What makes them really political: (pre-)determination • If these indicators pre-empt to a high degree the political decision, as political bodies have bound themselves before

6. Some examples Gross National Income for calculating the contributions of Member States to the EU budget regional GDP per capita in PPS for determining the eligibility of regions for structural funds EDP statistics for monitoring (pre-determining) the Treaty compliance of Member States … HICP targeting as performance indicator for monetary policy conducted by the ECB or component for a “traffic light” competitiveness classification of Member States employment rate, R&D investment or greenhouse gas emissions as performance indicator as laid down in the New European Strategy for Jobs and Growth … 6

7. Some consequences • more attention by the EU decision making bodies • before in preparatory meetings, during Council meetings and afterwards in the public debate • more attention by the media • mostly under a national(-istic) angle • more attention by all sorts of advocacy groups and lobbies • mostly under a topical angle • European statistics and in particular the policy indicators are much more under public scrutiny • first the accuracy of numerical results, then comparability and ultimately even methodology • credibility of results and authority of institutions threatened 7

8. How do we cope with it • we determine the production process of European statistics under subsidiarity and proportionality constraints • data collection, statistics compilation, indicator calculation • we provide a multifunctional body of European statistics accessible to everybody • fit not just for one purpose, but of general use for all sorts of users: media, science, professions, ... • serving as a basis for calculating additional (political) statistical indicators through methods agreed upon with (or laid down by) the political bodies concerned • we are embedded in a by now quite complex statistics governance system that allows us to see ourselves as being non-political and independent supported 8

9. Are we successful • by and large ok • Eurostat authority (and authority of ESS as a whole) has grown (intra- and extra-EU) among official statisticians and among a variety of users (professional, scientific, ...) • but recurring problems with the political indicator service with some of them developing into fully fledged crises • initially on methods, then on independence and now on data quality and data manipulation • with the danger of contaminating our general service through • a loss of credibility of our results • a loss of authority of our institutions 9

10. Could we do better • we could (almost always) manage in the past • quality drive, Code, new legislation, new governance, ... • but always driven by events and dealt with internally as a technical matter: Eurostat-, ESS-, Commission-, EU-internal • therefore political transaction costs around our political indicators have increased considerably • substantial resources are absorbed at all levels: Eurostat, Commission, Council, ECB, media, ... • therefore we should become much more pro-active and less technical, but how? • by publicly slaughtering some sacred cows and debating our statistical indicator service as widely and publicly as possible 10

11. We should question our self-understanding • Are we really as non-political as we seem to believe? Can we insist on doing just a technical or scientific job? And not at all a political job? • we select, we remember, we conceptualise, we assume and impute, we focus attention, we shape perceptions, ... • Isn't it in the end better to identify our political role? And give explicitly legitimacy to what we are doing? • the more autonomous we are the more we have to justify what we are doing (why and how) • We would be much better prepared for future challenges that will inevitably come 11

12. We should discuss the epistemological limits and the political logic of our statistics • Are our statistics as conclusive as they are usually seen and wanted by us to be seen? • Do they really have the discriminatory power? • eligibility, compliance • Do they really have the numerical accuracy? • change versus level, observation versus estimation • Do we provide a sufficiently pluralistic framework? • Is our framework responsive? (pensée unique) • Is our framework participative? (inclusive or exclusive) • Is our framework unbiased? (convention, tradition, macro) • The risk of overburdening the statistical system and of misusing statistical results would be reduced 12

13. We should discuss organisational pre-conditions for a robust provision of “political statistics” • Does “statistics quality management” guarantee that our statistics are automatically fit for all (political) purposes? • Do statistical processes really have to be uniform and independent of the usage of their results? • Is it possible to kill two (or more) birds with one stone? • Is it helpful to distinguish general purpose statistics from statistics for administrative or even political purposes? • should notifications be treated like any other statistics? • Should the results of “political indicators” be subjected to a specific “approval or legitimisation process”? • We might be less vulnerable if try to achieve a broad consensus with and among all our (political) stakeholders 13

14. Why “political statistics” might be a helpful concept (I) • We like to maintain an universal approach to official European statistics • all statistics are treated in the same way • all respondents and users are treated equitably the European Code of Practice is amongst others meant to assure this • But should each and every statistical indicator really be treated in the same way? • Should usage have an influence on processes used for defining, compiling, controlling or disseminating such indicators? 14

15. Why “political statistics” … (II) • Shouldn’t we be much more aware of the complexity of our political role? • providing general European statistics for evidence based policy making in its entirety subject to the Code of Practice • providing experimental statistics (considered to be potentially relevant for evidence based policy making) not necessarily in full compliance with the Code of Practice • providing indicators for specific political purposes (recognised as adequate for the intended purpose) not in compliance with all impartiality criteria of the Code of Practice 15

16. Why “political statistics” … (III) • Shouldn’t we • accept specific features in the development, compilation and dissemination of experimental statistics and political indicators? • an absolute transparency, a somewhat limited complexity • acknowledge differences between our statistical services. • political indicators cannot be subject of a cost-efficiency procedure as they are imposed by political authorities and their definition often given as well by authorities • be aware that impartial dissemination is not an aim in itself. • it has to be in the public and not in individual interest • acknowledge that there is a need for a robust consensus on concepts and a mechanism for consensus building. 16

17. Why “political statistics” … (IV) • The concept of “political statistics” should allow us to • strengthen credibility, provide transparency and seemingly paradoxically enhance integrity (see pillars of integrity); • devote special attention to politically highly sensitive indicators with operational functions without compromising the body of our general statistics; • protect the body of our general statistics from any political contamination; • reach out to partners either concerned or supportive or both (central bankers in the past, auditors perhaps in the future) • assure an adequate resource endowment at both national and European level 17

18. Conclusion • The independence of statisticians is not an end in itself, it has to serve a purpose • such as contributing to a convergence of perceptions and facilitating provision of objective statistical information • Statisticians should not sit in their numerical ivory tower • instead they have to be in touch and open to a debate on what they do and how they are doing it. • Statisticians should not confuse their statistics with reality • as statistics are nothing but an image or conceptualisation of reality 18