Le droit et la politique de concurrence face à la crise économique et financière: Le cas des pays de l’Afrique sub-saha

1. Le droit et la politique de concurrence face à la crise économique et financière: Le cas des pays de l’Afrique sub-saharienne Frederic Jenny Professeur d’Economie, ESSEC Juge, Cour de cassation, France Président du Comité de la concurrence de l’OCDE Conference on Strengthening Constitutencies for Effective Competition Regimes in Selected West African countries Interim Review Meeting 29-30 Juillet 2009 Banjul, Gambie

2. Pre-crisis growth of developing countries As a group, the developing economies had entered the decade (that began in 2000) in much better shape (macroeconomically and otherwise) than had been the case during the previous two decades, for example with lower inflation and more sustainable fiscal situations. These conditions would likely have predisposed the developing world to more rapid growth, and also better equip developing countries to deal with exogenous shocks in the current crisis. Between 2002 and 2007, the developing world found its growth stoked further by increased export revenues and higher commodity prices, a surge in foreign direct investment, and increased remittances from abroad. Justin Yifu Lin , The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries Chief Economist, The World Bank, Africa ,Seoul October 31, 2008

3. Pre-crisis growth of developing countries Exports increased as a share of developing countries’ GDP from 29 percent in 2000 to 39 percent in 2007. Also, the flow of foreign direct investment to developing countries soared, as investors sought higher returns than they could earn domestically in a period of low yields in mature economies. In 2007 alone, net private capital flows to developing countries increased by $269 billion, to a record $1 trillion. Remittances from workers in foreign countries also increased sharply, to a total of about $240 billion in 2007. (…) These transfers were a particularly important source of finance for some labor-abundant, resource-poor countries. Justin Yifu Lin The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank, Seoul October 31, 2008

4. The direct and indirect effects of the financial and economic crisis on developing countries As the financial sector in low-income countries is less integrated into global financial markets, the direct effect on it will be significant only in countries with a high foreign bank presence. The largely indirect impact in other countries will be felt through secondary transmission channels: slower investments, reduced remittances, reduced tourism receipts, reduced availability of credit, such as trade finance, falling terms of trade, contraction of private-sector activity and slower export growth. Justin Yifu Lin The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank, Seoul October 31, 2008

5. The direct effects of the financial and economic crisis on sub-saharan African countries Stock market volatility has increased since the onset of the crisis and wealth losses have been observed in the major stock exchanges. In Egypt and Nigeria, stock market indexes declined by about 67 percent between March 2008 and March 2009. Significant losses have also been observed in Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia and Botswana. There is growing evidence that it has a negative effect on bank balance sheets and that non-performing loans in the banking sector are likely to increase. In Ghana, the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans increased from 7.9 per cent to 8.7 per cent between 2006 and the third quarter of 2008. In Lesotho, it increased from 2 per cent to 3.5 per cent over the same period (IMF 2009). 1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5 June 2009

6. The direct effects of the financial and economic crisis on sub-saharan African countries Most African banks do not have any significant exposure to the sub-prime mortgage market and asset-backed securities. They are, however, vulnerable to contagion effects arising from the high rate of foreign ownership of banks in several countries in the region. To the extent that foreign-owned banks reduce their support of local banks or sell their assets, it will have serious negative consequences for the financial sector in Africa. The countries that are highly susceptible to contagion from this source include Botswana, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho and Zambia. In these countries foreign ownership of banks is quite high. 1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5 June 2009

7. The direct effects of the financial and economic crisis on sub-saharan African countries The financial crisis has also increased the risk premiums that African countries have to pay in international capital markets. There is evidence that several countries in the region have difficulty obtaining funds from international capital markets. For example, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda have cancelled plans to raise funds in these markets. The drying-up of this source of external finance is a serious setback for development in the region because the money raised would have been used to finance infrastructure development and boost growth. The private sector is also facing challenges in raising funds in international capital markets. 1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5 June 2009

8. The indirect effects of the crisis on sub-saharan African countries:Exports One effect will be a substantial reduction in their exports.(…) The IMF recently projected growth in world trade volumes of just 4.1 percent in 2009, down from 9.3 percent as recently as 2006; in the recent World Bank projections, the deceleration is much more rapid and could in fact lead trade volumes to fall in 2009. Example Visitor arrivals (and revenues) to Kenya fell 30% over the first 9 months of 2008. Justin Yifu Lin The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank, Seoul October 31, 2008

9. The indirect effects of the crisis on sub-saharan African countries:Exports There has been a significant decline in the prices of key commodities exported by African countries since the second half of 2008. (…) There has been a downward trend in prices of these commodity groups since the second half of 2008. The most affected commodity has been crude oil, which experienced price declines of more than 50 per cent between February 2008 and February 2009. The prices of copper, coffee,cotton and sugar also declined by more than 20 per cent over the same period. Examples: In Cote d’Ivoire earnings are expected to decline from US$ 10.4 billion in 2008 to US$ 7.7 billion in 2009. Zambia has been affected with the price of copper falling by 40% since July 2009.

10. The indirect effects of the crisis on sub-saharan African countries: Investment All of the main external sources of funds for investment are likely to drop off sharply in the first round of effects. Portfolio investment will fall, as greater risk aversion keeps capital closer to home. While FDI is historically more resilient to shocks, it too is expected to decline. In addition, developing countries that are able to gain access to capital will pay higher interest rates, because of the flight to safety and greater risk aversion of lenders. And as labor markets slacken, foreign workers are likely to suffer disproportionate impacts on their earnings, which will reduce remittances. Justin Yifu Lin The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank, Seoul October 31, 2008

11. The indirect effects of the crisis on developing countries: Investment The World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies foresees a 15% drop in FDI 20091. Examples: FDI to Turkey has already fallen 40% over the last year and FDI to India dropped by 40% in the first six months of 2008. FDI to China was $6.6 billion in September 2008, 20% down from the monthly average in year 2008 so far, and mining investments in South Africa and Zambia have been put on hold.

12. The indirect effect of the crisis on sub-saharan African countries: Remittances Remittances were estimated to amount to US$ 251 billion worldwide in 2007, twice the amount of international aid. If remittances via informal channels are added, the number is 50% greater, according to the World Bank. The World Bank predicts that the financial crisis will reduce remittance inflows to sub-Saharan Africa by US$ 1 to 2 billion in 2009 compared to 2008. Liberia, Lesotho, the Gambia, are highly vulnerable because remittance inflows represent more than 10% of their GDP. Remittances to Kenya (which also depend on the US economy) have been hit hard, with the Central Bank estimating a 38% year-to-year drop in August 2008.

13. The indirect effects of the crisis on developing countries: Overall appraisal Our latest research based on current updates and forecasts as well as on evidence of what happened in previous slowdowns and in the absence of policy responses, suggests that net financial flows to developing countries may fall by as much as $300 billion over a two year period, equivalent to a 25% drop. The World Bank forecasts a drop of around $4-500 billion over the next two years. Some countries, including successful African countries, are more vulnerable than others. 1)Dirk Willeem te Velde Effects of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries and Emerging Markets, ODI, Dec 8 2008

14. The indirect effects of the crisis on sub-saharan African countries: Overall appraisal Given the heterogeneity of African countries, the crisis is certainly going to affect some countries much more than others. For example, the decline in economic growth expected in 2009 will be more severe in Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea and the Sudan, which are expected to lose more than 4 percentage points in growth. In Egypt, Kenya, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, growth is expected to decline by between 2 and 3 percentage points in 2009. 1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5 June 2009

15. The indirect effect of the crisis on developing countries: Country studies The Overseas Development Institute monitoring study: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Indonesia, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia. −Increased tightening of credit conditions for bank lending in Cambodia, Ghana and Zambia. - Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been affected less, but this varies from one country to another. − Export values are falling. − Growth predictions have had to be revised significantly in all ten countries. − There are significant job losses. Ex: Zambia lost 8,100 (25%) of its 30,000 mining jobs in 2008.

16. Macroeconomic responses to the crisis in a sample of African Countries Oil-exporting countries in the region have more fiscal space to conduct counter-cyclical policies because they accumulated huge foreign reserves during the recent oil price hikes. In non-oil economies, however, the ability to adopt counter-cyclical policies is severely limited and so the use of fiscal stimulus measures is not widespread in these economies. Measures include interest rate reductions, recapitalization of financial institutions, increasing liquidityto banks and firms, fiscal stimulus packages, trade policy changes. Some countries have set up task forces or committees to monitor the financial crisis and advise the Government how to respond : Rwanda, Kenya, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5 June 2009

17. Are fiscal stimulus program an adequate response to the crisis for African Countries ? High dependence on export of a few commodities, small domestic markets to rely on, a large informal economy, high propensity to import, low tax base, lack of safety nets - all these African specific characteristics suggest that expansionary fiscal plans similar to those being applied in other regions are unlikely to be effective in Africa Fiscal stimulus can work more effectively and quickly through commodity exporting sectors that have large multipliers effects, whenever they exist.

18. Responses to the crisis in African Countries: Fiscal stimulus packages Fiscal stimulus packages, with a view to cushioning the effects of the crisis and boosting growth, have been adopted in Cape Verde, Egypt, Gabon, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa and Tunisia. In most of these packages, infrastructure development has been emphasized. The South African stimulus plan, announced in February 2009, is quite broad and has four aspects: a $69.4 million three-year public investment programme; expansion of public sector employment opportunities; increase in social spending; and assistance to the private sector. The stimulus plan adopted by Morocco includes measures to improve access to credit, tax incentives, vocational training for workers, and reducing red tape and corruption. 1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5 June 2009

19. Adequate responses to the crisis for African Countries Investments in infrastructure and reforms that improve the investment climate will be effective in improving economic growth in the medium term and set the stage for a more rewarding and rapid recovery. If the global recession continues, governments will have to introduce policies to protect vulnerable groups from likely increases in prices of food and fuel due to exchange rate depreciation. What kind of Fiscal Stimulus for Africa ? Joege Saba Arbache, Office of the Chief Economist Africa Region, The World Bank, March 31st 2009

20. Responses to the crisis in African Countries: Trade measures African exports have been impaired by protectionist responses to the financial and economic crisis abroad. But it does not seem that African countries have engaged in large scale protectionist trade policies themselves ( although they may have engaged in such policies on some occasions ).

21. Trade responses to the crisis and their impact on sub-saharan African countries Export subsidy Ex: the Minister of Commerce and Industry of India announced that the exports of leather and textile goods would be given incentives of $US 87 million starting in April 2009. Affected trading partners : Botswana, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia Source : Global Trade Alert

22. Trade responses to the crisis and their impact on sub-saharan African countries Surcharges on Imports Ex: In early 2009, Ukraine notified the WTO of its intention to introduce a temporary (six month) surcharge to improve its balance of payments. Specific reference was made in the notification to the financial crisis as the motivating factor. Affected trading partners: Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda. Source : Global Trade Alert

23. Trade responses to the crisis and their impact on sub-saharan African countries Tariff measures On 28 May 2009 The Zambian government increased the import duty on finished petroleum products from 5 to 25%. Deputy minister for Energy and Water Develoment, Lameck Chibombamilimo, said the move was aimed at saving two local firms from collapse. Affected countries : Zimbabwe, Tanzania

24. Trade responses to the crisis and their impact on sub-saharan countries • Strategic use of public procurement • The Framework for South Africa’s Response to the International Economic crisis includes measures such as : • increase of tariffs; • use of administrative measures to minimize imports; • use of preference price system and preferential margin for domestic firms in government procurement • Source : Global Trade Alert9 April 2009

25. Competition issues raised by the crisis in sub-saharan African countries • Changes in the competitive environment due to the crisis • - decrease in demand • - decrease international trade (i.e., both in export opportunities and in potential competition) • - failing firms (i.e., increase in market concentration) • - scarcity of available funds for investment (decrease in potential competition) • 2) Possible threats to competition due to policy responses • - protectionnist policies • - discriminatory fiscal stimulus packages • - strategic use of public procurement ( risk for competition and corruption) • - temptation to establish price controls • 3) Growing importance of pro-poor policies (emphasis on redistribution)

26. Conséquences pour les autorités de concurrence: hiérarchiser les priorités La situation de crise économique et financière est susceptible de réduire les ressources des autorités de concurrence dans les pays ou l’autorité de concurrence est financée sur fonds publics en raison de la diminution des recettes de l’impôt en période de récession économique. Les autorités de concurrence vont devoir, plus que par le passé, hiérarchiser leurs priorités et définir leur politique de saisine pour allouer leurs ressources déclinantes au mieux de leurs objectifs. A cet égard il est nécessaire qu’elles prennent en compte la défense des segments les plus vulnérables de la population, particulièrement touchées par la crise économique (par exemple, la distribution alimentaire, les transports, les services locaux, la distribution des engrais etc…)

27. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: set priorities The situation of economic and financial crisis is liable to diminish the resources of competition agencies. This implies that the competition authorities will, more than in the past, have to order their priorities and define their referral policy in order to allocate their declining resources to best meet their objectives But competition authorities must also keep in mind that the economic and financial crisis will require paying particular attention to the poorest segments of society. Thus competition authorities must be particularly open to cases which are of great importance for the poor (such as food distribution, transportation, water and local services, distribution of fertilizers etc…)

28. Conséquence pour les autorités de concurrence:Participer au débat sur la régulation Les autorités de concurrence peuvent et doivent jouer un rôle utile, en coopération avec l’exécutif ou les autorités sectorielles, dans le débat sur les nouvelles formes de régulation de façon à s’assurer que celles-ci ne comportent pas de restrictions à la concurrence non strictement nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs économiques ou non économiques qui les justifient et pour favoriser un environnement favorable à l’investissement.

29. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: advocacy They can and should play a useful role, in cooperation with the executive branch and the sectoral authorities, in discussing new types of regulations, to ensure that they do not contain restrictions on competition that are not strictly necessary for attaining the economic or non-economic objectives that justify these regulations. They should also play a role in advocating measures which will improve the investment climate.

30. Conséquence pour les autorités de concurrence: participer au débat sur les plans d’aide Les autorités de concurrence peuvent et doivent également participer à la mise au point des plans d’aide ou de sauvetage des entreprises ou des secteurs en difficulté pour veiller à ce que ces plans ne créent pas des distorsions de concurrence sur les marchés qui en facilitant des situations de rente réduiraient l’efficacité globale des entreprises et rendraient problématique le redémarrage de l’économie réelle.

31. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: advocacy Competition authorities can and should play a useful role, in cooperation with the executive branch and the sector authorities, in participating in the formulation of assistance or rescue plans for struggling firms or sectors to ensure that these plans do not create distortions of competition in the markets which, by facilitating rent-seeking, would reduce the firms’ overall efficiency and complicate efforts to get the real economy moving again.

32. Conséquence pour les autorités de concurrence: préserver l’intégrité des marchés publics Les autorités de concurrence peuvent et doivent constituer un rempart contre l’utilisation stratégique et anticoncurrentielle des procédures de marchés publics. Ceci est d’autant plus important que, comme nous l’avons vu, les plans d’aide et de sauvetage comprennent fréquemment un plan de développement des infrastructures. De la même façon, les autorités de concurrence devraient s’allier, lorsque celà est possible, avec les organismes anti-corruption dans la mesure où les pratiques anti-concurrentielles sur les marchés publics accompagnent fréquemment des pratiques de corruption (voir à ce sujet l’expérience de l’Indonésie).

33. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: advocacy Competition authorities can and should be a bulwark against uses of public procurements to foster protectionism or to severely distort competition. This is particularly important since, as seen before, stimulus packages will often have an important component aimed at the development of infrastructures. Equally, they could and should join forces whenever possible with anti-corruption bodies since anti-competitive practices on procurement markets often go hand in hand with corruption (see the interesting example of Indonesia).

34. Ce que les autorités de concurrence peuvent et devraient faire en période de crise: prévenir la montée du protectionnisme Enfin les autorités de concurrence peuvent et doivent constituer un rempart contre la montée des mesures protectionnistes (dont nous avons vu qu’elles peuvent être tentantes pour les gouvernements des pays d’Afrique sub-saharienne).

35. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: advocacy Competition authorities can and should be a bulwark against the temptation to use protectionist trade measures which could distort of competition. This is important as we have seenthat African countries may occasionally be tempted to use protectionist trade policies.

36. La capacité institutionnelle de promouvoir la concurrence en Afrique Sub-saharienne • Mais encore faut-il que les cadres institutionnels dans lesquels elles opèrent leur permettent d’intervenir au bon endroit, au bon moment et avec la force de conviction nécessaire. • Les pays d’Afrique Sub-saharienne ont de ce point de vue deux atouts: • En premier lieu il y a dans beaucoup de pays une direction de la concurrence rattachée au Ministère du Commerce ou au Ministère de l’Economie. Cette direction est l’interlocuteur privilégié des autres ministères pour la défense de la concurrence. • Dans certains pays, par exemple dans le cadre de l’UEMOA, l’autorité qui met en oeuvre le droit de la concurrence dispose de pouvoirs pour sanctionner les aides d’Etat anticoncurrentielles. Ces moyens peuvent être utilisés pour contrôler les plans d’aide ou de sauvetage des entreprises.

37. The institutional capacity to promote competition in sub-saharan Africa • This implies, however, that the institutional frameworks in which these authorities operate allow them to intervene in the right place, at the right time, and with the requisite strength of conviction. • Sub-saharan African countries have two advantages in this respect: • -First in many countries there is a Competition Directorate in the Commerce or Economic Affairs Ministry. This directorate is in a position to interact with other ministries for the promotion of competition. • Second, in some countries, such as in WAEMU, the competition authority has the power to fight and sanction anticompetitive State Aids.

38. Le rôle des autorités de concurrence en période de crise: Le Traité de l’UEMOA Aux termes de l’article 88, alinéa c, du Traité de l’UEMOA, sont interdites de plein droit les aides publiques susceptibles de fausser la concurrence en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines productions, sous réserve d’exceptions limitées pouvant être prévues par le Conseil des ministres en vertu de l’article 89 du même traité. Aux termes du règlement n°04/2002/CM/UEMOA, la notion d’aide publique doit être entendue de la façon la plus large, aussi bien en ce qui concerne la forme de l’aide que la personne publique qui fournit l’aide. Constitue une aide publique toute mesure qui entraîne un coût direct ou indirect, ou une diminution des recettes pour l'État, ses démembrements ou pour tout organisme public ou privé que l'État institue ou désigne en vue de gérer l’aide, et confère ainsi un avantage sur certaines entreprises ou sur certaines productions (p. ex. exonérations fiscales).

39. Le rôle des autorités de concurrence en période de crise: Le Traité de l’UEMOA Les exemptions : Six catégories d’aides sont considérées comme compatibles avec le marché commun, sans qu’un examen préalable par la Commission ne soit nécessaire, notamment : Les aides destinées à promouvoir la réalisation d’un projet important d’intérêt communautaire ou à remédier à une perturbation grave de l’économie d’un État membre ;

40. Exemple d’intervention de l’UEMOA dans le contrôle des aides d’état L’Uemoa condamne l’Etat du Sénégal, dimanche 4 mai 2008. Par lettre en date du 12 juillet 2007, Yves Crémieux, directeur général de la société ‘Rufsac’, avait saisi la Commission de l’Uemoa, pour faire examiner le fonctionnement du marché des sacs de ciment en papier au Sénégal. Le responsable de cette entreprise, ayant son siège à Rufisque, s’était plaint de distorsions de concurrence dues aux exonérations dont bénéficient les importations de produits concurrents de ceux que son usine produit. L’Uemoa demande à l’Etat du Sénégal de mettre un terme aux exonérations qu’il a accordées aux deux cimenteries importatrices d’emballages en papier que sont la Sococim et les Ciments du Sahel. Elle considère que ces importations sont à l’origine de distorsions de concurrence au détriment des emballages fabriqués localement.

41. Conséquences pour les autorités de concurrence: Mesures provisoires En période de crise économique une proportion de saisines plus importante que par le passé proviendra d’opérateurs économiques en difficulté et leurs saisines seront accompagnées de demandes de mesures conservatoires. Ainsi, les autorités de concurrence seront conduites à s’interroger pour savoir si elles doivent modifier le curseur qu’elles utilisent pour apprécier la gravité ou l’immédiateté du danger que fait courir une pratique éventuellement anticoncurrentielle aux parties saisissantes, par ailleurs affaiblies en raison d’une conjoncture économique défavorable.

42. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: provisional measures It is probable that a larger share of referrals than in the past will come from struggling economic agents, and that these referrals will be accompanied by requests for provisional measures. Competition authorities will be inclined to ask themselves whether they should change their benchmark for assessing the gravity or immediacy of the danger that a potentially anticompetitive practice poses to the referring parties, which are, in addition, weakened by unfavourable economic conditions.

43. Conséquences pour les autorités de concurrence: Contrôle de la concentration Il est vraisemblable, tout d’abord, que dans un nombre de concentrations plus important que par le passé, les parties à l’opération soutiendront que l’opération doit être autorisée par application de la doctrine de l’entreprise défaillante. Or cette défense n’a guère fait l’objet de réflexions approfondies par les autorités de concurrence. Par ailleurs, l’imposition de conditions structurelles en cas de concentration anticoncurrentielle, qui impliquent le vente de certains actifs, peut être difficile, voire impossible en raison de la crise financière. L’allongement des délais pour que les parties se séparent de certains actifs n’est pas, contrairement à ce qui pourrait paraître à première vue, une solution facile à mettre en oeuvre.

44. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: Merger control It is likely that in a larger number of mergers than in the past, the parties to the operation will argue that the operation should be authorised, invoking the failing firm defence. Moreover, the fulfillment of structural conditions imposed to allow otherwise anticompetitive mergers, such as selling some assets in order to reduce the market share of the merged firms or to allow viable competitors to emerge, will be difficult if not impossible in a situation of scarce credit and reduced investment.

45. Conséquences pour les autorités de concurrence: Cartels La tentation de partage de marché et de l’entente de prix est plus forte en période de diminution significative de la demande, lorsque chacune des entreprises sur le marché est menacée de faillite, qu’en période d’expansion économique où elles peuvent toutes simultanément développer leurs chiffres d’affaires. Du point de vue de la dissuasion, la multiplication attendue du nombre de cartels, au moins dans un premier temps, appelle une révision de la politique de poursuite de ces pratiques. Les autorités de concurrence pourront vouloir intensifier leurs efforts dans ce domaine et diversifier leurs enquêtes pour maintenir la probabilité de détection et de sanction des cartels à un niveau comparable à celui qui prévalait avant la crise.

46. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: Cartels The temptation of market sharing and price fixing is stronger in a period of significantly reduced demand, when each firm in the market is threatened by bankruptcy, than in a period of economic expansion when all can increase their turnover simultaneously. Competition authorities may want to step up their efforts in this area and to diversify their investigations in order to maintain the probability of detecting and sanctioning cartels at a level comparable to that which prevailed before the crisis.

47. Conséquences pour les autorités de concurrence: Relations verticales et abus de domination Les restrictions verticales ou les pratiques abusives d’entreprises ayant une position dominante seront susceptibles d’avoir des effets d’exclusion anticoncurrentiels plus importants que par le passé. En effet, en cas de crise financière et économique, le marché du crédit peine à financer des projets de diversification qui sont porteurs d’intensification de la concurrence alors que les dispensateurs de crédit ont une plus grande aversion au risque et une moins grande visibilité de ce que sera le futur. De même, la baisse très significative du commerce international est un facteur d’affaiblissement de la concurrence.

48. What competition authorities in developing countries can and should do in a period of crisis: vertical restraints and abuse of dominance The anticompetitive effects of exclusion through vertical restraints, or abuses of dominance by firms, are apt to be greater than in the past. In a time of economic and financial crisis, the credit market struggles to finance diversification projects – which have the potential to intensify competition – while lenders have a greater aversion to risk and less ability to predict what the future will bring. Likewise, the very significant fall in international trade is a factor undermining competition. We can therefore expect that the number of cases in which such practices are deemed anticompetitive will be higher than in the past.

49. Conclusion Loin d’être affaiblies par la crise financière et économique, les autorités de concurrence ont un rôle de conseil important à jouer pour aider les gouvernements à adopter des mesures permettant une reprise durable et rapide de la croissance. Elles doivent également adapter la mise en œuvre du droit de la concurrence au nouvel environnement économique sans compromettre leurs objectifs.

50. Conclusion Competition authorities have an important role to play during the financial and economic crisis by helping governements adopt measures which will allow a fast and durable return to economic expansion. They must also adapt their enforcement activities to the new macroeconomic environment without compromising the goal of protecting consumer surplus.