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Smart Grid Security Challenges

Smart Grid Security Challenges. Ahmad Alqasim. Agenda. Problem Statement Power system vs. smart grid Background Information Focus Point Privacy Attack Privacy Attack Countermeasures Jamming attack Jamming Attack Countermeasures Conclusion Discussion Time. Problem Statement.

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Smart Grid Security Challenges

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  1. Smart Grid Security Challenges Ahmad Alqasim

  2. Agenda • Problem Statement • Power system vs. smart grid • Background Information • Focus Point • Privacy Attack • Privacy Attack Countermeasures • Jamming attack • Jamming Attack Countermeasures • Conclusion • Discussion Time

  3. Problem Statement • Analyze smart grid security challenges • Focus on: • Privacy attack: Aims to illegally reach to the customer’s load profile (CLP) • Jamming attack: Aims to cause a denial of service to the wireless system in home area network (HAN)

  4. Traditional System vs. Smart Grid Traditional Power system Smart Grid System Two-way Dialogue More Efficient, Reliable, Secure and Greener Allow customers to manage electricity usage and bill over the web Automatically rerouting and restoring power delivery • One-way Interaction • Unable to meet the new energy demand • Customers only have a physical access to their electrical devices • Depends on complex distribution scheme and manual switching

  5. IT Systems and Power Systems Integration IT Systems Power Systems Integration Smart Grid System

  6. IT Systems and Power Systems Integration TCP/IP SCADA WAN ICCP/DNP3 Operating Systems EMS IT Systems Power Systems EMS TCP/IP WAN ICCP/DNP3 SCADA Operating Systems Smart Grid

  7. Conceptual Model Market Operations ServiceProvider Customer Distribution Transmission Bulk Generator Electrical Flow Secure Communication Flow Domain

  8. Focus Point Service Provider Distribution Privacy Attack HAN Jamming Attack Smart Meter

  9. Home Area Network (HAN) ZigBee Wireless

  10. Privacy Attack • Customer’s Load Profile (CLP) stored in the smart meter • Represent the reading figures by different appliances during different periods of time • The service provider use the CLP to calculate the electricity price • A behavioral information about customer can be extracted from the CLP • For example: waking up or sleeping time • The motivation to use these information can be: spying, burglary or business benefits

  11. Privacy Attack Customer’s Load Profile Graph Wake up time – 8:00 am Evening Activities– 7 pm-10 pm Reference : [Molina-Markham et al., 2010]

  12. Privacy Countermeasures • Trusted Third Party (TTP) • High Frequency Encryption • De-Pseudonymization • Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL)

  13. Trusted Third Party (TTP) Service Provider Trusted Third Party (TTP) • The TTP Will not access to the smart meter. Rather, it will receive the reading figures and send them to the service provider Smart Meter

  14. High Frequency Encryption Unencrypted LF Encrypted HF Service Provider • The service provider can access to the LF in order to calculate the electrical bill

  15. De-Pseudonymization television, electrical consumption • Aims to store customer personal information and load information in two different databases Address, name and phone

  16. Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL) • Actual CLP • Masked CLP • Aims to mask the actual load profile without affecting the actual data 1 Mask CLP Battery 2

  17. Jamming Attack • Performed against ZigBee wireless in HAN • Hacker usually aims to prevent the smart meter from communicating with different appliances • In smart grid, the priority for availability, then integrity and confidentiality • Jamming attack affects the availability of data

  18. Jamming Techniques and Types Techniques Types Constant Jammer Deceptive Jammer Random Jammer Reactive Jammer • Spot Jamming • Sweep Jamming • Barrage Jamming • Deceptive Jamming

  19. pseudorandom Sequence • Pseudorandom sequence is a key that only known by the sender and receiver • And aims to hide the SFD Start of Delimiter Frame (SFD) Packet pseudorandom Sequence Mask the SFD

  20. Frequency Hopping • The packet jumps between different frequencies. So, the jammer does not know exactly which frequency to jam Washing Machine

  21. Wormhole-based Anti-jamming • The wire cable is used in case the wireless range is jammed Wire Cable Node 2 Wireless Range Node 2 Node 1 Jammed Area

  22. Conclusions • Smart grid provide more reliable, efficient and greener energy than power system • Privacy attack aims to develop a behavioral pattern about customers in order to perform a future action • Jamming attack aims to affect the availability of data and wireless communication in HAN • Current security tools are not completely suitable for smart grid. So, new tools have to be developed • And, the cost of security system has to be justified to fit with the business requirement

  23. Discussion Time Questions and Answers

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