190 likes | 269 Views
Industrial practice on mixed-criticality engineering and certification in the aerospace industry. 2013-03-22 DATE 2013 / WICERT 2013. Development process in Aerospace. Development process - Definition. Development process – Integration and V&V. Verification vs. Validation.
E N D
Industrial practice on mixed-criticality engineering and certification in the aerospace industry 2013-03-22 DATE 2013 / WICERT 2013
Who defines the requirements • Customer • Typically OEM – formal and … “less formal” definition • Civil Aviation Authority • FAA, EASA, etc., through Technical Standard Orders(TSO, ETSO) • Internal standards • Body performing the development ! Functional, non-functional, and process requirements
Who checks whether requirements are met • Customer • Typically OEM – Reviews, Validation, Integration testing • Civil Aviation Authority • FAA, EASA, etc. - Through Certification • Internal standards • Body performing the development – As defined by operating procedures. Typically aligned with aerospace development processes.
How is certification done • Civil Aviation Authority does not only check the requirements testing checklist. • CAA primarily controls the Development process and checks the evidence that it was followed • Typically, an agreement must be reached with the CAA on acceptable means of compliance/certification. Typically, this includes: • Meeting DO-254 / ED-80 for electronics • Meeting DO-178B / ED-12B for software (or newly DO-178C) • Meeting agreed CRI – Certification Review Item • The following items are agreed: • The means of compliance • The certification team involvement in the compliance determination process • The need for test witnessing by CAA • Significant decisions affecting the result of the certification process
Why not having one process? • CS-22 (Sailplanes and Powered Sailplanes) • CS-23 (Normal, Utility, Aerobatic and Commuter Aeroplanes) – <5.6t,<9pax or twin-prop <9t,<19pax • CS-25 (Large Aeroplanes) • CS-27 (Small Rotorcraft) • CS-29 (Large Rotorcraft) • CS-31GB (Gas Balloons) • CS-31HB (Hot Air Balloons) • CS-34 (Aircraft Engine Emissions and Fuel Venting) • CS-36 (Aircraft Noise) • CS-APU (Auxiliary Power Units) • CS-AWO (All Weather Operations) • CS-E (Engines) • CS-FSTD(A) (Aeroplane Flight Simulation Training Devices) • CS-FSTD(H) (Helicopter Flight Simulation Training Devices) • CS-LSA (Light Sport Aeroplanes) • CS-P (Propellers) • CS-VLA (Very Light Aeroplanes) • CS-VLR (Very Light Rotorcraft) • AMC-20 (General Acceptable Means of Compliance for Airworthiness of Products, Parts and Appliances)
Small vs. large aircraft (CS23 vs. CS25) Table modified from FAA AC 23.1309-1D Figure from FAA AC 25.1309-1A >10-5 10-5-10-9 <10-9 >10-5 Can happen to any aircraft 10-5-10-9 Happens to some aircraft in fleet <10-9 Never happens
Software-related standards – DO-178B(C) • Development Assurance Level for software (A-D) • Similar definition also exists for Item, Function … • Specifies • Minimum set of design assurance steps • Requirements for the development process • Documents required for certification • Specific Objectives to be proven
More than one function • Two situations: • Single-purpose device (e.g. NAV system, FADEC – Full Authority Digital Engine Controller, etc.) • Typically developed and certified to a single assurance level • Exceptions exist • Multi-purpose device (e.g. IMA – Integrated Modular Avionics)
Mixed-criticality • Same HW runs SW of mixed criticality • For SW, more or less equals to mixed DAL • Implicates additional requirements • Aircraft class specific • CS-25: Very strict • Time and space partitioning (e.g. ARINC 653) • Hard-real-time execution determinism (Problem with multicores) • Standards for inter-partition communication • CS-23: Less strict • Means to achieve safety are negotiable with certification body
Design assurance, verification, certification • Design assurance + qualification does it work? • Functional verification • Task schedulability • Worst-case execution time analysis • … and includes any of the verification below • Verification does it work as specified? • Verifies requirements • Depending on the aircraft class and agreed certification baseline, requirements might include response time or other definition of meeting the temporal requirements • On singlecore platforms, this is composable – isolation is guaranteed • On multicore platforms – currently in negotiations (FAA, EASA, Industry, Academia, …) • Requirements are typically verified by testing • Certification is it approved as safe? • Showing the evidence of all the above
Software verification means (1) • Dynamic verification • Testing – based on test cases prepared during the development cycle. Integral part of the development phase. • Unit testing – Is the implementation correct? • Integration testing – Do the units work together as anticipated? • System testing – Does the system perform according to (functional and non-functional) requirements? • Acceptance testing – As black-box - does the system meet user requirements? • Runtime analysis – Memory usage, race detection, profiling, assertions, contract checking … and sometimes (pseudo)WCET • Domain verification – not with respect to requirements, but e.g. checking for contradictions in requirements, syntax consistency, memory leaks
Software verification means (2) • Static analysis – type checking, code coverage, range checking, etc. • Symbolic execution • Formal verification – formal definition of correct behavior, formal proof, computer-assisted theorem proving, model checking, equivalence checking • Not much used today … just yet
Verification for certification • Typical approach is to heavily rely on testing, supported by static analysis and informal verification • DO-178C (recent update of DO-178B) defines requirements for using • Qualified tools for Verification and Development – DO-330 • Model-based development and verification – DO-331 • Object-oriented technologies – DO-332 (that’s right, 2012) • Formal methods – DO-333 • To complement (not replace) testing • Tool qualification • Very expensive • Tools that can insert error: basically follow the same process as SW development of same DAL. Usable only for small tools for specific purposes. • Tools that replace testing: for A,B: developed and tested using similar development process. For C,D: subset needed. Can use COTS tools.
Near future • Replacement of (some) testing by qualified verification tools Towards formal verification • Adoption of DO-178C instead of DO-178B • Definition of technical and process requirements for multicore platforms • Growth of model-based development and verification • Enablers for incremental certification (which assumes composability of safety)
... and that’s it! Ondřej Kotaba ondrej.kotaba@honeywell.com