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Explore the necessity of long-term carbon regulation for individual car companies, the drawbacks of association approaches, and various regulatory options to drive innovation, market transformation, and environmental impact in the European car industry. Discover insights on model range vs. sales weighted regulation, CO2 limits, company averages, internal and external trading, and conclusions on the most effective strategies.
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LowCVP Conference: Policy Challenge Options for Carbon Regulation of the European Car Industry Alex Veitch Transport Strategy Manager Energy Saving Trust
The case for regulation • Long-term carbon regulation for the car industry is required • Individual companies should be regulated, rather than associations • Flexibility can be built-in to the regulation • Emissions trading should be viewed with caution
Voluntary agreement progress T&E figure Source: EC Monitoring Report 2005, T&E 2006 Target year is 2008 for ACEA; 2009 for JAMA & KAMA
Structural issues • Association approach is flawed • Free riders • No control over members’ production and marketing strategies • Companies could leave the association • Lack of transparency: No official reporting of EU wide company average
The case for regulation • A popular step: 70% of people support mpg regulation* • Industry certainty: Long-term regulatory framework to drive innovation • Global competitiveness: Stay ahead of regulation in China, Japan, US * 70% agreed with the statement: “Car makers should be legally required to make cars that get high MPG (miles-per-gallon)” Mori for EST2005, Base 1,001
Target: Model Range or Sales Weighted? • Model range • Simpler for manufacturers to administer • Risks tokenism - low-numbers of low-carbon cars actually sold • Sales weighted average • Drives marketing toward low-carbon models • Sales weighted is already lower than model-range, so better deal for manufacturers
Average CO2 emissions: Best selling car companies in the UK 2005 Source: EST analysis of SMMT data
Regulation option: Max CO2 limit • Outlaws inefficient products • Transforms the market • Has worked for white goods • However… • Small “tail” of high CO2 cars • No flexibility for niche producers
Car sales in the UK: CO2 distribution Source: SMMT
Regulation option: Company Average • Similar to U.S. CAFE standards • Simple structure, companies have ownership • Uniform target is tough for niche producers • Refinements for provide flexibility • Percentage reduction target • Company target based on its model range
Internal trading • Provides some flexibility • Enables high CO2 producers to purchase credits from low CO2 producers rather than alter their model range • However, limited market • Could be a small number of companies earning credits • Risk of “hamstering” – could require a regulator to intervene
External Trading • Requires analysis of actual carbon emissions rather than a fleet-average figure • This changes the calculation of the impact that each company has on the climate
Average vs. Total Company Emissions Source: SMMT data, with assumed vehicle lifetime of 200,000km .
External Trading • Flexibility: In addition to making lower carbon cars, manufacturers could: • Reduce sales • Influence driving behaviour • Influence purchase decisions • Buy credits on the market • Problems • Quantifying carbon savings from advice activities
Conclusions • Strong case for carbon regulation of the car industry, placed on individual companies • Targets and structure of regulation • Sales weighted target better than model range • Percentage target could provide flexibility • Caution on emissions trading • Internal trading - insufficient flexibility • External trading - difficult to quantify savings from advice activities
LowCVP Conference: Policy Challenge Options for Carbon Regulation of the European Car Industry Alex Veitch Transport Strategy Manager Energy Saving Trust