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REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A. Can the California and New York crisis occur in Europe ? Rui Pestana IST - 25th October 2003. Topics. The California Market Portuguese outages International outages U.S. & Canada London Sweden & Denmark Italy. The California Market. Reserve Margins
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REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A. Can the California and New York crisis occur in Europe ? Rui Pestana IST - 25th October 2003
Topics • The California Market • Portuguese outages • International outages • U.S. & Canada • London • Sweden & Denmark • Italy
The California Market • Reserve Margins • Unexpected increase of unit unavailability • California Exports • Buy at any cost & Price Cap
The California Market • Buy at any cost & Price Cap • The exports were bought back at higher price, giving big revenues to market players. • The final customer was protected by the price cap. • The TSO became bankrupt. • The market design was wrong.
Portuguese Outages • 9-May-2000 : Lisbon & South • 6-September-2001 : South • 2-August-2003 : South
9-May-2000 • External cause : Stork • Internal cause • Inadequacy Maintenance Procedure • Incomplete Commissioning of the bus bar differential protection • Design philosophy of backup protections
9-May-2000 • Internal cause • Inadequacy Maintenance Procedure (line fault -> bus bar fault) • Incomplete Commissioning of the bus bar differential protection (bus bar fault -> double bus bar fault) • Design philosophy of backup protections (double bus bar fault -> Station fault)
6-September-2001 • Lost two 400kV lines -> Network split • External cause : live insulator washing • Internal cause • Backup protection with a wrong orientation • Lost thermal stability of a coal power station (1200 MW).
2-August-2003 • Lost two 400kV lines -> Network split • External cause : bush Fire • Internal cause • Lost thermal stability of a coal power station (1200 MW). • Restriction in supplying the load • The fire prevented to reconnect the lines • The thermal units took 4 hours to synchronise
U.S. & Canada • 14 August 2003 • 70.500 MW load lost • 50 million people • Ohio, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts. • Ontario, Quebec.
U.S. & Canada • The Network has to carry big quantities of energy to great distance. • Any contingency causes voltage drop, limiting the capacity to carry power, and it may evolve to a Voltage Collapse. • The great Lakes didn’t help • Increased the transport distance. • Amplified the power swing.
U.S. & Canada • Planned Outages (Generation and Lines) • The network was less reliable. • Peak Load • Very humid • Computer problems • FirstEnergy had no alarms. • MISO had the State Estimator down.
NERC - North American Electric Reliability Council • Near-Term Actions to Assure Reliable Operations • Voltage and Reactive Management • Reliability Communications • Failures of System Monitoring and Control Functions • Emergency Action Plans • Training for Emergencies • Vegetation Management
London • 28 August 2003 • 724 MW load lost • 410.000 customers • London Underground • Network Rail
London • Planned Outages
London • “Buchholz alarm” at Hurst
London • Wrong Setting in a Backup Protection
London • N-1 criteria was used • but with 43.000 protection pieces, with 99,99% reliability, there are 4 pieces malfunctioning. • The topology of the station requires that to remove a transformer, it was first needed to remove a line.
Sweden & Denmark • 23 September 2003 • 3000 MW load lost in Sweden • 1850 MW load lost in Denmark • 1.6 million people in Sweden • 2.4 million people in Denmark • Copenhagen
Sweden & Denmark • N-1 criteria • Double bus bar fault • Lost 6 lines, • Lost 2 Nuclear units. • The lack of generation (3000 MW) and lines causes a voltage collapse
Lesson to be learn - bus bar fault • Bus bar fault is not a contingency used in the planning of the transmission grid in Portugal. • REN has installed differential bus bar protections. • In the Operation handbook between REN and EDIS, we have a description of the regional blackouts related to the lost of one voltage level by station.
Italy • 28 September 2003 • 21.000 MW load lost • 50 million people • Frequency rose in the rest of Europe
Italy • 3:01 - Line tripped in Switzerland (ATEL). • 3:15 - Call from ATEL to GRTN to reduce 300 MW. • 3:25 - Line tripped in Switzerland (EGL). • 220 kV tielines IT-CH tripped by overload. • 3:27 - three 400 kV tielines IT-FR tripped. • 3:27 - 400 kV tieline IT-Slovenia tripped. • The Italian network became isolated.
Italy • The deficit of load was • 300(Swiss)-3700(pump)=-3400 MW • The deficit of generation was • 6700(imp)+3650(units)+2000(dist.)=12350 MW • Total deficit • -3400+12350=8950 MW • Remaining generation • 21000-6700-3650=10650 MW • Percentage of load to shed • 8950/10650=84%
Italy • N-1 criteria, admits that some lines can be temporarily overloaded. • The overload was not eliminated in time, due to the lack of communication between ETRANS (6 TSO) and GRTN. • The GRTN control room has a button to loadshed 1000 MW of pumping. • The Italian under-frequency loadshed was unable to hold the frequency.
Lesson to be learn - N-1 criteria • The computation of the Interchange Capacity is based in the N-1 criteria. • Any increase of security, implies a decrease of interchange capacity. • With the creation of the Iberian Market the need for interchange capacity is essential to avoid market split.
Iberian Split • 27 December 1999 • We were not connected to UCTE during 1:51:17 • The frequency dropped • Spain was importing from France • Spain became supplier of south of France
Iberian Split Split at 19:52:52
Iberian Split Synchronous with UCTE at 21:44:09
Iberian Split • Due to the reduced Interchange capacity between France and Spain it was possible to control the frequency.
REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A. Can the California crisis occur in Europe ? - No, because there are too many institutional players working together (EC, ETSO, CEER, EuroPEX, …). Can the New York crisis occur in Europe ? - Never in Italy (Berlusconi) - Yes (Rui Pestana)
