National Series Lecture 5 Responsibility of Life Scientists

1. National SeriesLecture 5 Responsibility of Life Scientists Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK Picture Image Transparent Globe by digitalart- from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

2. Outline • Dual-use ethics/dual-use dilemma • Responsibilitiesassociated with potential/actual dual-use science • Tensions between scientific benefit versus risk analysis • The Precautionary Principle (PP) • Statement on Scientific Publication and Security 2003 • Decision making in dual-use dilemmas

3. International statements about the responsibilities of life scientists • IAP: Statement on Biosecurity 2005 • “Scientists have an obligation to do no harm” • WHO: Responsible Life Sciences Research for Global Health Security 2011 • “The dual-use dilemma is inherently ethical in nature” • BTWC: Final Document of the Meeting of States Parties 2008 • Codes of Conduct should: “Cover ethical and moral obligations throughout the scientific life cycle, including during the proposal, funding, execution and dissemination stages” • US National Research Council: On Being a Scientist 2009 3rdedtn • “Research is based on the same ethical values that apply in everyday life, including honesty, fairness, objectivity, openness, trustworthiness, and respect for others.”

4. Why is dual-use an ethical matter?

5. Dual-Use Research Research…… ……“that based on current understanding can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or material.” (Emphases added) (NSABB 2007) If scientists take the responsibility of showing what they are doing to prevent the misuse of their research, then “interference” may be minimised

6. Dual-use as an ethical issue The same piece of scientific research For harm For good The dual-use dilemma (Miller and Selgelid 2007, Sture 2010)

7. Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (i) • The principle covers: • Not only intentional actions but also unintentional consequences/risks surrounding scientific research • Risk without harmful intent is part of moral responsibility • (Kelly 2006) An influential definition of the bioethical principle........“Non-maleficence” (the obligation to “do no harm”)

8. Responsibilities associated withdual-use science (ii) Dual-use potential raises the ethical question: • “Should we hold an agent morally responsible for the consequences of an action?” • And.... • “When those consequences were not intended and were, in some cases, beyond the agent’s control?” It asks whether a person (an “agent”) is morally bound to take pre-emptive precautions to avoid unwanted future outcomes. (Miller and Selgelid 2007)

9. Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (iii) foreseen effects The question here is : “Not how far a scientist is responsible for the intended effects of his action,” “But how far he is responsible for the foreseen effects of his research, for their prevention and also for the effort to predict certain results.” So....is preventive effort a duty? (Ehni 2008, Dando 2009)

10. Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (iv) What is “foreseeable”? Kuhlau et al (2008) also argue..... Reasonable obligations Scientists have....“Duties to consider potential negative implications of one's research, protect access to sensitive material, technology and knowledge, and report activities of concern.” Responsibility And also have .....“Obligations concerned with preventing foreseeable and highly probable harm.” (Kuhlau et al 2008)

11. Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (v) Five criteria for meeting the obligation to prevent harm Researchers should take actions to prevent harm that: • Fall within their professional responsibility • Fall within their professional capacity and ability (scientists know their work best) • Address the minimisation of reasonably foreseeable risk (“’reasonable’ implies active engagement from scientists to seek knowledge and consider potential misuses of research”) • Minimise risks that are proportionally greater than the benefits of the research • Are not more easily achieved by other means (Kuhlau et al 2008)

12. Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (vi) Kuhlau et al propose therefore that scientists have the following ethical obligations: - To prevent bioterrorism - To engage in response activities to bioterror attacks - To consider the negative implications of their research - To not publish or share sensitive information - To oversee and limit access to dangerous material • To report activities of concern (Kuhlau et al 2008)

13. Responsibilities associated with dual-use science (vii) Implying oversight of research? A general duty to not contribute to dual-use that is malign and, as far as controllable..... Specific duties within this include: - Do not carry out a certain type of research - Systematically anticipate dual-use applications in order to warn of dangers generated by them • Inform public authorities about such dangers • Do not disseminate results publicly, but keep dangerous scientific knowledge secret (Ehni 2008)

14. Tensions in benefit-and-risk analysis (i) Rights to academic freedom and scientific progress Risk Benefit What is at stake in the dual-use dilemma (Miller and Selgelid 2007)

15. Tensions in benefit-and-risk analysis (ii) Making decisions about the “censorship” of science Responsibilities (of whom?) Rights (of whom?) (Miller and Selgelid 2007) What is at stake in dual-use dilemma?

16. Tensions in benefit-and-risk analysis (iii) Making decisions for trade-offs Security/public health needs Rights to scientific progress and science dissemination small sacrifices in the way of public health and/or security to achieve enormous benefits with regard to the progress of science small sacrifices with regard to the progress of science to achieve enormous benefits regarding public health and/or security. (Miller and Selgelid 2007)

17. Who is responsible for what, to whom and why? Prospective Responsibility Retrospective Responsibility Looks backwards The result(s) of an action imputed to the actor (the scientist) who contributed actively to this action or who could have prevented it • Looks forwards • The responsibility to care for somebody founded on a duty resulting from the role the responsible person has • Stems from the duties of the scientists and the scientific community (Whitby and Novossiolova 2011)

18. Exercise1 Is oversight of research relevant? • Discuss the rationale for the (biosecurity) oversight of scientific research(10 min) • Who should be responsible for identifying possible research areas of concern (scientists, institutions, government, others?). How should the balance between security and the freedom of science be managed? • Report to the class.

19. The Precautionary Principle (PP) (i)

20. The Precautionary Principle (PP) (ii) (Somerville and Atlas 2005)

21. The Precautionary Principle (iii) A fundamental message of the PP.... “...‘on some occasions, measures against a possible hazard should be taken even if the available evidence does not suffice to treat the existence of that hazard as a scientific fact’....” (Kuhlau et al 2009) Evidence

22. The Precautionary Principle (iv) Four main conceptual dimensions/triggers come into play: threat, uncertainty, prescription and action If there is: a threat, which is uncertain, then some kind of action is mandatory. (Kuhlau et al 2009)

23. The Precautionary Principle (v) Concerns of “over-securitization”.... (Kelle 2005, Fildler and Gostin 2007. Koblentz 2010)

24. Statement on Scientific Publication and Security (i) (Journal Editors and Authors Group 2003)including Nature, Science and ProNAS

25. Statement on Scientific Publication and Security (ii) Are scientific journals qualified to judge security risks? “An important question thus concerns the extent to which the government, bioethicists and/or the security community should be involved in scientific censorship.” (Miller and Selgelid 2007)

26. Decision making in dual-use dilemmas (i) Optional mechanisms for the decision-making process include: - Complete autonomy of the individual scientist - Institutional control - Mix of institutional and governmental control - An independent authority Full governmental control (Miller and Selgelid 2007)

27. Decision making in dual-use dilemmas (ii) Existing proposals • Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)) • Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance (J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) • Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information (US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) • DNA Synthesis and Biological Security (Buglet al) (United Nations 2008b)

28. Decision making in dual-use dilemmas (iii) The common (shared) view Only a mixed authority which is constituted by the scientific community together with government bodies can address the dual-use dilemma effectively Responsibilities of scientists, governments and others = “context dependent”.

29. Exercise 2 Is the decision on the H5N1 influenza appropriate? • Discuss the consequence of the decision to recommend the modification of the paper on H5N1 influenza (2011) (10 min) • Is the decision acceptable from the perspective of the precautionary principle or have security requirements overwhelmed scientific freedom in this case? • Report to the class.

30. References • The references cited in this lecture are viewable in the Notes section of this presentation.