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HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN FRANCE

HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN FRANCE. Christian NADAL President EDF INA cnadal@edfina.com. Nuclear Energy in France Today. 19 plants - 58 Units Installed capacity: Total = 110 GW Nuclear = 63 GW (57%) Net Electric generation: Total = 549 TWh Nuclear = 429 TWh (78%).

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HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN FRANCE

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  1. HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGYINFRANCE Christian NADAL President EDF INA cnadal@edfina.com

  2. Nuclear Energy in France Today • 19 plants - 58 Units • Installed capacity: • Total = 110 GW • Nuclear = 63 GW(57%) • Net Electric generation: • Total = 549 TWh • Nuclear = 429 TWh (78%) Sources: EIA, 2004 - IAEA,2006 - EDF

  3. (t CO2/GWh) Nuclear share in generation mix Renewable share in generation mix CO2 intensity of power generation (t CO2/GWh) Nuclear Energy in France Today • Around 40% of total primary energy supply in 2006 (117 Mtep) • Low Carbon Intensity: 0.26 Metric ton/Thousand $2000 (US = 0.55) and less than 80 Metric tons of CO2 per GWh of electricity in 2004 Source: International Energy Agency, 2004

  4. THE PIONEERS THE TRANSITION PHASE THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 1945 1960 1973 1974 1985 1990

  5. ENERGY • France has no Natural Resources • Independence is key issue for French Politicians since WW I • e.g. Oil Sector Reorganization Act – 1928 • Stability of Supply • Nuclear is no exception

  6. Uranium fission results in multiple neutron emission (F. Joliot & al 1939) Chain Reaction possible Nuclear Energy Pre WW II

  7. Nuclear Energy • Pre WW II (Cont’d) • Patents describe main Features of a Nuclear Reactor • Young scientists hired for designing/building a nuclear reactor (F. Perrin – 1940) • Secure Heavy Water supply

  8. THE PIONEERS THE PIONEERS BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE 1945 - 1973

  9. KEY DECISIONS • End of WW II sees French economy left in shambles • Priority is rebuilding French Infrastructure • Crediting French Historical Tradition • Strong Government involvement • Centralized decisions • Create two Government-owned entities • CEA (Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique 10/18 1945) • EDF (Electricite de France 03/29 1946)

  10. CEA and EDF CEA EDF R&D Science Industry Defense Radiation Protection Standards Raw Material Supply Prospection Mining Design, Build industrial ScaleNuclear Units Advise French Government for International Agreements Monopolies Generation Transmission Distribution Imports & Exports Design Build Generating Units Operate

  11. POLICY • Need Long-Term Vision • Dictated by French Situation • Uranium Enrichment not Practicable • Industrial Capability not adequate • Funding unreasonable  Natural Uranium is the only solution • Confirmed by International Environment • Mc Mahon Act (08/01 1946)

  12. POLICY • Consequence is Plutonium • Defense • Civilian use • Evaluate consequences of Strategic Orientations • Fuel Reprocessing • Interest for LMFBRs

  13. POLICY Practical Implemention Quinquennial Planning • General Trend constant • Natural Uranium • Plutonium Separation as an objective • LMFBRs contemplated as early as 1953 • Periodic Reassessment

  14. POLICY Practical Implementation Quinquennial Planning • Marginal modifications tolerated • Scheduling • Technical • Moderator type (Heavy Water [EL] or Graphite [G]) • Output  No Standardization

  15. The Chinon site (mid 60s) The Gravelines site (early 80s)

  16. EDF’s APPROACH • Long-term priority is cost-effectiveness CONTROL PROCESS ENGINEERING CAPABILITY LEAD CONTRACTOR A.I. (1954) • General orientations MASSIVE DEPLOYMENT (PRICE PERMITTING) 1955 PAY OVERHEADS FOR FIRST UNITS BASELOAD ENTIRELY WITH NUCLEAR UNITS

  17. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT The 50s open new perspectives • Atoms for Peace • Geneva Conferences • 1953 • 1958 • EURATOM Treaty (03/25 1957) • Open door for evaluating US technologies

  18. KEY MILESTONES • G1 (2 MWe – GG) 1956-1968 • G2 (40 MWe – GG) 1959-1980 • G3 (40 MWe – GG) 1960-1984 • Chinon 1 (70e MW - GG) 1963-1973 • Chinon 2 (180 MWe - GG) 1965-1985 • Chinon 3 (360 MWe - GG) 1967-1990 • SL1 (390 MWe – GG) 1969-1990 • SL2 (450 MWe – GG) 1971-1992 • Bugey 1 (540 MWe – GG) 1972-1994 • Brennilis (70 MWe – HW) 1967-1985

  19. THE PIONEERS THE TRANSITION PHASE THE TRANSITION PHASE TIME FOR DIFFICULT DECISIONS 1960 - 1974

  20. THE NEW CONTEXT The 60s confirm need for change • Development of Uranium Enrichment techniques is first step for contemplating LWRs (1967) • EURATOM treaty gives opportunity for testing US LWRs • CHOOZ (beginning of construction - 1962) • TIHANGE (1967) • Gas-Graphite technology limited to # 700 MWe • LMFBR technology (longer term) • RAPSODIE (beginning of construction - 1961) • PHENIX (beginning of construction- 1967)

  21. STRATEGIC APPROACH • The PEON(1) Committee • Reevaluate available options and propose graded approach crediting • Security of Supply • Political Independence • Economic Independence (Hard Currency) • Instability of Fossil Fuel markets • French Economy Capabilities • Budget • Industry • Cost-effectiveness (1) Committe advising the French Government for Nuclear

  22. STRATEGIC APPROACH • Most Significant Conclusions • Keep all options open for further decision • Access to Plutonium remains an objective • Fast breeders development needed • Light Water Technology consistent with strategic issues • BWRs, PWRs potential candidates • Costs will govern decisions • Develop technologies for Front/Backend of the Fuel Cycle

  23. MILESTONES • 12/1967 – Authorization for two Gas-Cooled Reactors (GCRs) at Fessenheim (FSH) • 07/1968 – Appropriateness of GCRs at FSH questioned • 05/1969 – PEON Committee recommends • Development of FBRs (Beyond PHENIX) • Order for 4 to 5 LWRs before 1975 • Decisions on GCRs and Heavy Water Reactors before 12/1970 • Purchase licenses from US vendors

  24. MILESTONES • 11/1969: French Government decides for Light Water Reactors (LWRs) • De facto stop for Natural Uranium GCRs • Nuclear Leadership transfered to EDF • 1970: 2 PWRs at FSH • 1971: 1 PWR at Bugey (BGY) • 1972: EDF decides for 2nd PWR at BGY, instead of BWR • Cost was decisive • 08/1975: French Government decides for PWRs • Cost is the most important parameter for decision

  25. THE PIONEERS THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE THE TRANSITION PHASE THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE THE PWR CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 1973 – 1990

  26. TIME FOR DECISIONS • 1973 • Oil share in energy consumption is 69% • OIl prices triple (unacceptably high) • 1974 • Decision to develop a Nuclear Program • Political Majority is pro-Nuclear • Political Minority Reluctant • Objective is 30% Nuclear of primary energy supply by 1990 • 1975 • 08/06 French Government choose PWRs

  27. 36 U + SPX (LMFBR) 12 U 8000 7000 6000 5000 Net Installed Capacity (MW) l 4000 4 U 3000 6 U 2000 1000 0 1999 1993 1996 1997 1992 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 FRENCH PWR PROGRAM

  28. TRENDS AND FLUCTUATIONS • Before 1981 • 42 units decided by the French government • Superphenix • All orders confirmed except 1 (900 MWe) • After 1981 • Program Reevaluation • Political Reasons (e.g. Plogoff canceled) • Economics: Consumption Growth less than anticipated • Orders on a Need to Basis • Last 3 1400 MWe units delayed by EDF

  29. FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM

  30. WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS? • Main reason is Political • Government • Controlled CEA and EDF • Enforced key Decisions • Made all decisions • Kept program on track • Provided help for enforcing decisions (at sites) • Industrial Policy (Infrastructure) • French Society • Favored the Nuclear option • Though opposition did exist

  31. WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS? Creusot Workshop in the 70s • Second reason is technical Standardized Program (series) • Engineering and Construction cost • Construction time • Operating and maintenance cost • Safety

  32. Fleet Standardization Gravelines Site Chooz Site Paluel Site 32 3-Loop 900 MWe 20 4-Loop 1300 MWe 4 4-Loop 1450 MWe

  33. Gravelines, France WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS? • Third reason is EDF policy • Strong involvement in local development • Relationship with local authorities (information + development) • Contracts with small businesses • Public acceptance • ‘Open door’ policy / transparency • Relations with opinion leaders and scientists • Maintaining Infrastructure Capability • Maintenance policy

  34. COMMENTS • French Government didn’t provide subsidies or tax credits • Program mostly financed by debt • ‘Advised’ EDF towards loans in $ • Huge financial impact • Authorized retail prices didn’t reflect real program costs (increases moderate)

  35. THE PIONEERS LOOKING AT THE FUTURE THE TRANSITION PHASE THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE THE REP 2000 PROGRAM 1985 – 2007 GEN IV LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

  36. The CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT (1986) • Huge impact on the european public • Poor Communication by most organizations • Increased NIMBY, BANANA • Need to factor Severe Accidents into Design • Realization that nuclear issues are transnational

  37. PROGRAM SHAPING • Discussions with several Countries • Agreement with Germany (Political) • Design Approach (EPR) • Regulatory Approach • Agreements with Belgium, Germany, UK, Spain, Italy (others later) • International Programs (LWRs) • Common Utility Requirements (EUR)

  38. NUCLEAR WASTES • Waste issue is key for nuclear • Approach must credit former decisions • Outcomes are • 12/30/1991 Law (1st Bataille Act) • Defines R&D orientations • Defines Administrative Measures • 06/28/2006 Law (2nd Bataille Act) • Confirms R&D orientations • Sets Deadlines • Technical Feasibility of Contemplated Solutions • Site Selection • Facility Commissioning

  39. GEN IV • Objectives well in-line with France’s strategy • France decides to join GIF (2000) • French proposals reflect constant strategy • Fuel cycle closure (Gas-Cooled Fast Reactors) • Waste management (Molten Salt Reactor) • Former President Chirac decides GEN IV Reactor connected to the grid by 2020 • Only available technology is LMFBR • Renewed interests in LMFBRs • Agreements underway for • Delineating R&D program • Recreating industrial infrastructure

  40. CONCLUSION Nuclear Programwas a success • Expertise existed • National Commitment • Long-term Strategy • Capability to build on experience • Stick to fundamentals • Accept failures in the approach(Gas-Cooled Reactors) • Endorse alternatives when needed • No stone unturned • Frontend / Backend of the Fuel Cycle

  41. CONCLUSION • Program was a success (Cont’d) • Public support • But Chernobyl modified perspective • Support for operating plants remained strong • Less support for new constructions • EDF policy with small business and local communities • EDF’s Industrial Policy • Applied research on anticipated technologies • Lead contractor / Vendors • Standardization

  42. CONCLUSION • Program remains a success • Financial performance / largest shareholder company in Europe

  43. CONCLUSION • Program remains a success (Cont’d) • Stable electricity prices over long time period

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