History of Ethics

1. History of Ethics Section 4 John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism

2. John Stuart Mill • Best interpreted as a rule-utilitarian, adhering to moral rules not as mere generalizations of beneficial deeds but as an ideal moral code.

3. Mill’s Utilitarianism • The goal of life and also the standard of morality are lives of happiness, lives, that is, as exempt as possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments: ‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’ (see note 1 [final slide of this Section]).

4. Mill’s Rule-utilitarianism • Since it is not single actions that can be said to tend to promote anything, but rather types of actions, this account of rightness is best interpreted as saying that it is types of actions, such as actions complying with a rule or practice, which are made right or wrong by what they tend to promote.

5. To consider • Distinguish between act-utilitarianism & rule-utilitarianism.

6. Unlike Jeremy Bentham, Mill compared pleasures by quality as well as quantity. It is far from clear that this move is consistent with keeping pleasure (& the absence of pain) as the sole criterion of a good life. Pleasures

7. But… • Mill can consistently defend introducing secondary right-making rules, & resorting to his primary criterion to resolve clashes between them.

8. Proof of the Desirability of the General Happiness • Just as the only proof that an object is visible is that people actually see it, the only proof that anything is desirable is that people actually desire it. • But each person desires their own happiness, & so happiness is a good; accordingly the general happiness is a good for people in general (see note 2 [final slide of this Section]). • Besides, happiness is the sole object of desire, for nothing is desired which is not either a means to happiness or a part of happiness. • Happiness must then be the sole end of human action, and so its promotion is the test of conduct & the criterion of morality (see note 3 [final slide of this Section]).

9. Some objections • (1) ‘Desirable’ is not comparable to ‘visible’, as ‘visible’ just means ‘able to be seen’, whereas ‘desirable’ means ‘fit to be desired’, & is used of what there is reason to desire. So his argument seems to move fallaciously from facts about desire to value-claims about desirability. • (2) Even if each person desires his or her own happiness, it does not follow that everyone desires the general happiness, let alone that the general happiness is desirable. (For further objections, & replies to those objections, see ‘Mill’s Proof’ in Sec. 4, History of Ethics Chapter.)

10. Reply to (1) Although Mill’s attempted proof confronts some objections, it’s not as obviously a fallacy as it seems: • (1) Being able to be desired is at least a necessary condition of being desirable. Further, if, as Mill thinks he can show, only one thing is actually desired, & if, as nearly everyone assumes, something or other is desirable, then this will have to be the one thing that can be desired (for nothing else is eligible) & is desired. So his opening move need not be construed as a fallacy at all, although it depends on the vulnerable claim that only one thing is actually desired.

11. Reply to (2) • (2) The relation of the general happiness of society to society could be regarded as analogous to the relation of the happiness of one person to that person. Since what is desirable is what there is reason to desire, the happiness of society will be even more desirable for society than individual happiness is for that individual. (Mill disclosed in a letter that he was not arguing that the general happiness will be desirable to each person, but rather that since happiness is desirable & can be multiplied as the number of happy people increases, the aggregate happiness is also desirable, & multiply so.)

12. Obligations • Mill well distinguishes obligations of justice, other moral obligations, & morally desirable deeds that are not obligatory (that is, supererogatory acts).

13. Mill & Justice • When discussing justice, Mill claims that utilitarianism embodies impartiality & equality. • His stance on impartiality can be defended, but only with difficulty over the charge that utilitarianism permits unsatisfactory distributions.

14. In rejecting coercion except to prevent harm to others, Mill condemns paternalism (constraining someone for their own good). But… there is a moral case for paternalistic interventions, despite Mill’s arguments. Rejection of Paternalism

15. To Consider • What is at issue when paternalism is pitted against autonomy? • Explain Mill’s view of paternalism.

16. Notes 1. Mill, J.S. (1910), Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Representative Government, Everyman edition (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, and New York: E.P. Dutton & Co.), p.6. 2. ibid., pp. 32-33. 3. ibid., p. 36.