1. FOUNDATIONS (Dualism, Behaviorism, Central-State Materialism) (G. Ryle, ‘Descartes’ Myth’)

1. 1. FOUNDATIONS (Dualism, Behaviorism, Central-State Materialism) (G. Ryle, ‘Descartes’ Myth’)

2. For Tuesday: H. Putnam, ‘Brains and Behavior’. In Chalmers, pp. 45-54.

3. Topics 1. Dualism 2. Introspection 3. Category Mistakes 4. Mental States not Causes of Behavior 5. Behaviorism

4. Dualism ‘Mind and body are different kinds of stuff.’ - vs. there’s only one kind of stuff, physical stuff.

5. 1. Knowledge of your own existence more certain than knowledge of any material thing. 2. Can conceive separately of body and self, so body and self are separate. 3. Matter is divisible but the self is indivisible.

6. We don’t introspect non-physical substance. It shimmers, beyond any knowledge we have. So it doesn’t explain anything.

7. Suppose that each soul only lasted for a second, but transmitted all its psychological states to the next soul coming up, and a person has a long series of such souls.

9. Everything would seem just the way it does now, to you and to the person. So supposing it’s one soul, rather than a series, doesn’t explain anything.

10. Suppose that at any one time, each person’s body had associated with it a thousand souls, all acting together.

11. So when the body speaks, there are a thousand souls wanting to say that thing.

12. Again, everything would seem just the way it does now - to you and to the person. So supposing it’s just one soul doesn’t explain anything.

13. Topics 1. Dualism✔ 2. Introspection 3. Category Mistakes 4. Mental States not Causes of Behavior 5. Behaviorism

14. Descartes’ Myth 1. Knowledge of your own existence more certain than knowledge of any material thing. 2. Can conceive separately of body and self, so body and self are separate. 3. Matter is divisible but the self is indivisible.

15. Introspection ‘Not only can he view and scrutinize a flower through his sense of sight and listen to and discriminate the notes of a bell through his sense of hearing; ‘he can also reflectively or introspectively watch, without any bodily organ of sense, the current episodes of his inner life.’

16. Introspection ‘This self-observation is … commonly supposed to be immune from illusion, confusion or doubt.’ - unlike sense-perceptions.

17. Introspection ‘On the other side, the person has no direct access of any sort to the events of the inner life of another.’

18. Introspection ‘Absolute solitude is on this showing the ineluctable destiny of the soul. Only our bodies can meet.’

19. Introspection Knowledge of one’s own: emotions (fear, happiness, depression) sensations (pains - e.g. footballers’ injuries) thoughts beliefs (e.g. that X can’t be trusted) virtues (kindliness, generosity) temperament (shyness) - Different possibilities of error in each case.

20. Introspection Knowledge of someone else’s: emotions sensations thoughts beliefs virtues temperament - a different basis from knowledge of your own?

21. You can be an expert on the mental states of some other person. You’re a specialist on your own states. You know about them the same way you know about the mental states of others.

22. Topics 1. Dualism✔ 2. Introspection✔ 3. Category Mistakes 4. Mental States not Causes of Behavior 5. Behaviorism

23. Watching the operations of someone else’s mind: mental arithmetic vs. working it out on paper.

24. mental arithmetic vs. working it out on paper. Suppose we take ‘thinking’ to be ‘manipulating symbols’. You can do this just as well in public as you can in your head.

25. mental arithmetic vs. working it out on paper. You can perform one and the same mental activity publicly as privately. When you perform the calculation in writing, there isn’t a private calculation that is causing it.

26. So other people can have just as good knowledge of what calculation I’m performing as I do myself. • cf. also, ‘trying to find my watch’. Can do this by hunting, or by silently reflecting.

27. Consider also, ‘being angry’ ‘being in pain’ etc.

28. Showing someone the University: UC Berkeley photo

29. UC Berkeley photos

30. But where is the University? www.ghettodriveby.com/dungeon/

31. ‘Expecting someone to come for tea at 4 o’clock’

32. ‘Expecting someone to come for tea at 4 o’clock’ filling the kettle with water looking out of the window looking at your watch

34. Topics 1. Dualism✔ 2. Introspection✔ 3. Category Mistakes✔ 4. Mental States not Causes of Behavior 5. Behaviorism

35. Dualism: ‘a para-mechanical hypothesis’.

36. Descartes ‘had mistaken the logic of his problem. Instead of asking by what criteria intelligent behavior is actually distinguished from non-intelligent behavior,

37. ‘he asked “Given that the principle of mechanical causation does not tell us the difference, what other causal principle will tell it to us?” ‘He realized that the problem was not one of mechanics and assumed it must therefore be one of some counterpart to mechanics. ‘Not unnaturally psychology is often cast for just this role.’

38. The para-mechanical causes were assumed to be known infallibly by each of us, through introspection. - thus we can never know how to classify one another’s behavior.

39. Descartes should have asked: by what criteria intelligent behavior is actually distinguished from non-intelligent behavior.

40. This makes it sound as though: psychological terms are just ways of classifying complex behaviors, not: ways of identifying the causes of behaviors.

41. Behaviorism: the view that psychological terms are just ways of classifying complex behaviors.

42. Topics 1. Dualism✔ 2. Introspection✔ 3. Category Mistakes✔ 4. Mental States not Causes of Behavior 5. Behaviorism

43. How are we to explain the meanings of psychological terms? We can describe behavior in non-psychological terms. We can definepsychological concepts in terms of behavior.

44. Carnap defines psychological terms like this: ‘A is excited’ asserts the existence of:

45. “that physical structure (micro-structure) of Mr. A’s body (especially of his central nervous system) that is characterized by a high pulse and rate of breathing, which, on the application of certain stimuli, may even be made higher, by vehement and factually unsatisfactory answers to questions, by the occurrence of agitated movements on the application of certain stimuli, etc.”

46. Couldn’t you be excited without having any tendency to show any of those symptoms?

47. If Carnap was right, how could you know by introspection whether you were excited? You’d have better knowledge of whether someone else was excited than you do of whether you are excited yourself.

48. Topics 1. Dualism✔ 2. Introspection✔ 3. Category Mistakes✔ 4. Mental States not Causes of Behavior 5. Behaviorism