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Explore the Entropia Virtual Machine (VM) for Desktop Grids presenting desktop security, clean execution environments, and unobtrusive application security. Understand the VM components, resource scheduling, sandbox execution, and enforcement of resource limitations. Discover the mediation of OS interactions and application security measures.
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The Entropia Virtual Machine for Desktop GridsBrad Calder, Andrew A. Chien, Ju Wang, Don Yang – VEE-2005 Raju Kumar CS598C: Virtual Machines
Introduction • Desktop Grids • Entropia Desktop Distributed Computing Grid (DCGrid) • VMs for protection • How was protection provided earlier ?
Overview • DCGrid • Goals • Entropia VM • Results • Conclusion
DCGrid Details • Physical Node Management • Resource and Application management • Resource Scheduling • Scheduling subjobs • Job Management • Decomposes job into subjobs, deploys subjobs and accumulates results • Entropia VM
Entropia VM Requirements • Desktop security • Clean execution environment • Unobtrusiveness • Application security
Entropia VM Components Contd… • Desktop Controller • Provides unobtrusiveness • Sandbox Execution Layer • Provides all features including unobtrusiveness
Wrapping Application • Wrapped inside EVM using binary modification • Wrapped interpreters – cmd.exe, Perl, JVM • vm.dll as first entry in import table • vm.dll’s main() dynamically modifies loaded binaries and required dlls to intercept system calls
Validating Binaries • Checksum of each binary file • Whether sandboxed • Integrity • Configuration file - Checksums for all binaries • Encrypted and transferred to EVM • Encryption Key – securely communicated • CreateProcess for code in a new binary file • Check if registered in configuration file • Verify checksum
Desktop Control • EVM monitors subjob usage of key resources • If subjob uses excess resources, subjob’s processes paused or terminated – Acceptable ? • Unobtrusiveness – • Sandbox Execution Layer – resource usage restriction per process • Desktop Controller – resource usage restriction per subjob • Processes may belong to EVM or subjob • Separate resource control using VM Portal
EVM Portal Thread • Invisible Portal thread per Sandboxed application • Sandboxed application unaware of Portal thread • Thread listing does not show Portal thread • Terminating Portal thread not allowed by virtualizing relevant system calls • Heart-beat maintained between Portal thread and Desktop Controller • Loss of heart-beat – Portal thread kills the sandboxed application • When is heart-beat lost ? • One Portal thread for each process • Terminate • Pause • Resume • On being paused, process memory paged to disk – security issues ?
Enforcing Resource Limits • If desktop usage is high, Desktop Controller pauses subjob (via Portal thread) – all or nothing solution • If pausing does not decrease usage, terminate – is this correct ? • Different levels of unobtrusiveness • Highest level – pause on mouse movement, keyboard-memory-disk I/O-CPU usage of non-Entropia processes – Background processes in Windows ? Distinction between user and system processes in Windows ? • Lowest level – ignore keyboard and mouse usage • Subjobs can run between keystrokes • Subjob threads are run at lowest priorities
Paging Issues • Subjob requirements • Specified by user • Specified by administrator (a typical value) • Resource Scheduler schedules subjob on a client with sufficient resources • Excessive Paging implications • Active user • Incorrect value of subjob requirement provided/estimated • Enforcing Resource Limitation • Pause/terminate subjob • Mentions excessive memory usage as well – is it correct ? • Examples • Tracing code – Excessive disk usage • Erroneous process – Excessive threads
Resource Problems • Failure reported to • Resource Scheduler • DCGrid Administrator • Job Manager • Categorization • Desktop Resource Contention • Client Black Hole • Malformed subjob
Sandbox Execution Layer • Goal • Control subjob’s interaction with OS • Virtualize some OS components • Subjob’s access to all important system APIs is mediated
OS Interception Layer • Device Driver – intercepts hardware access • Binary modification – virtualize some APIs • Sandbox Layer is a VMM
Device Driver Mediation • Device Driver Mediation • Provides Desktop Security feature • Mediated interfaces cannot be bypassed • Global mediation overhead • Hence mediates only interfaces with resource access • Dynamic Binary Modification • Trampoline approach
Design Decisions • Self-modifying code not allowed • JIT code for JVM allowed • Virtualized components • Files • Registry • GUI • Network • Threads and Processes
Application Security • Desktop user does not have administrator privileges • Subjob runs in a separate user space • Device driver provides complete user-space isolation • File encryption • Tampering detection
Related Work • Existing desktop grid solutions • Require changes to code or well-behaved assumptions • Classic VMs • Obtrusive • JVM and .NET/MSIL based grids • Obtrusive, not comprehensive • VMs for desktop grids • Obtrusive, heavy • VMs with resource control • Assume closed system
Conclusion • EVM provides • Desktop security • Clean execution environment • Unobtrusiveness • Application security