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This report provides an overview of the discussions and decisions made during the SMG10 meetings at SMG#30, including security enhancements for SS7 and IMEI, recommendations for GEA2 implementation, and updates on WPA and WPB security mechanisms. It also highlights future areas of work for SMG10.
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SMG10 report to SMG#30Tdoc SMG P-99-741 Michael Walker Chairman ETSI SMG10
SMG10 meetings since SMG#29 • SMG10 plenary #2/99, joint with 3GPP SA3, 3-5 August, Sophia Antipolis • SMG10 ad hoc meeting - to prepare CRs for agreement by correspondence, 26 October, The Hague
Reports for approval • Threat analysis on SS7 security, Tdoc SMG P-99-744
CRs for approval • 02.09(and resulting CRs to 02.16, 03.03 and 11.10), Enhancement of IMEI security, Tdoc SMG P-99-742 • 03.20, Introduction of EDGE variant of A5, Tdoc SMG P-99-743 • 03.20, Clarification on triplet re-use conditions, Tdoc SMG P-99-743
Liaison statements to SMG • LS to SMG (copy GSMA SG) on use of GEA2, Tdoc SMG P-99-745 • LS to SMG (copy GSMA SG) on use of A5 algorithms for EDGE, Tdoc SMG P-99-556 • LS to SMG (copy GSMA SG) on A5 algorithm - use of 64 bit Kc, Tdoc SMG P-99-555 • LS to T1P1 (copy SMG) stating that SMG10 endorses stage 2 but that it has identified two risks, Tdoc SMG P-99-746
Special item for SMG#30IMEI security • CRs to enhance IMEI security, Tdoc SMG P-99-742 • CR to 02.09 to add the line: • “It shall not be possible to change the IMEI after the ME’s final production process. It shall resist tampering by any means (e.g. physical, electrical or software)” • Corresponding CRs to 02.16, 03.03 and 11.10
Special item for SMG#30SS7 security • Messages can be read, altered, injected or deleted i • Threats include denial of service, security triplet replay to compromise authentication and allow eavesdropping of user traffic • Exacerbated by increasing number of connections (and potential to connect to/via Internet) • Report contains list of threats related to “dangerous” messages • Handover work to 3GPP SA3
WPA Security mechanisms 1Chairman Henri Gilbert • GPRS • LS to SMG (copy GSMA SG) on use of GEA2 • SMG10 recommend that GEA2 should be an option in terminal/network from R97 and should become mandatory (EDGE can be mandatory from the outset) • SMG asked to consider appropriate timescales for making GEA2 mandatory • Network should be able to select between GEA1 and GEA2 during migration but network should not be able to set no encryption • If recommendations adopted then exact details need elaboration
WPA Security mechanisms 2 • Use of full length Kc • LS to SMG (copy GSMA SG) on use of 64 bit Kc • SMG#27 wrote to manufacturers - only positive responses were received • Manufacturers to ascertain that their equipment will work with a 64 bit Kc • Cut off date May 2000
WPA Security mechanisms 3 • EDGE • LS to SMG (copy GSMA SG) on use of A5 algorithms for EDGE • CR to 03.20 Annex C.1 on EDGE variant of A5 - for approval • Algorithm should be run to provide 696 bits (instead of 228) • No requirement for additional test data
WPB Security services 1Chairman Simon Collins • Clarification on triplet re-use conditions • CR to 03.20 on security triplet re-use conditions • CR agreed in SMG10 with comments from N2 (SMG3 WPC) • Allows re-use when system failure in HLR, disallows re-use in the event that subscriber unknown or barred • Changes from withdrawn CR at SMG#29 • Removed requirement that re-use should not be performed in case of badly formatted requests • Removed requirement that operator could specify how many times triplets could be re-used in VLR/SGSN • CRs to R96 and R97 withdrawn because of retro-fit issues
WPB Security services 2 • LCS • LS to T1P1 (copy SMG) on LCS • SMG10 endorse LCS stage 2 but have the following concerns • Possibility exists to manipulate MS positioning estimate through • Manipulation of differential GPS data (coming from another source than network) • Software changes to the MS • No changes suggested
WPB Security services 3 • Follow-me • LS was sent to SMG1 asking that the following is added to the specification • A note to the effect that the service shall not be offered in standard GSM releases, and that in any case it must be enabled by the operator • A statement that FIGS can be used where CAMEL is available • Wording on password control should indicate that this is not a very secure solution
WPB Security services 4 • SMS abuse • SMG#29 asked SMG10 for a statement on the nature of SMS abuse • Threats • mass mailing - resulting in denial of service, commercial opportunism • concern over liability for abusive content, damage to third party • Counters • control of direct and indirect access to manage SMS volumes and source
WPB Security services 5 • MExE • The MExE R99 has been handed over to 3GPP S3 • SMG10 shall be informed about progress
WPD Lawful interceptionChairman Bernie McKibben • SMG10 WPD supporting 3GPP LI work
Future scope of SMG10 • After transfer of 3G-related issues to 3GPP, the main areas where work is ongoing in SMG10 are: • Security for location services, CTS changes • Introduction of larger cipher key in GSM (if sufficient support from member companies is offered) • Evaluation of features developed for 3G for applications in GSM • Propose amalgamation with 3GPP SA3 - process to be discussed at next SMG 10 meeting
Future meetings • 16-19 November - SMG 10 plenary, joint with 3GPP S3 (Security)