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Let’s Go Together !!!

Let’s Go Together !!!. CTF HUIMANG Mission Analysis Brief. Operation CHUN SA MPAT TE – 3 Seoul, Korea 15 January 2002. PURPOSE. Conduct mission analysis, the first step of the CTF commander’s estimate process To brief the staff’s analysis of the situation and assigned mission

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Let’s Go Together !!!

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  1. Let’s Go Together !!!

  2. CTF HUIMANGMission Analysis Brief Operation CHUN SA MPAT TE – 3Seoul, Korea15 January 2002

  3. PURPOSE • Conduct mission analysis, the first step of the • CTF commander’s estimate process • To brief the staff’s analysis of the situation • and assigned mission • Obtain CCTF guidance

  4. AGENDA Crisis Situation ROK JCS (Higher Headquarters) Guidance Facts / Assumptions / Limitations Centers of Gravity Tasks Available Forces Risk Desired Endstate Time Analysis Proposed CCTF Mission and Intent Statements CCTF Feedback / Guidance

  5. Crisis Summary • 04 Aug : Typhoon “Dawn” strikes ROP • 25 Aug : Earthquake hits ROP • 10 Sep : 100,000 refugees arrive in ROK • Refugee Camps : Cheju, Mokpo, Kunsan • 12 Sep : ROP asks for International and • ROK assistance • 14 Sep : UN issues an appeal (money, supply) • 24 Sep : UN issues a second appeal • requesting ROK lead MNF • 27 Sep : Typhoon “Nari” strikes ROP and • Southwest part of ROK • 01 Oct : CTF “HUI MANG” stood up Typhoon “DAWN” Typhoon “NARI” CTF Refugee Camp Refugee Camp Earthquake Refugee Camp Parang Do

  6. Kunsan C T F Pohang Pusan Mokpo 110 NM Cheju ROP CTF Area of Operations • AO (Area of Operations) • - Kyong Sang Province • (Pusan, Daegu) • - Cheon La Province (Kwnagju) • - Cheju Province • - Republic of Parang Do

  7. CRISIS SITUATION • Weather: rainy and cold season • - Roads passable, but there is a potential for • landslides in mountains • Red Banner (RB) criminal threat mainly in ROP • - Red Banner may turn crisis to its long-term • advantage • - Supply and equipment buildup on island may • attract criminals

  8. Railton Youngdo Perth Collinsvale Dong Nam Po CRISIS SITUATION • Disaster Areas (Cholera all areas) • Capital Dong Nam Po • 100K • Measles • East Coast • 40K • Central Highlands • 45K • 20K (RB Land) • 25K (Young Doo) • North Coast • 15K • Rice crop harvest • 25% of crop remains • 22.5 thousand metric tons North Coast 4 cities East Coast

  9. ROK JCS MISSION(Higher Headquarters (HHQ)) CTF Huimang assist the Republic of Parang Do (ROP) by providing initial HA / DR in ROP and for ROP refugee camps in the ROK, and in assisting with initial infrastructure recovery operations in Parang Do until civilian authorities and non-governmental organizations are capable of assuming these missions.

  10. ROK JCS INTENT(Higher Headquarters) I intend for CTF Huimang to conduct HA / DR operations to provide immediate life saving, relieve human suffering caused by the natural disasters in the operational area, conduct emergency infrastructure repair, and turn over mission to competent civil authorities and redeploy at the earliest possible opportunity.

  11. ROK JCS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (HHQ) CTF Huimang provides the planning / C2 HQ for multinational military contributions to relief efforts for Operation CHUN SA. Military planners from contributing nations will augment the CTF to assist with the development of the plan and to assist with C2 functions during mission execution. CTF Huimang operations are in support of civilian and government agencies. Coordinated and synchronized operations are imperative to mission success.

  12. ROK JCS PLANNING GUIDANCE (HHQ) Rapidly deploy forces / establish C3 to facilitate MNF arrival and LG support Plan for strategic / tactical movement of food, medical supplies, shelters and other supplies to distribution sites in the AO and assist in the distribution Conduct emergency repairs to critical infrastructure / restore basic services Support NGOs in HA / DR relief operations Coordinate transition of support missions to ROP, UN and other agencies as appropriate Redeploy forces

  13. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING AIR ASSETS 2 x C 160 22 x C 130 6 x C 47 2 x C5 4 x C 17 2 x IL 76 2 x C 141 2 x KC 135 4 x MELIN HELOS 2 x LIGHT HELOS 5 x UH 1 x SP HELO 1 x HH 60 MARITIME 7 x LST 1 x FFG 1 x LPD 1 x LHD 2 x LSD 1 x LSH 100 x LARGE CRAFT 300 x MED CRAFT 100 x SMALL CRAFT LAND FORCES BDE (-2) 3 x BN (+) 6 x LAV 10 x HMMVS 2 x ENGR BN 6 x ENGR CO 4 x ENGR PLT 4 x ENGR TEAM 2 x ACE 10 x EN HMMVS 5 x MED CO 9 x MED TM 2 x AMBULANCES 45 x TPNs 1 x CABN 2 x SOFCO 5 x SOFTM 1 x LOG BDE HQ 1 x LOG GRP 2 x LOG CO 2 x DR TM

  14. INITIAL FORCE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS Sealift – sufficient from supply points in ROK Airlift – sufficient for food mission (assuming other lift utilized for MNF deployment and support Engineers – adequate Communications – need additional tactical and strategic communications

  15. FACTS & CONCLUSIONS • Facts • Food required in RPO by C+3, ROK by C+1 • Water/shelter required from C+1 • Eng services initially focused on min infrastructure repair to enable relief operation • Health support required from C+2 • Strategic/tactical lift is limited • Conclusions • Utilize NGOs to maximum extent practicable • Need to establish HA hubs (Conclusion)

  16. ASSUMPTIONS 100K Korean IDPs and damaged infrastructure in ROK will be responsibility of the ROK Sufficient fuel for air / sea operations will be available ROK assets are sufficient to transfer initial food and supplies (Maritime). Additional strategic lift available for force deployment / sustainment (Air). Required basing available for transient aircraft (Air). Limited landing areas available for helicopters (SOF). Weather will permit airborne operations in the short term. Initial assessments conducted by quick deployable force. A forward CP will be established in Parang Do (C2).

  17. LIMITATIONS • CONSTRAINTS: (must do) • Information Ops (I/O) Campaign (we are here to help) • Must begin distributing food/water/medical supplies/shelter to ROP refugees by 4 Oct • Must provide force protection in ROP • Recover infrastructure in ROP • Deploy some forces NLT 4 Oct • Deploy bulk of forces by 12 Oct • Complete mission within 60 days (4 Dec) • RESTRAINTS: (can’t do) • Can’t control the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) / International Organizations (IO) / media • Can’t use USFK and ROK forces without higher approval • Operations are limited to AO (area of operations)

  18. CENTERS OF GRAVITY • Strategic: Coalition cohesiveness • Operational: Ability to conduct HA /DR Logistically (airlift and sealift assets)

  19. SPECIFIED / IMPLIED / ESSENTIAL TASKS Specified / Implied / Highlighted in Yellow: Essential • Rapidly Deploy • Establish IO / CMOC • Provide Initial HA/DR • Provide water / food / shelter / medical care • Provide force protection / security for camps and APODS(Aerial Ports of Debarkation) / SPODS(Sea Ports of Debarkation) • Stop flow of Refugees from ROP to ROK • Repatriate Refugees from ROK to ROP • Assist in emergency infrastructure recovery in ROP • Restore power to water generation facilities • Repair airports / sea ports / roads • Transition to competent civil authorities • Assist with law and order • Redeploy ASAP (as soon as possible) • Support NGOs • Provide C3 • Integrate planners into CTF • Provide mort affairs • Conduct SAR (Search and Rescue)

  20. RISK ASSESSMENT • Mission accomplishment and force • protection risks: • Lack of food, water and shelter • Degradation of SPODs / APODs • Disease outbreak • Looting / crime • Civil unrest • Misinformation / panic

  21. OPERATIONAL END STATE Human suffering alleviated and environment stabilized: water, food, shelter and medical care available to affected ROP populace and refugees Host nation / civil authorities / NGOs (as appropriate) have assumed Multinational Force (MNF) missions Emergency infrastructure recovered MNF Redeployed

  22. TIME ANALYSIS • Mission Complete within 60 days • Must start delivering food to Parang Do within 3 days • CCTF Must be able to supply fuel to all CTF immediately • CCTf must be able to supply all other logistic supplies to forces within 5 days

  23. PROPOSED CTF RESTATED MISSION When directed, CTF Huimang will provide initial HA/DR and conduct emergency infrastructure repair within the AO in order to alleviate human suffering and create an environment enabling the transition to civil authority

  24. PROPOSED CCTF INTENT I intend for CTF Huimang to relieve human suffering and save lives by conducting emergency infrastructure repair, providing medical assistance and basic needs of the affected persons, turning over all support missions to civil authorities and NGOs within 60 days.

  25. CCTF GUIDANCE • Feedback on Staff’s Mission Analysis • Initial Commander’s Intent • CCIR • Planning Guidance

  26. Commander’s Guidance Mission Statement: Commencing 3 October, CTF Huimang deploys to the Area of Operations (AO) (ROP; ROK – Kyongsang & Cholla Province and Chejudo) to provide food, shelter, medical support and to repair emergency infrastructure in order to relieve human suffering and transition to competent civil authorities

  27. Commander’s Guidance Commander’s Intent: Purpose: To provide food, shelter and medical support To repair emergent infrastructure To transition to competent civil authorities End State: The suffering of ROP refugees in Korea and affected populace in ROP is relieved The CTF mission is fully transitioned to host nation/NGOs The CTF is fully redeployed to the respective nations

  28. Commander’s Guidance Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR): The status of airfield and seaports on Parang Do Displaced persons’ status on Parang Do Any losses or activities that jeopardize successful CTF mission accomplishment

  29. Time to Develop COAs

  30. Backup slides

  31. Situation Update ( 01 12:00 Oct. 2001 ) CofS, CTF (COL Yang)

  32. Strategic Background • Republic of Parang Do initially asks for ROK and UN assistance with disaster relief • ROK designated “Lead nation” by UN for ROP response • ROK President directs MND to coordinate and synchronize mulinational relief operations • Chairman, ROK JCS activates Coalition Task Force • “HUI MANG” • CTF “HUI MANG” prepares “Operation CHUN SA” • to respond UN appeal

  33. Crisis Summary • 04 Aug : Typhoon “Dawn” strikes ROP • 25 Aug : Earthquake hits ROP • 10 Sep : 100,000 refugees arrive in ROK • Refugee Camps : Cheju, Mokpo, Kunsan • 12 Sep : ROP asks for International and • ROK assistance • 14 Sep : UN issues an appeal (money, supply) • 24 Sep : UN issues a second appeal • requesting ROK lead MNF • 27 Sep : Typhoon “Nari” strikes ROP and • Southwest part of ROK • 01 Oct : CTF “HUI MANG” stood up Typhoon “DAWN” Typhoon “NARI” CTF Refugee Camp Refugee Camp Earthquake Refugee Camp Parang Do

  34. Current Threats • Situation in Parang Do • - DP : 200,000 people without shelter • - Infrastructure •  Dong Nam Po : Only 1 pier undamaged •  Young Doo Po : All piers damaged •  Airfield : Damaged •  Power generation / water stations destroyed • - Food : 3 days food supplies remained (- 4days) • - Medical : Illness, Cholera / Measles outbreak • - Security : Looting relief supplies

  35. Current Threats (cont.) • Situation in S/W ROK • - Youngsan / Mankyung River overflowed • - All roads at 80% capacity • - Power Genaeration damaged • - Cheju Int’l airport damaged 8 Oct • - Without Shelter : 100,000 People • - Medical : Illness, Cholera outbreak • - Food : 10 days for 300,000 people remained(-12 days) • Refugee Camps in ROK • - 20 refugee camps (100,000 people) severely destroyed • due to the overflooding • - Power distribution lines destroyed

  36. Int’l Contributions • 101 pallets of food per day (for 30 days) • 9 pallets of medical supplies per day (for 30 days) • 18 pallets of shelter materials per day (for 30 days) • Aircraft : 30 for 30 days • Strategic lift(16) • 2 / C-5 : US • 4 / C-17 : US(2), UK(2), • 1 / IL-76 : India • 9 / C-130 : Australia, Canada, France, Japan, • Malaysia(3), UK(2) • Tactical lift : 4 / C-130 (Korea) • Helo(10) • Heavy : 5 (Korea), 2 (Singapore) • Medium : 2 (France), 1 (Singapore)

  37. Int’l Contributions(cont.) • Sealift : 74 for 60 days • Small Costal Freighter : 20 • Medium Costal Freighter : 33 • Large Freighter : 11 • US LSD(5), LCU(4), AS LSH(1) :10 • Engineer (60 days) • 6 Light construction units • 6 Water production units • Medical (60 days) : 6 Field Dispensaries :

  38. Tasks to Supporting Commanders • Multinational Forces • - Integrate planners into CTF HUIMANG NLT 011200 Oct • - Provide liaison with NCAs and with CCTF • - Establish NCEs to provide command over national forces • - As required, provide OPCON / TACON contributing naton forces • to the CCTF • ROK Operational Commanders • - Provide CCTF OPCON / TACON of designated forces • - As required, Provide liaison to CCTF • ROK Regional Units • - As required, Provide liaison to CCTF • - Provide ROK military facilities in support of Operation CHUN SA

  39. Warning Order - Operation CHUN SA - Chairman, ROK JCS

  40. Contents • CCTF Mission • Assumptions • Concept of operations • Coalition Operation Area • Intent / Coordinating Instructions • Command Relations • Other Guidance

  41. CCTF Mission • To assist the Republic of Parang Do (ROP) by providing initial HA / DR in ROP and for ROP refugee camps in the ROK • To assist initial infrastructure recovery in Parang Do

  42. Assumptions • ROP Government will only be able to recover its ability to control over the disaster after 60 days. • No significant internal security threats exist in ROP. • ROK Armed Forces can only provide additional assets to CTF under Government approval. • International contributions will be available as planned.

  43. Concept of Operations • CTF “HUI MANG” operations are in support of civilian government agencies. • Main efforts of Operation “CHUN SA” is logistic operation. • Endstate of Operation “CHUN SA” is its mission fully transitioned to civillian authorities and the MNF redeployed. • Coordination / synchronization is imperative to the success of the mission.

  44. Kunsan C T F Pohang Pusan Mokpo 110 NM Cheju ROP Coalition Operational Area • COA • - Kyong Sang Province • (Pusan, Daegu) • - Cheon La Province (Kwnagju) • - Cheju Province • - Republic of Parang Do • For detailed APOD, SPOD, Main Roads refer to the map

  45. Commander’s Intent My intent is for CTF “HUI MANG” to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations to provide immediate life saving and relieve human suffering caused by the natural disasters in the operational area, to conduct emergency infrastructure repair and to turn over the mission to a competent civil authority and redeploy at the earliest possible opportunity.

  46. Coordinating Instructions • Execute planning upon receipt of this warning order. • Make use of the liaison officers. • All forces require to be self-sufficient for firstv five days. • Sustainment of forces is a joint responsibility of the NCEs and the CCTF. • Maximize the use of Mutual Support Agreements • Use of deadly force for self-defense is authorized. • Main effort of Operation is concentrated on Parang Do, • if APOD and/or SPOD is available.

  47. Command Relations • CCTF is the supported commander • Participating forces to be OPCON or TACON to CCTF • National Command Elements from contributing nations provide command (less OPCON) of deployed national forces and provide liaison to CCTF • Direct liaison of all supporting elements with CCTF authorized • CTF HUI MANG “Main” initially located vicinity of Taegu

  48. Other Guidance • Provide recommended Course of Action • NLT 03 1200 Oct. Include: • Plan for strategic and tactical movement of food, medical supplies, shelter materials for distribution • Concept for utilization of engineer and medical unit • Strategic Center of Gravity is the cohesion among participating nations • Time is critical for this operation • C day = D day (03 Oct. 2001)

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