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Explore the implementation of a Delegate Authentication System to simplify eduroam deployment across 1200+ institutions in Japan, enhancing network stability and security.
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29th APAN Meeting Feb. 8-11, 2010, Sydney, Australia eduroam Delegate Authentication System with Shibboleth SSO Hideaki Goto, Hideaki Sone Tohoku Univ. / NII Ichiro Yamaguchi, Takaaki Suzuki Tohoku Univ.
A great challenge … How many higher education institutionsare there in Japan? 1,200+ (govt. survey in year 2008) • 765 universities (86 national, 90 public) • 481 two-year colleges and vocational colleges eduroam deployment: 11 / 1200 = 0.9%
Problems • A large number of institutions (1,200+) • Difficulties in RADIUS deployment • Laborious eduroam connection / management work • Our solutions • Federated Delegate Authentication System with centralized RADIUS server • remove RADIUS IdP at each institution • Federation using Shibboleth SSO • simplify RADIUS tree (higher stability) • solve some privacy and security issues • Web-based eduroam IdP / SP management system • reduce the work at both the eduroam JP officeand each institution
Easy-to-join eduroam system 2. eduroam IdP/SP management web Institution’sRADIUS server national top-level <secret key 1> access points RADIUS proxy auth requests <secret key 2> RADIUS IdP 1. Delegate Authentication System (DEAS)
Federated Delegate Authentication System • Account Issuer as a Shibboleth SP of Japan’s UPKI inter-university federation • Centralized RADIUS server to simplify the RADIUS proxy tree • 3 types depending on the needs and federation level • Pseudo-anonymized, fixed-term, and traceable roaming IDs
Delegate Authentication System - Type I Japan’s centralizedaccount issuer Institutions RADIUSserver The account is temporary and expires within 6 months. pseudonymousaccounts IdM IdM Web UI Manual account issue requests by administrators. • The system can be used even without IdM. • Issuing Guest IDs is possible.
Delegate Authentication System – Type II Japan’s centralizedaccount issuer Institutions RADIUSserver The account is temporary and expires within 6 months. pseudonymousaccount Web UI IdM IdM ID federation using Shibboleth/SAML for administrators only. • Administrators can request for user accounts in bulk. • Issuing Guest IDs is possible.
Delegate Authentication System – Type III Japan’s centralizedaccount issuer Institutions RADIUSserver The account is temporary and expires within a month. pseudonymousaccount IdM IdM ID federation using Shibboleth/SAML • End user can request for personal accounts only.
Web-based eduroam IdP / SP management system • Application for eduroam IdP / SP connectionvia eduroam JP website • Online sign-up for institutional administrator(s) ( require approval by the national admin. ) • Online registration of institution data • Management console for institutions • RADIUS server address and secret setting • Enable or disable Self-IdP / DEAS / SP(AP) • Remote authentication self-testing (planned) development under way Features:
NEWS • Negotiation is under waywith a commercial Wi-Fi Service Provider • We will have hundreds of eduroam APs in the central Tokyo ! Outsourcing campus Wi-Fi system would be a key to success of large-scale deployment.
Summary • Large-scale eduroam deployment in Japan -- A great challenge -- • Delegate Authentication System • ease eduroam deployment • Federated ID issuer as a Shibboleth SP • simplify eduroam network = stabilize eduroam authentication • Web-based eduroam IdP / SP management • make eduroam easy-to-join • simplify connection and administration work • at the national administrative body • at each institution
Problem details in large-scale deployment • Difficult and laborious configurations of RADIUS / APs at each organization. • Difficulties in newly constructing an “eduroam account database” or making a RADIUS-IdM bridge for each organization. • Many universities do not have Federated IdM yet. • Laborious work for institution connection. • A lot of paper work • RADIUS configuration support • Connection testing • Troubleshooting … etc. Impossible to deal with hundreds of institutions!
eduroam JP in UPKI project • An activity in NII’s UPKI project • Promotion and Operation of eduroam JP • 11 institutions connected (Feb. 2010) • Tutorial & technical documents • R&D to solve problems • Easy configurations • Guest use of local IP addresses • Location privacy, etc. • Talks with commercial W-ISPsfor roaming • Shared access points possible? • Negotiations are under way.
Threats of ID/PW leakage • User ID is logged at proxy servers along the AAA path. • Location privacy problem. • PW could be logged due to inappropriate configuration by the user. • Critical security breach if an important PW is used. logged Worldwide RADIUS tree potentialleakage logged logged logged ID database RADIUS Access Request RADIUS Access Accept / Reject AP