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This study delves into the cognitive aspects of mathematics education and history, examining methodologies and practices within the field. Discover the intersection of cognitive science and sociology in understanding mathematical practices.
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Toward a Cognitive Historiography of Mathematics Education Iason Kastanisa & Nikos Kastanisb a) Universidad de Barcelona, Spain b)Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
Overview • Introduction • Cognitive consideration in contemporary mathematics contexts: • In mathematics education • In history of mathematics • A look into the methodology of the cognitive history of mathematics • The practice in the historiography of science • An example in history of mathematics: the abacus cultural practice • The practice as means in the historiography of mathematics education • Conclusion
Motivation In 1999 published the book Cognitive history of mathematics, it is something that does exist. So, there should also be a cognitive history of mathematics education But, what is a cognitive history of mathematics? And what about a cognitive history of mathematics education?
The cognitive consideration is favored today in mathematics contexts In Mathematics Education
James Greeno states thatthe cognitive approach emphasizes: conceptual structures, representations of information, conceptual changes, and discourses of practice
In History of Mathematics page 7
It is obvious that there are cognitive concerns and inquiries in the Mathematics Education and the History of Mathematics. But, what is known about the methodology of the cognitive history of mathematics?
Unlocking the historiographical door of mathematics Page 13 “The historians need to analyze the concrete scientific action rather than an abstract life of mathematical ideas.” This is a position of the German historian, Moritz Epple.
As Epple further clarifies: “The practice of mathematics […] is a complex of actions, such as defining, conjecturing, proving, etc. These mathematical actions are immersed in communicative and social actions like publishing, giving talks, applying for positions, organizing meetings, and the like.” This is a new approach to the history of mathematics, and it can be applied to various case studies, for example:
In their history-oriented studies, Epple and Kjeldsen analyzed the distinct research practices that led to new theories of modern mathematics. They noticed the local character of the respective research activities that expresses the local traditions of mathematical practices, that is the distinct mathematical cultures. On the other hand, Matthew Jones focused on the discursive practices that were developed within the broader cultural and cognitive context of 17th century mathematics.
The practice in the historiography of science Since the 1960’s, the ideas of Thomas Kuhn dominate the historiography and epistemology of science. Kuhn and his followers “reorient the philosophy of science toward an account of scientific practices rather than scientific knowledge”.
Around 1980, two movements emerged in the epistemology of science: the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, and the Cognitive Science Kuhnian epistemology Sociology of Scientific Knowledge Cognitive Science Steven Shapin Nancy Nersessian
The position of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: -science is a product of the historical interactions of intellectual groups, [rather than a rational inspiration of individual human mind], -there is a shift from conceiving of science as knowledge to conceiving of science as practice.
History of mathematics from the point of view of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
The position of Cognitive Science: -there is a interplay between the case studies of historical scientific practices and the corresponding problem-solving ways of thinking, human reasoning and representations, -the scientific activities emerge within the cultural and social environment of a specific historical period and region.
History of mathematics from the point of view of Cognitive Science
Historical approach to mathematics with elements from both Cognitive Science and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
A look at practice from the historiographical point of view — Tools/means Motivations/goals Practice: — Products/consequences cognitive practice historico-psychological viewpoint Sociocultural viewpoint Interests, Choices, Representations, Ways of reasoning practices in a Historical Case Social conditions, Cultural values, Legitimacy of means of practices in Historical and Local Contexts
Components of cognitive practice Social and Cultural Trends for Scientific Changes in a Historical Period Institutional, Professional, Normalizational Possibilities/Limits in a Cultural Context cognitive practice Epistemological, Methodological, Discursive Resources in a Historical Context
An example from the history mathematics: the abacus cultural practice Jens Høyruppoints out that “The norm system which governed the practice of abacus mathematics was not identical with that of Greek-inspired Humanist and university mathematics, and could not be already because the practices they governed were different in spite of similarities.” “As early as 1900, it is true, Moritz Cantor had spoken of the existence throughout the 15th century of two coexisting “schools” of mathematics, one “geistlich” (“clerical”, that is, universitarian), the other “weltlich oder kaufmännisch” (“secular or commercial”, supposedly derived from Leonardo Fibonacci’s work).”
The distinctive professional normalization formed different scientific identities: that of mathematics practitioners and that of mathematics scholars. But, this diverse identities reflected, also, different discursive practices: a folk mathematical discourse, from one side, and a learned mathematical discourse, from the other. This historical case shows the existence of two different cultural practices in late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, which corresponded, also, to two different mathematical educations.
The practice as means in the historiography of mathematics education Already, such historical approaches have appeared in the history of science education, e.g. the works of Kathryn Olesko and David Kaiser.
In history of mathematics education, very close to this historiographical kind are the publications of Gert Schubring and Lewis Pyenson.
Schubring and Pyenson developed, systematically, the epistemological, cultural, and institutional approaches to the historical cases of mathematics education. These are shared with the contemporary cognitive historiography of mathematics. Warwick’s book Masters of Theory, Cambridge and the Rise of Mathematical Physics, makes a turn from the standard perception of “focusing mainly on the history of mathematical innovation[s]” toward mathematical practices and their dependence upon local pedagogical contexts.
Warwick is inspired by the contemporary tendency of the historiography of science and science education, which he applied in his analysis of the emergence of mathematical physics in the context of Cambridge University in the 19th century. He shows “how a system of values that holds in the mathematics and science education, the institutional conditions of pedagogical practices, the coordination of secondary and higher education, and the assignation of social prestige to the new scientific careers and to the science teaching led to transform the state of a local scientific culture”.
Two interesting remarks in Warwick’s analysis: The first one refers to the “pedagogical revolution” by the development and impact of such pedagogical devices as face-to-face training in problem solving on paper, written examinations, educationally orientated treatises, and end-of-chapter exercises. The second remark concerns the appearance of blackboard in teaching. He presented a related 1850 illustration:
These remarks, naturally, generate related questions central to the cognitive historiography of mathematics education: When did the use of exercises in the mathematical textbooks of various countries or cultural communities begin? How and why did it spread? Which pedagogical necessities or pedagogical theories motivated the practice of blackboard? How did this pedagogical tool spread to various countries? These questions concern the history of mathematics education. And they are related to pedagogical practices.
This new perspective on history of mathematics and mathematics education is fully compatible with social constructivism, nowadays dominant in the epistemology of mathematics and mathematics education. And its momentum in contemporary historiography of science and mathematics is very strong.