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Securing your IP based Phone System. By Kevin Moroz VP Technology Snom Inc. . What are we trying to protect? . Denial of Service – the phone system is down! T oll Fraud – a very large phone bill! Eavesdropping – someone listening to your calls.
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Securing your IP based Phone System By Kevin Moroz VP Technology Snom Inc.
What are we trying to protect? • Denial of Service – the phone system is down! • Toll Fraud – a very large phone bill! • Eavesdropping – someone listening to your calls. • Call detailed records exposed – who is calling you and who are you calling! • Karma! – keeping everyone happy! • remote users, internal users, road warriors, finance, admins, • system should be “Set it and forget it “ • moves adds changes SHOULD be the major activity
Denial of Service is Priority 1 • DoS attacks can take your whole system down. • nobody can call you and you can’t call anybody for help! Worse case scenario! • If your phone system sits on a public IP address this is a very realistic scenario. • Why be on a public IP address? • makes it very easy for remote users to connect from home and on the road from behind NAT’d devices if the IPBX has this capability. • debatable whether this is the practical scenario for enterprises but a must for service providers.
Intrusion Detection is a must! • Need to automatically detect an attack and email admin
Intruder Alert! Automatic Email Notification • From: thepbx@yourcompany.com [mailto:admin@mycompany.com] Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2011 8:57 PMTo: admin@mycompany.com.comSubject: My Company Name Goes here: Address 69.61.210.157 has been blacklisted • The IP address 69.96.218.157 has been blacklisted for 1440 minutes • because there were 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts (sip). • From: thepbx@yourcompany.com [mailto:admin@mycompany.com] • Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2011 8:57 PM • To: admin@mycompany.com.com • Subject: My Company Name Goes here: Address 70.96.218.17 has been blacklisted • The IP address 70.96.218.17 has been blacklisted for 1440 minutes • because there were 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts (http).
Many programs on Internet to “test” the system for vulnerabilities.
Friendly VoIP Scanner not so friendly! • scans the network SIP packets. • Once it gets a SIP response back like a 401 or a 404 it sends massive amounts of SIP packets to the IP address • Renders it useless since it is to busy processing all of the packets. • Even if you have port forwarding the router will forward the calls and bog it down. • Need something intelligent to figure out you are being attached and to do something about it while maintaining the current call load.
SipVicious! • test tool that can go rogue easily. • test tools gone wild!
hackingvoip.com • probably a good read to learn some torture tricks for an IPBX! • Not a bad idea to test your system with some of these public tools.
More free “tools” available • these tools make it easier for “newbies” to be able to launch “DOS” attacks.
IPBX should monitor the CPU! • If more than x% of the CPU is in use then don’t accept any more calls. • Send a 5xx message – Server Failure with the reason code in the packet. • protects current calls to be processed without any quality issues. • New calls may not go through until a call is released or CPU is under the threshold. • Send email alert!
Different topologies • IPBX has one network interface card (NIC) on a private address. Remote users VPN in. • not practical since not many phones support VPN natively yet and complex to setup the VPN endpoints. • open VPN is a good open source project. • IPBX has on NIC on a private address with a SIP aware router/session border controller installed. • IPBX is on a public IP address and a private IP address. • make sure your running the latest OS and patches. • IPBX is only on a public IP address • service providers
Toll Fraud- Big business! Big Money • VoIP Bandit Got em! http://www.amw.com/fugitives/capture.cfm?id=49218&refresh=1 • Recent 12 Million dollar case in Romania. • Not
1st line of defense is the passwords! • Most toll fraud is accomplished by guessing simple passwords. Extension 101 / password 101. • This happened to one of my customers just last week. The ITSP cut them off at $250 since their usage spiked dramatically.
How to protect toll fraud • password management • restrict Direct Inward Station Access (DISA) accounts or calling card type of features. • Put a rate table on the trunk and restrict the accounts. • prepay or have the ITSP put limits on the accounts.
How can we train the users? • Force them to use strong passwords? • How? Make sure the system forces them!
Difference between High and Medium Passwords • Medium Security: The score must be 120 or higher • High Security: The score must be 200 or higher
admin needs to monitor passwords! • The status screen indicates that the password is weak. • either it is the same as the username. • It is easily guessable 1234
Prepay support • ability to put a rate table in the pbx • put a dollar amount in on the extension or the whole pbx. • Once the balance is expired no more external calls for that extension or system.
What are we trying to protect? • Denial of Service – the phone system is down! • Toll Fraud – a very large phone bill! • Eavesdropping – someone listening to your calls. • Call detailed records exposed – who is calling you and who are you calling! • Karma! – keeping everyone happy! • remote users, internal users, road warriors, finance, admins, • system should be “Set it and forget it “ • moves adds changes SHOULD be the major activity
Prepay support • ability to put a rate table in the pbx • put a dollar amount in on the extension or the whole pbx. • Once the balance is expired no more external calls for that extension or system.
Protecting the conversation! • Probably the easiest since not a new problem to solve. i.e. https. • Probably the hardest to implement • certificates, keys, encryption, VPN’s