200 likes | 371 Views
Anti-Corruption Agencies: Building to Last. Gabriel Kuris Innovations for Successful Societies Princeton University August 7, 2012 ‘Comparative, International Perspectives on Corruption’
E N D
Anti-Corruption Agencies:Building to Last Gabriel Kuris Innovations for Successful Societies Princeton University August 7, 2012 ‘Comparative, International Perspectives on Corruption’ A symposium hosted by the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) and Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg *
Overview • What do anti-corruption agencies do? • Why do countries create them? • What are some successful examples? • Takeaway lessons
Types of Agencies Single-function agency Multi-function agency Decentralized authorities
Why do countries create ACAs? And why on earth would corrupt actors in government agree to it? • Legal obligations • International pressure • Domestic demand • Confidence it can be neutralized or controlled UNCAC Ratification (2011)
Two popular models Easier to create, requires more trust in supporting institutions. Higher profile, requires more accountability.
Recent Examples of Success • Not many • Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Botswana, New South Wales • Mixed successes: Malaysia, Slovenia
Factors of success • Political commitment • Ample resources • Sound Structure
Attributes of success • Independence • Strength • Sustainability
Matrix of success Independent Strong Weak Captured (Sustainability is change of position over time)
Perceptions of Corruption in a new democracy Democratic Transition Improvement (or habituation?) Public disenchantment Turmoil! Scandals in the press Decentralization of corruption Money politics
Indonesia KPK • Strategy of Attack: • Build capacity • Earn trust • Then ramp up attack • Early Successes • Pushback: • Parliament • Police • Strategy of Defense: • Huge public rallies • International pressure
Indonesia KPK Results • Survival. High public trust (but down from peak) • 100% conviction rate • Nearly 50 MPs, 28 mayors, also ambassadors, governors, ministers, mayors, business leaders, central bank governors, directors of state-owned companies. • Hundreds of millions in recovered assets (US$) • Wealth reporting compliance ~85% • Upshot: inspiring, unprecedented performance • But can the goalie win the game alone?
Latvia (KNAB) • Strategy of Attack: • Quick start • Slowly stalk the big game • Use all levers (admi • Early Successes • Pushback: • Parliament • Internal • Strategy of Defense: • Major public rallies • Political pressure
Latvia (KNAB) Results • Survival. High public trust. • Electoral sea change • Oligarch-aligned parties in Parliament: 51% (2006) to 13% (2011) • Legislative reforms • E.g. zero-declarations law • Dozens of cases • Some big fish • Upshot: Triggered change
Lithuania (STT) • Strategy of Attack: • Build capacity • Evolve towards independence, multi-functionality • Early Successes • Pushback: • Parliament • Media • Strategy of Defense: • Live to fight another day • Reorient towards prevention, education
Lithuania (STT) Results • Survival. Moderate public trust. • Hundreds of investigations • Near-universal review of draft legislation, integration of AC curricula into schools nationwide. • Upshot: investigative impact unclear. • But still a success?
Lessons • Independence is about more than position • Must build capacity and internal controls • Public support is the only trump card • To gain advantage, change the rules of the game • To win the game, change values