Keynote Presentation to Networking and Security Research Center (NSRC) Industry Day 2012

1. Keynote Presentation to Networking and Security Research Center (NSRC) Industry Day 2012 • Robert A. Kehlet • Basic and AppliedSciences • J9 Research and Development • Defense Threat Reduction Agency • 26 April 2012 Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

2. Secretary of Defense Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Director, DTRA DTRA History WMD Threat Reduction Counterproliferation Non-Proliferation DTRA BASIC RESEARCH 2005 2007 1947 1997 1998 Today

3. Chemical Weapons ... cheap and easy to make ... casualties not widespread High-Yield Explosives ... easily available materials with many ways to deliver … point targets Biological Weapons …. not difficult to find/use … attacks not quickly recognized, … casualties propagate with time WMD THREATS Nuclear Weapons ... difficult to acquire, devastating in use Radiological Devices ... dangerous to assemble with high contamination impact … low lethality DTRA Mission DTRA safeguards the United States and its Allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects. Providing Solutions Across the Full Spectrum of Combating WMD

4. RD-BA Directorate Focus • Foster farsighted, high payoff research focused on the unique challenges to prevent, reduce, eliminate, defeat and mitigate threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) • Attract next-generation workforce • Advance the fundamental knowledge and understanding in the sciences • Promote university research to support WMD threat reduction • Facilitate transition of research results to higher levels of S&T maturation 4

5. Physical Networks & Network Theory • Motivation and Long-Term Objectives • Motivation: A WMD event will have a large geographic impact simultaneously across multiple networks causing cascading failures and decreased capacity across networks with shifting demand • Objectives: Expand understanding and identify methods/strategies for the response, resilience, and recovery of interconnected networks to the extreme environments associated with WMD effects • Current Practice: • Network structure and dynamics are fairly well understood • Early research into adaptive recovery of networks whose structure has changed • Little to no capability to predict, prioritize or manage changed demand for remaining infrastructure capacity • DTRA Niche: • Extreme conditions over a wide area simultaneously affecting multiple networks • Cascading failures across infra-structure networks • “Hardening” and mitigation strategies from impacts of WMD use • Impact: • Near real-time support for pre-event predictions, damage assessments and strategies to remediate the effects of WMD attack (e.g. cascading failure, change in demand)

6. One potential WMD Environment • A high altitude nuclear weapon burst can produce an “electromagnetic shock wave” covering a significant portion of the United States • Such geographically-large “insults” simultaneously affect networks, their interconnections, and may induce cascading failure

7. Physical Networks & Network Theory Algorithms to Extract State of Network Failure Reporting and Robustness Network Dynamics with Respect to Multiple Failures Rapid Analysis of Dynamics Recovery Strategies and Optimized Survivability Physical Networks & NetworkTheory New Theories for Adaptive Recovery Adaptability to cascading Failures & Interdependencies Robust Network Design Strategies to Counter Multiple Failures Modern Technical Network Behaviors Analysis of technical networks Under multiple failures

8. Physical Networks & Theory Algorithms to Extract State of Network • Challenges & Barriers: • Field is relatively nascent, little research in the DTRA niche exists • Changing research focus to include cascading and interdependent networks • Limited DTRA mission niche • Objectives: • Identify factors for network robustness of interdependent networks • Discover theory and create algorithms for WMD damage assessment • Opportunities: • Research on analyzing the robustness of interdependent networks • Research on topology categorization for interdependent systems of networks • Bio-inspired resilient network design

9. Physical Networks & Theory Algorithms to Extract State of Network

10. Physical Networks & Theory Network Dynamics - Multiple Failures • Objectives: • Identify behavior of networks including changes in network topologies over time • Opportunities: • Rapid analysis algorithms could contribute to containment and remediation of major damage • Challenges & Barriers: • Fundamental models for dynamic topologies are needed • Real networks are interdependent

11. Physical Networks & Theory Network Dynamics - Multiple Failures A subsequent failed node A node within the impact radius, but not affected by the failure A failed node

12. Physical Networks & Theory Network Dynamics - Multiple Failures

13. Physical Networks & Theory New Theories for Adaptive Recovery • Challenges & Barriers: • Lack of fundamental mathematical representations for network dynamics with changing topologies • Inability to process massive data sets for data-to-decision close to real time • Understanding of human cognition for autonomous systems • Objectives: • Develop mathematical based strategies and techniques for identifying stopping cascading failures, repairing damaged networks, and ultimately for adaptive recovery from WMD attacks. • Opportunities: • Mathematical methods for burst robustness and rapid analysis of cascading failures • Strategies for network repairing and resource reallocation via topology, logic structures and multilayer network dynamics • New theories to speed up data-to-decision process

14. Physical Networks & Theory New Theories for Adaptive Recovery

15. Physical Networks and Theory Modern Technical Network Behaviors • Objectives: • Characterize impact of changed demands on networks due to WMD attack • Characterize Modern-technical feedback of networks and its impact • Opportunities: • Predict and prioritize changed demand and identify optimal strategies for allocation of remaining capacity under varying attack scenarios • Challenges & Barriers: • Abundance of network data available, but few characteristic events • Validation of theory 15

16. Physical Networks and Theory Modern Technical Network Behaviors

17. Basic Research Awards 2007-2011 University Grants (includes 6 industry) 212 RD-BA FY07-11 6.1 Grants as of 11 Aug 2011 DOE National Laboratory Awards 6 3 DOD Laboratory Awards 1 MA 2 16 1 14 RI 3 1 CT 1 CT 8 1 10 NJ 2 4 2 2 9 MD 7 2 6 8 10 DC 3 6 1 1 1 3 9 23 4 3 5 6 2 5 6 10 1 5 9 2 2 1 12 11

18. Physical Networks and Theory Future Directions • Mathematical constructs beyond graph representations to capture geometric and dynamical characteristics • Create revolutionary (continuous) dynamical models which could capture/characterize temporally and spatially changing properties after a WMD event • Identify functional relationships and dynamical changes among the network layers after a WMD event

19. Summary DTRA has DoD’s only basic research investment that is 100% focused on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) DTRA is dedicated to long-term university-centric basic research to CWMD Support training of next generation workforce University engagement is critical to our success 250+ research teams at 100+ universities & laboratories conduct quality research for CWMD Your participation is WELCOME!! We invite ideas, peer reviewers, research partnerships & collaboration Information and links to solicitations at: www.dtrasubmission.net/portal

20. Questions??