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Wireless Security – How Secure is it Really?

Wireless Security – How Secure is it Really?. Brad “RenderMan” Haines RenderLab.net & Church of Wifi Render@Renderlab.Net. Introduction. Who am I? Why am I here? Why are you here? Scope of this talk Why you should stay awake.

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Wireless Security – How Secure is it Really?

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  1. Wireless Security – How Secure is it Really? Brad “RenderMan” Haines RenderLab.net & Church of Wifi Render@Renderlab.Net

  2. Introduction • Who am I? • Why am I here? • Why are you here? • Scope of this talk • Why you should stay awake

  3. “It is not the goal of this presentation to tell you not to use wireless networks, but make you aware of the risk so you can make informed decisions about your usage of wireless technology and do everything possible to protect your organizations network infrastructure, data and integrity of its client computers” - Paul Asadoorian Caveats

  4. Why are you here? • 10/2003: Lowe's • Botbyl and Timmins access an unencrypted, unauthenticated wireless LAN in Southfield, Michigan • Obtain access to internal servers across 7 US states • Crash PoS system while planting CC sniffing software • Apprehended by FBI, both plead guilty to charges • 3/2004: BJ's • Wholesale merchant reports that a "small fraction" of its 8-million customers may have had CC#'s stolen • FTC asserts charges against BJ's for unencrypted wireless networks, default usernames/passwords and insufficient monitoring • BJ's settles, recording $10M in legal costs, agrees to thorough external audits every other year for 2 decades

  5. Why are you here? • 6/2005: GE Money • Branch in Finland reports €200,000 stolen • Investigators traced attack to unprotected consumer WLAN • Initial investigation against owner revealed suspect not guilty, unprotected WLAN used to hide tracks • Further investigation reveals GE Money data security manager and accomplices stole account information

  6. Why are you here? • 1/2007: TJX • Marshalls department store in St. Paul Minnesota WEP-protected WLAN compromised • Estimates between 45.7 million and 200 million payment card numbers revealed • 451,000 drivers licenses and SS#'s also compromised • Forrester Research estimates the cost of the breach could surpass 1 billion dollars in 5 years

  7. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timelines Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  8. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timelines • Most public attacks against unprotected networks • WEP attacks effective 6+ years after critical flaws announced • Emerging attacks of today not solved with standards Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 TJX Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication GE Money Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing BJ's Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Lowe's Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  9. Where it all started • 802.11b - Released October 1999 • 2.4Ghz, 11Mbit (4.5 nominal)‏ • Popularity exploded with Apple Airport • Quickly took off and integrated into everything • 40 bit (later 64, 128 bit) WEP, MAC filtering • 13 channels in Europe (11 North America)‏ • WPA added later

  10. Where it went from there • 802.11a - Released October 1999 • 5 Ghz, 54Mbit (~20 nominal)‏ • Shorter range, less penetration • Not backwards compatible with 802.11b • 12 channels • More restrictions on use • 40 bit (later 64, 128 bit) WEP, MAC filtering • WPA added later

  11. Where it went from there • 802.11g - Released October 2003 • 2.4Ghz, 54Mbit (19 nominal)‏ • Quickly integrated into new devices • Backwards compatible with 802.11b • 13 channels (11 North America)‏ • WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) + WEP

  12. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  13. Where it all started to go wrong • 802.11 broadcast beacons • Wardriving hit big after Defcon 9 (2001)‏ • Shipped default open, anyone can connect • Wardriving community grew exponentially • Apple Airport ramped up sales and usage

  14. Wardriving • “The benign act of detecting wireless networks while in motion” - Blackwave • Wireless networks are radios, Every card is a capable reciever • Network information is broadcast with each packet – Network name, encryption status, associated clients all detectable • Add GPS for making cool maps • Wigle.net – 12,000,000+ nets with location (Oct, 2007)‏

  15. Wireless is everywhere • $30 for an AP at a computer shop • Most laptops come with WiFi built in • Personally discovered ~175,000 devices (~100,000 in Edmonton and area)‏ • #17 on wigle.net (soon to be 16)‏ • Hotels, Airports, conferences, coffee shops, restaurants, etc... • Can all be detected and catalogued

  16. It's Everywhere!

  17. Wardriving • The presence of networks no longer secret • Many people ignorant of the issue • Wardriving brought the issue to the forefront w/ pretty maps • Worldwide Wardrive brought it to the media (and CSIS, the Canadian CIA)‏ • Not a huge issue • Cloaking does nothing to help, it's a radio!

  18. Where it all started to go wrong • MAC addresses can be observed without connecting • Changing your own MAC address is easy • Simple program to change it in Windows • Only useful in keeping authorized users from connecting unauthorized things • Not a security measure

  19. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  20. Kismet • De facto free site survey tool • Listens to all 802.11x traffic (monitor mode)‏ • Detects 'cloaked' networks • Can include GPS for maps • Remote drone sniffers for distributed monitoring • Kismet-Newcore promises more features • Linux native, some windows support (Kiswin, airpcap)‏ • Should be in every wireless toolkit

  21. Kismet

  22. Netstumbler • Windows based • 'Active' scanner • GPS capability • Signal to noise graph • Useful for quick surveys, antenna alignment, etc

  23. Netstumbler

  24. Netstumbler

  25. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  26. Hostspot Impersonation • Hot spots gain popularity • Cafe's. Airports, hotels, etc • No discrimination of identical SSID's • 'Drift' or 'Coax' to other networks • Man in the middle attacks, credential snarfing, etc • Airsnarf, etc

  27. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  28. WEP – What were they thinking? • Based on RC4 (weak), 40 bit – Export restrictions • Limited computing power onboard • 64-128 bit added later after export laws relaxed • No standard key generation specified – incompatibilities between brands • Many tried, a lot failed open • Who wants to type out a 64 char HEX key?

  29. WEP cracking • Goal is to collect enough IVs to be able to crack the key • IV = Initialization Vector, plain text appended to the key to avoid repetition • Airsnort – 5-10 Million packets • Injecting packets to generate more IV's (faster)‏ • Aircrack analyses the packets and gives you a key • Needed 100K to 1M packets in early version (10 Min)‏ • Aircrack-PTW – Need only 40-100K (~60 seconds)‏

  30. Aircrack

  31. Jamming / Interference • Physics are harsh • Introduce more noise than signal • Microwave oven, cordless phone, baby monitor or other sources • Accidental or intentional • Spectrum analyzer

  32. Wavebubble

  33. WPA • WPA fixes many WEP flaws • Based on early 802.11i draft - Stop-gap • 256 bit key – Still RC4 • Pre-shared key or Enterprise 802.1X • Standard key generation standard – PBKDF2 • Key salted with SSID • TKIP, MIC (Michael)‏ • Sequence enforcement

  34. Standards are hard - WPA • WPA – Do more on old hardware • Feared mass obsolescence • Backwards compatibility • Needed soon • Not perfect, got the job done • Fixed a lot of WEP problems, weaknesses

  35. WPA2 • Mandatory elements of 802.11i • Uses AES (CCMP) instead of RC4 • Supports PSK and 802.1X mode • Very interoperable • Defacto standard for wireless

  36. The Devil is in the Details • WPA not without problems • People choose weak passphrases • Susceptible to brute force attack • “A key generated from a pass-phrase of less than about 20 characters is unlikely to deter attack” - 802.11i spec • Cowpatty, Aircrack

  37. Cracking WPA • Capture WPA 4-way handshake • Hash dictionary word with PBKDF2 and compare output to capture • SSID salted into key • CPU intensive • Early programs had to start over each time

  38. Cracking WPA Faster • CoWPAttty, Genpmk and CoWF WPA tables • Pre-hash 1.2 Million words against top 1000 SSID's = 48 gig of WPA cracking torrent goodness • Time / Memory trade off - calculate once, crack many • Cracks WPA v1 and v2 • Drastically faster checking onsite • Available after the talk and throughout the con

  39. coWPAtty

  40. The Devil is in the details • Michael countermeasures • 2 bad checks = Radio turns off • Defense against injection and manipulation • Several layers deep, should not normally trip • “If a non-AP STA receives a deauthenticate frame with the reason code “MIC failure,” it cannot be certain that the frame has not been forged, as it does not contain a MIC. The STA may attempt association with this, or another, AP” - 802.11i spec

  41. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  42. Abusing Michael • Sequence enforcement, encryption need to be successful before MIC checked • MIC taken of data + header + sequence # • Wireless multimedia specifications (QoS)‏ • Seprate counters for different QoS bits • MIC covers QoS bits which are not encrypted.....

  43. Abusing Michael WPA Encrypted QoS bit Sequence Data MIC Checksum

  44. Abusing Michael • Capture high priority packet • Flip QoS bits • Retransmit to other counter • Sequence enforcement is maintained • Encrypted data decrypts successfully • MIC check fails from flipped QoS bits • 2 errors in 60 seconds = DoS condition • Clients continue to try and connect • Not in the wild, but soon...

  45. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  46. Client attacks • Karma • Cleartext traffic = easy manipulation • Airpwn • Management frames cleartext and unauthenticated • Void11, deauth attacks • Driver attacks

  47. Look Familiar?

  48. 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, ExternalInternetwork, Mgmt. FrameProtection PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 802.11g, Europe5 GHz, WPA RegulatoryDomainExtensions 802.11i, WPA2, Japan5GHz, EAP-FAST PEAP, TTLS QoS LEAP Technology 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing?RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Vulnerabilities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

  49. Driver Vulnerabilities • 2006 - Johnny Cache & David Maynor fuzz and break many drivers • Death threats from Apple fanboys • Do not even need to be connected to a network • Metasploit includes some driver exploits • Point n' pwn

  50. Standards bodies • IEEE/IETF do good work • We can get on wirelessly at the office, conferences • It could be a lot worse • Involves lots of blood, sweat, travel and politics • Problems can be solved

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