Iacopo Senatori Marco Biagi Foundation, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia

1. The Troubled Relationship Between Law and Industrial Relations as Regulatory Systems in Italy. Integrations and Interferences after the Labour Law Reform (so-called “Jobs Act”) Iacopo Senatori Marco Biagi Foundation, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia iacopo.senatori@unimore.it Alberto Mattei Law Department, University of Verona alberto.mattei@univr.it 11° ILERA European Regional Congress, Milan, 8-10 September 2016

2. An alternative title: «The Never Ending Story» • 4 major labour law reforms, with a directregulatory impact on IR,in lessthan 15 years (2003, 2011, 2012, 2015). • 4 nationalframeworkagreements on collectivebargaining (actors, levels, competences, effectiveness) in lessthan 10 years (2009,2011, 2013, 2014). • Uncoordinatedinitiatives by autonomousplayers (FIAT case, 2010 onwards): establishment of single-level company bargainingsystems.

3. Theoretical framework: remember Kahn-Freund? • «The law isnot the principal source of social power» (Labour and the Law, 1972). • The mainfunctions of law in respect of collectivebargaining: • Auxiliarylegislation, promoting the making of collectivebargaining (promotion of negotiation, promotion of agreement)and favouring the enforcement of collectiveagreements (e.g.rules on effectiveness, selection of players). • Regulatorylegislation, establishing the boundariesbetween lawand collectivebargaining.

4. Factual framework: the main features of the Italian system • Autonomy of IR in the shadow of supportivelegislation (Constitutionalright to trade union freedom, «Workers’ Statute»). • Legal effectivenessdependent on factualpremises (principle ofeffectiveness). • Co-ordinateddecentralisation of collectivebargaining (since 1993,with a slowlyincreasing trend). • IR as a regulatoryresource for the State (delegation of powers,participation of IR players in the law-makingprocess). • Enduringproblems: enforcement, lowcoverage of secondlevelagreements, diverging policy targets (uniformity to correctinequalities;diversification to boost a «race to the top»).

5. The impact of the Jobs Act: 1. Actors Art. 51, legislative decree n. 81/15 • Levels: national, local and company are put on an equal standingNo priorregulation, implicitacknowledgement of the parties’ownsettlements. • Actors: • Representativeunionsat the nationallevel (for national and localagreements) • Theirrepresentativebodiesat the plantlevel, i.e. «rappresentanzesindacali aziendali, rappresentanza sindacale unitaria» (for companyagreements). • A markedshifttowards a single-channel model: bargaining,participation and trade union rightsat the company levelenjoyedby the sameplayers. • Representativenessas an entitlement to negotiate: assessed on acomparative basisat the nationallevel, no majorityrule.

6. The impact of the Jobs Act: 2. Functions of collective agreements. Lights and Shadows • Cases in which the law grantscollectiveagreementsexclusive or prioritycreditsas a regulatory source. E.g.: fiscal incentives toproductivity-enhancingarrangements, seealso Budget Law 2016; transfer of rest and holidayentitlementsbetweenemployees on solidaritygrounds. • Cases in which the law sets up a «regulatoryshadow» for theexercise of individualrights, also in case of inactivity of collectiveagreements (possibile effect: boostcollectiveregulation andprotectindividualemployees’ freedom of choice). E.g. fruition ofparentalleaves on a hourlybasis.

7. The impact of the Jobs Act: 2. Functions of collective agreements. Lights and Shadows • In general, for diverse, heterogeneous and non-linear referrals to social partners in the Jobs Act; • In general, for the contradictorycoexistence of the proximitycollectivebargaining (Article 8 l. 148/11) and referrals to collectivebargaining inthe Jobs Act; • In particular, for the collectiveautonomythatisinstrumental-functionalat the Jobs Actpoliticaltowards the goal of easing the protections (eg.: downgrading and recentreformulation of Article 2103 c.c. on jobclassifications).

8. A key concept: disintermediation • Hard disintermediation • Soft disintermediation

9. Definition, sources and articulations

10. Definition, sources and articulation • Tax Law: ”Irpef Decree" (l. d. 24 April 2014, n. 66, into l. 23 June 2014, n. 89). • Social Security Law and Labour Law: exemption from the obligation to pay social security contributions for hiring employees (Budget Law 2015, l. 23 December 2014, n. 190, and Stability Law 2016, l. 28 December 2015, n. 208). • Tax Law, Social Security Law and Labour Law: possibility conciliation taking place after dismissal and is not subject to tax and social security contributions (Jobs Act, l. d. 4 March 2015, n. 23).

11. Definition, sources and articulation

12. Definition, sources and articulation • Labour Law and Industrial Relations: equalization of collective bargaining levels (Jobs Act, l. d. 25 June 2015, n. 81). • Labour Law, Tax Law and Social Security Law: employment benefits (Budget Law 2016, l. 28 December 2015, n. 208)

13. Definition, sources and articulation

14. Conclusion • The law promotesdecentralisation with a neutralapproachasregards the degree of coordination of collectivebargaining. • The law considers IR as a regulatoryresource, mainly just aslong asitisaligned with its policy goals. • Uncertainwhether the law willcontribute to solve the enduringproblems in the IR field. • Comingsoon: legislation on minimum wages and on thestructure of collectivebargaining?