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Epistemology of Science. Peter Ross Associate Professor Philosophy Department February 10, 2011. The diversity of scientific methods. I assume that science has authority and that this authority is owing to its epistemic methods.
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Epistemology of Science Peter Ross Associate Professor Philosophy Department February 10, 2011
The diversity of scientific methods I assume that science has authority and that this authority is owing to its epistemic methods. • That said, there’s no neat characterization of these methods • There’s no straightforward way to falsify a hypothesis
The similarity of scientific methods • To obtain a viewpoint from which the diversity of scientific methods washes out and we can see a similarity across them, consider: • Richard Dawkins claims that the existence of God is a scientific question. • Is it?
Thesis: Dawkins is mistaken. • The existence of God is—at least currently—a philosophical question. • And: the distinction between philosophical and scientific existence questions allows us to see similarity across scientific methods.
Philosophy and science have very different stereotypes • Science: • Quantitative • Experimental • Productive; theory that can be put into practice • Philosophy: • Qualitative • Armchair • Non-productive; theory that solves nothing
But to the contrary: • Philosophy and science use the same general sorts of reasoning processes • But in very different contexts • The difference in context gives rise—unfairly—to the stereotypical differences What’s meant by a ‘different context’? Good question.
An ancient example • Parmenides claimed that change is impossible (so the appearance of change is an illusion) • Democritus agreed with Parmenides that change is impossible—but just with respect to atoms. Atoms, which are not directly perceived, move around and combine to produce the changes we perceive (so the appearance of change is not an illusion).
What sort of reasoning did Democritus use? • Democritus seemed to reason as follows: • Assume: change is not only possible but actual. • The explanation of change must be ultimately in terms of some entities which are themselves unchangeable (or else we face an infinite regress of producers of change). • Since we don’t perceive things that are unchangeable, these entities are not perceivable but instead underlie the change that is perceivable. • Was Democritus’ inference scientific?
Support for Democritus’s inference not being scientific Democritus had no idea of how to detect atoms. Democritus’ reasoning was so abstract, that if you were to ask him: “Is there any specific evidence to show that atoms exist?” he would reply, “No; change (in general) is evidence of atoms (in general). I know of no way to get at the particular properties of particular atoms beyond speculation.”
The question of context • Back to the point: philosophy and science apply the same general sorts of reasoning processes, but in very different contexts. • The contexts in question are epistemological contexts, that is, contexts described in terms of what we know about the world. • Philosophy works in an impoverished context. • Science works in a rich context.
Why the bad reputation? • The difference in context gives rise to the stereotypical differences between philosophy and science. • Because philosophy works in the context of deep ignorance about the world, it gets the reputation for being non-productive, as theory that solves no problems. • But philosophy is both inescapable and productive
Philosophy is inescapable and productive • The case of atomism is instructive. Philosophical problems often arise because we have • (a) a compelling reason to think an entity exists, and • (b) a lack of any idea as to how to detect the entity. • Despite (b), (a) cannot be ignored. Philosophy is inescapable. • And in the cases of these sorts of problems, good philosophy transitions into becoming science. Philosophy is productive; it produces science.