Nussbaum “Non-relative virtues: An Aristotelian Approach”

1. Nussbaum “Non-relative virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” Does contemporary virtue theory represent a turn toward relativism? How can virtue theory be understood in a non-relative way.

2. Virtues of virtue theory • Virtue theory is not “remote from concrete human experience.” (684) • It seems to avoid the hazards of impartial views like Kantian and utilitarian theory.

3. Relativism • The issue of relativism: A view is relativist, roughly, if it regards truth as relative to circumstances. • Aristotle says the mean of virtue is ‘relative to us’ but this does not mean he is a relativist because the virtues could be non-relative in a general sense. • The relativism of virtue is “the view that the only appropriate criteria of ethical goodness are local ones.”

4. No single norm of flourishing • Aristotle says that the human good is a life lived according to reason. • Modern virtue theory according to Nussbaum takes McIntyre, Williams and Foot to regard virtue theory as “abandoning the project of rationally justifying a single norm of flourishing life for all and to all human beings…with a reliance…on norms that are local both in origin and application.” (685)

5. Examples? • Does the Aristotelian model of courage work in a modern society where most people do not fight in a war? The ‘great souled’ man seeks honor but we do not have the same interest in public honor perhaps that the Athenians did. • So the point would be that various contexts would require different virtues and a good life would be different in each.

6. What Nussbaum doesn’t like • Relativism is an unattractive view—e.g., “…[i]f the position of women, as established by local traditions in many parts of the world, is to be improved, if traditions of slave-holding and racial inequality, if religious intolerance, if aggressive and warlike conceptions of manliness…are to be criticized in the name of practical reason this criticizing…must be done from a Kantian or utilitarian viewpoint…” (685)

7. Aristotelian theory is objective • A’s account of the human good is objective. • Aristotle is a critic of local traditions. He argues in Book II of the Politics that some local traditions are not conducive to flourishing.

8. What’s relativism got going for it? • The relativist looks at the radical difference between societies in terms of way of life, history, etc. “It is not only that specific forms of behavior recommended in connection with the virtues differ greatly over time and place, it is also that the very areas that are singled out as spheres of virtue, and the manner in which they are individuated from other areas vary…greatly…” (686) • How could there be a universal and objective list of human excellences that will lead to the human good? (E.g., the ‘great souled man’ doesn’t even quite make sense to us. A medieval knight’s virtue or an Athenian gentleman isn’t something we think to admire now.)

9. The objectivity of A’s List • What A does is introduce “a sphere of human experience…in which more or less any human being will have to make some choices rather than others, and act in some way rather than some other.” (686) • “Aristotle asks ‘what is it to choose to act well in that sphere?’” (686) • See table. Are these all universal/objective spheres?

10. The reason it is not relative • Virtues are relative to circumstance because the right amount of an emotion (e.g., anger) in one situation is too much or too little emotion in another. • However, there is a fixed element in virtue, according to Nussbaum. People “are arguing about the same thing, and advancing competing specification of the same virtue…” There is the same ‘grounding experience.’

11. Nominal definition of the virtue • “The thin or ‘nominal definition’ of the virue in each case is fixed by the spehere of experience—by what we shall from now on call the ‘grounding experience.’ • An example: “Attitudes toward slights and damages.” (687) The virtue would be ‘mildness of temper.’

12. Virtues describe a real thing • E.g., we hear a noise and call it thunder. There is a debate about what causes the noise but there is a fact of the matter. There are rival explanations and some are objectively better than others. Same with virtue—everyone is converging on one objective trait. We can make ethical progress when we “understand more precisely what problems human beings encounter in their lives with one another, what circumstances they face in which choice…[and consider] competing responses to those problems…” (688)

13. Two stages • (1) We consider the grounding experience that “fix the reference of the virtue” and (2) We consider the appropriate choice in that sphere. • It may look as though there is an incommensurable shift between, e.g., ‘megalopsuchia’ and humility (for Christians) but Nussbaum thinks that via the Stoics, the same issue is being dealt with…It is a “single debate.”

14. Upshot • There is objectivity because we can look at what is excellent functioning in each sphere and we can criticize “local and traditional moralities in the name of a more inclusive account of the circumstances of human life, and of the needs for human functioning that those circumstances calls forth…” (690) • [But many criticisms of local traditions are about human equality. How does a virtue theory get this off the ground?]

15. Objections: First Objection • I. “The first objection concerns the relationship between singleness of problem and singleness of solution…” (690) What if there are different solutions within different forms of life? Why think there’s a single answer? • Is there one virtue of courage? Are the virtues cross-cultural?

16. Reply to first objection • (a) maybe there needn’t be a single answer to what kind of virtue we need to deal with a certain aspect of human life. She says maybe we will “eliminate various contenders” such as the idea of original sin as a proper attitude to one’s own worth. (b) The ‘what is X’ i.e., what is generosity, courage, temperance, etc. might have local manifestations or different ‘concrete fillings.’ For example, generosity sometimes requires a great deal more in other societies than it does in the U.S. People in different countries might have different ways of being friends, but the basics of friendship (e.g., mutual good will, reciprocity, etc.) might be universal across cultures. (c) Virtue is always responding to particulars of a concrete situation. It might not have been virtuous for soldiers to cry out when injured in other cultures, while this is acceptable in our culture. This could be explained by the fact that other cultures may have had fewer options in how to treat injuries.

17. Second objection • Are there shared spheres of human experience? • Maybe courage varies but the fear of death is shared by all human beings. Maybe moderation varies but hunger, thirst and sexual desire are invariant. • The problem is: Fear, e.g., is culturally learned. So is the way people interpret their appetites. Aristotle is not aware of the way “historical and cultural differences” Should shape intentional awareness.

18. Epicurus and Foucault • Epicurus points out we can train our appetites with habits. E.g., we lose the taste for meat or rich food with a simple vegetarian diet. People learn that sexual relations take place in romantic unions. • Foucault points out that the Greeks did not view sexual desire as that different from hunger and thirst. Their interest was in self mastery. They did not care as much about the gender of the partner. So there are important elements of cultural learning. There is no homosexuality in ancient society even if there is much same-sex desire.

19. Response to Objection 2: Fillings • For some things, there is a broad sphere and various ‘fillings.’ “Friends in England will have different customs, where regular social visiting is concerned, from friends in ancient Athens.” (693) • So there would be a need to deal with appetites but a variety of ways to do that. (See list on p. 697)

20. Third Objection • Maybe some elements of life the Aristotelian takes as universal/objective are relative to circumstance. E.g., in a communist society, we would not need virtues relative to personal ownership such as generosity. There could be a “form of life that does not contain” all these basic grounding experiences. • The problem is that the Aristotelian view is going to make us regard something transient and socially located and maybe not ideal as “permanent and necessary.” (693)

21. Reply to Third Objection • Can we define what it is to be a human being and what it is to have a good human life? • Nussbaum says yes—there just are things that humans have to deal with—like death, pain, etc. • She also says that even if we radically change our form of life we’ll have new things to deal with. So if we got rid of property and the need for justice we might find some new problem arise, like “the absence of a certain sort of freedom.” (699) [She is misreading Marx there.]