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Rational Ignorance & Beyond

Rational Ignorance & Beyond. Gerry Mackie U.C.S.D Political Science May 2008. Paradox of Nonvoting. Individual would vote iff pB – C > 0 p = probability of being pivotal in causing election outcome B = Benefit to voter from winning election outcome C = Cost of voting to individual voter

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Rational Ignorance & Beyond

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  1. Rational Ignorance & Beyond Gerry Mackie U.C.S.D Political Science May 2008

  2. Paradox of Nonvoting • Individual would vote iff pB – C > 0 • p = probability of being pivotal in causing election outcome • B = Benefit to voter from winning election outcome • C = Cost of voting to individual voter • No one would vote • D = duty • E = expressive value of voting • pB- C + D + E > 0 ???

  3. Do Voters Value the Public Good? • Citizens value the public interest at least as much as they do their private interest • Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Sears and Funk 1990; Funk 1997; Funk 2000; Chong, Citrin and Conley 2001; • Brodsky and Thompson 1993; Shabman and Stephenson 1994 • Jankowski 2002; Jankowski 2004, Fowler 2006

  4. Is a Vote Irrational Unless Pivotal?

  5. Duplicative Causation • Smoky and Blaze independently start fires, each sufficient to destroy Suzanne’s house; they converge. Necessary condition test fails. • NESS test • a particular condition was a cause of (condition contributing to) a specific consequence if and only if it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence. (Note that the phrase "a set" permits a plurality of sufficient sets.)

  6. Is a Vote Irrational Unless it has a Perceptible Effect?

  7. More Typical Voters

  8. Imperceptible Effects • Imperceptibility of harm or benefit does not mean absence of harm or benefit • 100 bandits, 100 villagers, 100 beans • If stakes are high enough, each has a duty to contribute, even if her contribution is imperceptible

  9. Voters Motivated by Duty and By Influence on Outcome • Blais 2000: Duty; p, B, C variables • Schlozman, Verba, Brady 1995: Duty; influence policy • Opp 2000: Interaction of discontent and capacity to influence; duty • Finkel and Muller 1998: Discontent, group action can be successful, individual can influence

  10. Is it Irrational for an Individual to Advance the Public Good? • If public good is valued, are individuals willing to contribute to it? • Actual contributors’ dilemmas vs. potential contributors’ dilemmas • Thick theory – firms on the market, objective • Observer’s perspective on collective action • Thin theory – individuals, subjective • Actor’s perspective on collective action • Individuals do contribute to low-cost public goods; Pellikan and van der Veen 2002; Frey and Meier 2004 • Some social animals “vote”; so do humans

  11. Individuals Do Contribute to the Public Good

  12. Vote Contributes Both to Advancing Democracy and to the Decision on a Particular Issue

  13. Saving Expected Utility Theory • Vote not a choice of one alternative over another, but a contribution to a choice to be made by a collective. • Contribution to collective choice ≠ individual choice • Contributory model distinct from expressive model • For contributory, expressive value of vote can be zero • Contributory value = advancing a public good • Contributory model similar but not identical to altruistic model.

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