Secure Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates with Identity-based Signature

1. Secure Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates with Identity-based Signature Mr. Warodom Werapun warodom@graduate.kmitl.ac.th

2. Objective • Apply Identity-based signature framework to secure Binding Updates. • To get bandwidth efficiency with security.

3. Outline • Introduction • Mobile IP scenario • Home Agent registration • Triangle routing • Routing Optimization • Security Review • Identity-based signature framework • Conclusionand future work

4. Mobile IP scenario CoA CoA Home Address

5. Home Agent Registration

6. Triangle Routing

7. Routing Optimization

8. Security Review • Symmetric cryptography • Easy to use and implement • How to exchange the secret key • n^2 – n keys problem • Asymmetric cryptography • Use 2 keys: a private key and public key • Use certificated to verify public key

9. Identity-based signature PublicKey • In 1984, Shamir asked for a public key encryption schemes • Until 2001, D. Boneh and M. Franklin implement An Identity-based cryptosystem • To verify each other’s signatures without exchanging public or private keys 3ffe:b80:1e99:2::2 Or wwarodom@hotmail.com

10. Assumption for our framework • Suitable for use in organization only, for example, used in mobile conference. • Require a pre-existing security association between MN and its HA. • All nodes must implement an identity based cryptosystem and had system parameters for sign and verify signature. • The HA acts as an Identity based Private Key Generator.

11. Pre-exist security association • ID_SETUP: takes a parameter k (random) as input and generates params (system parameters) and master-key (know only PKG) • System parameters: elliptic curve equation, Point on elliptic curve, multiplicative of master-key with Point on elliptic curve, Hash function • ID_EXTRACT: input params, master-key and public_key (IPv6 address) and return private key to users

12. Pre-exist security association • Issue by PKG (ID_EXTRACT) • included system parameters

13. Secure Binding Updates • Mobile node signed binding updates and sent to correspondent node

14. Secure Binding Updates • Binding Updates: contain home address, care of address etc. following IPv6 header extension. • Signature: Hash the BU and sign with private key and params.

15. BU - Sign • The mobile node sent the BU to the CN by using ID_SIGN function. Sig = ID_SIGN(params, PrivKey, BU ); R = kP, S = k-1(H2 (M) P + Did) (1) Where: Did = sH1(IPv6-Address) (2) Qid = H1(IPv6-Address)(3) params

16. BU - Verify • The CN verify the BU from the mobile node by using ID_VERIFY function Valid = ID_VERIFY(Sig, ID, params, BU ); ê (R, S) = ê (kP, k -1 (H2(M)P + Did)) (4) = ê (P, H2(M)P + sQid ) = ê (P,P)H2(M) · ê (P, sQid) = ê (P,P)H2(M) · ê (Ppub,Qid)(5) Qid = H1(ID) params

17. Expected result • Get rid of the number of certificates because any nodes do not need to verify public key. • Identity-based cryptography implement based on elliptic curved cryptography to produce public-key cryptosystems and protocols that are more bandwidth efficient. • An elliptic curve whose order is a 160-bit prime offers approximately the same level of security as DSA with 1024-bit modulus p and RSA with 1024-bit modulus n.

18. Conclusion and future work • Proposed Identity-based signature framework to secure the Binding Updates. • A key challenge is CN does not need to verify the mobile node public key. • We aim to use network simulator tools to evaluate network performance with strong security.

19. THE END Question?