Current Techniques in Language-based Security

Current Techniques in Language-based Security David Walker COS 597B With slides stolen from: Steve Zdancewic University of Pennsylvania

Security Talks this Week • My Dad's Computer, Microsoft, and the Future of Internet Security. • Bill Cheswick, Lumeta, co-inventor of the Internet firewall • Today at 4PM (We’ll stop class early) • Extensible Semantics for XrML • Vicky Weissman, Cornell • Friday at 2:30, CS 402 • XrML (the eXtensible rights Markup Language) is a popular language in which to write software licenses. See what it is all about and how to give it a semantics. COS 597B

Types for Stack Inspection • Want to do static checking of lsec code • Statically detect security failures. • Eliminate redundant checks. • Example of nonstandard type system for enforcing security properties. • Type system based on work by Pottier, Skalka, and Smith: • “A Systematic Approach to Static Access Control” • Explain the type system by taking a detour through “security-passing” style. • Wallach’s & Felten’s “Understanding Stack Inspection” COS 597B

Security-passing Style • Basic idea: Convert the “stack-crawling” form of stack inspection into a “permission-set passing style” • Compute the set of current permissions at any point in the code. • Make the set of permissions explicit as an extra parameter to functions (hence “security-passing style) • Target language is a lambda calculus with a primitive datatype of sets. COS 597B

Target Language: lset • Language syntax:e,f ::= expressions x variablelx.e function e f application fail failure let x = e in f local decl.if pse then e else f member test se set expr. • se ::= S perm. set se  se union se  se intersection x COS 597B

Translation: lsec to lset • [[e]]R = “translation of e in domain R • with s = current permissions” • [[x]]R = x • [[lx.e]]R = lx.ls.[[e]]R • [[e f]]R = [[e]]R [[f]]R s • [[let x = e in f]]R = let x = [[e]]R in [[f]R • [[enable p in e]]R = let s = s  ({p}  R) in [[e]]R • [[R’{e}]]R = let s = s  R’ in [[e]]R’ • [[check p e]]R = if p  s then [[e]]R else fail • [[test p then e1 else e2]]R= if p  s then [[e1]]R else [[e2]]R • Top level translation: [[e]] = [[e]]P{P/s} COS 597B

Example Translation System = {“f1, “f2”, “f3”} Applet = {“f1”} h = System{enable “f1” in Applet{(lx. System{check “f1” then write x})“kwijibo”}} COS 597B

Example Translation [[h]] = (* System *) let s = P  {“f1”, “f2”, “f3”} in (* enable “f1” *) let s = s  ({“f1”}  {“f1”, “f2”, “f3”}) in (* Applet *) let s = s  {“f1”} in (lx.ls.(* System *) let s = s  {“f1”, “f2”, “f3”} in if “f1”  s then write x else fail) “kwijibo” s COS 597B

Example Translation [[h]] = (* System *) let s = P  {“f1”, “f2”, “f3”} in (* enable “f1” *) let s = s  ({“f1”}  {“f1”, “f2”, “f3”}) in (* Applet *) let s = s  {“f1”} in (lx.ls.(* System *) let s = s  {“f1”, “f2”, “f3”} in if “f3” s then write x else fail) “kwijibo” s Change permission check COS 597B

Stepping Back • Have two formulations of stack inspection: “original” and “eager” • Have a translation to a language that manipulates sets of permissions explicitly. • Includes the “administrative” reductions that just compute sets of permissions. • Similar computations can be done statically! COS 597B

Variable context Type Current protection domain Term Subset of current runtime perms Typing Judgments R;S;G|-- e : t COS 597B

Form of types • Only interesting (non administrative) change during compilation was for functions: [[lx.e]]R = lx.ls.[[e]]R • Source type: t  u • Target type: t  s  u • The 2nd argument, is always a set, so we “specialize” the type to:t –{S} u COS 597B

Types • Types:t ::= types int, string, … base types t –{S} t functions COS 597B

R;S’;G,x:t1 |-- e : t2 R;S;G|-- lx.e : t1 –{S’} t2 Simple Typing Rules Variables: R;S;G|-- x : G(x) Abstraction: COS 597B

R;S;G|-- e : t –{S}t’ R;S;G|-- e : u R;S;G|-- f : t R;S;G,x:u |-- f : t R;S;G|-- e f : t’ R;S;G|-- let x = e in f : t More Simple Typing Rules Application: Let: COS 597B

Rule for Check Note that this typing rule requires that the permission p is statically known to be available. R; S{p};G|-- e : t R; S{p};G|-- check p then e : t COS 597B

Typing Rules for Enable Enable succeed: R;S{p};G|-- e : t p  R R;S;G|-- enable p in e : t R;S;G|-- e : t p  R Enable fail: R;S;G|-- enable p in e : t -- latter should be flagged as useless code COS 597B

Rule for Test Check the first branch under assumption that p is present, check the else branch under assumption that p is absent. R; S{p};G|-- e : t R;S;G|-- f : t R;S;G|-- test p then e else f: t COS 597B

Rule for Protection Domains Intersect the permissions in the static protection domain with the current permission set. S’;SS’;G|-- e : t R;S;G|-- S’{e}: t COS 597B

R;S’;G|-- e : t S’ S R;S;G|-- e : t Weakening (Subsumption) It is always safe to “forget” permissions. COS 597B

Type Safety • Theorem:If P;P;|-- e : t then either e * v or ediverges. • In particular: e never fails. (i.e. check always succeeds) • Proof:Preservation & Progress. COS 597B

Example: Good Code h = System{enable “f1” in Applet{(lx. System{check “f1” then write x})“kwijibo”}} Then P;S;|-- h : unit for any S COS 597B

Example: Bad Code g = System{enable “f1” in Applet{(lx. System{check “f2” then write x})“kwijibo”}} Then R;S;|-- g : t is not derivablefor any R,S, and t. COS 597B

Static vs. Dynamic Checks Calling this function requires the static permission p: ;;|-- lx.check p in x : int –{p}int Only way to call it (assuming initial perms.are empty) is to put it in the scope of adynamic test: test p then …can call it here… else …may not call it here… COS 597B

Expressiveness • This type system is very simple • No subtyping • No polymorphism • Not algorithmic • Hard to do inference • Can add all of these features… • See François Pottier’s paper for a nice example. • Uses Didier Rémy’s row types to describe the sets of permission. • Uses HM(X) – Hindley Milner with constraints • Also shows how to derive a type system for the source language from the translation! COS 597B

Conclusions • Stack inspection is a complex security mechanism • In practice, useful for preventing some attacks • Formal reasoning useful for understanding what optimizations preserve semantics • Type systems or program analysis have the potential to catch “obvious” security violations at compile time where they can easily be fixed COS 597B

Current Techniques in Language-based Security