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This article discusses the challenges of infrastructure funding and budgetary mechanisms, highlighting the high costs and maintenance dilemmas. It also explores funding sources and budgetary boundaries that affect infrastructure development.
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Infrastructure and Fiscal PolicySpecific Challenges Marianne Fay Many thanks to Vivien Foster on whose 2005 PEAM course presentation this is largely based
Outline • Stylized facts • Funding sources • Budgetary boundaries • Budgetary mechanisms
Infrastructure is “big money” • Stocks • Equivalent to about 100% of developing country GDP • Dominated by electricity (45-55%), and transport (30 to 40%) • “cheaper” telecom (5-15% and growing) and W&S (5 to 15%) • Maintenance: • About 2 to 3% of GDP per year
Infrastructure is “big money” • Output: • About 6% of GDP for electricity (MICs) • The same for telecom & transport? • Much smaller for W&S
Expensive when poorly managed • Electricity: • Total hidden costs (underpricing; technical and commercial losses) estimated in ECA at 4% of GDP • In Mexico – untargeted subsidies amount to 1% of GDP • Rail and public transport: historically huge drains on public coffers • Water and sanitation: typically much smaller (0.4% of GDP in ECA)
Much of it, public responsibility • Differences across sectors: • Fairly universal trend for privatization of telecom, air transport, possibly rail • More varied with electricity, public transport • Limited potential for roads • W&S – complicated…
Distinguishing features • Investment • Highly capital intensive (60%+) • Long term planning horizons (30 yrs) • Infrequent lumpy investments • Long lead times (Up to 5yrs) • Unpredictable investment costs
Distinguishing features • Maintenance • Long asset lives (Up to 30 yrs) • High maintenance (2-3% AV) • Exponential cost of deferred maintenance • Catch-22 • Decision to invest based on estimated rate of return, itself conditioned by whether maintenance occurs
The maintenance dilemma 100 Very Good 90 -Filling Cracks 80 70 Good -Geotextile and Strengthening 60 Condition of Pavement (%) -Reconstruction of the Surface -Reconstruction of the partial base course Fair 50 40 Poor -Complete Reconstruction 30 20 Very Poor 10 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 Lifetime of Pavement (years) If maintenance on a 20 year road is not done by the end of the 12th year. It starts to deteriorate eight times faster than in the early years
Fiscal consequences • For all of these reasons, ill-suited to unpredictable annual budgetary cycle • Moreover, particularly vulnerable to budgetary downturns • Politically soft target for budget cuts • Maintenance less attractive than investment • Long lived assets delay hour of reckoning • Even investments can always be deferred
The infrastructure public finance paradox • Maintenance and investment are prime candidates for cuts • Subsidies – however poorly targeted - are difficult to eliminate • Some countries spend more on consumption subsidies than on either investment or maintenance…
A complication – no data • No country systematically collects investment data on infrastructure • “infrastructure” a broad and vague category – unlike health and education • Poor fit with IMF GFS categories • Public investment data notoriously poor – hard to distinguish from O&M • A few valiant efforts (Calderon & Serven; specific country studies) • The implication – no monitoring
Only three possible sources • Tax payers (fiscal transfers) • Users: • fees • cross-subsidies • Asset depletion: • quality • non-expansion of service…
Historic under-pricing Ratio of revenue to costs Source: WDR 1994
Cost recovery: water Degree of cost recovery Source: Foster & Yepes, forthcoming
Cost recovery: electricity Degree of cost recovery Source: Foster & Yepes, forthcoming
Who really gets the subsidy? In Hyderabad (India), employees capture 40% of the subsidy, and consumers 60%, half of which they spend on alternative providers
What distributional incidence? Source: Komives et al., forthcoming
Budgetary boundaries • Infrastructure has a tendency to creep off the budget for both good and bad reasons • There are a number of mechanisms through which this takes place • Extra-budgetary funds (fuel tax, USL) • State Owned Enterprises • Public Private Partnerships
Earmarked funds • Loved by sectoralistsprovide a stable source of financing in sectors without possibility of user fees, isolated from budgetary and political interference • Loathed by macroeconomistsreduce budgetary flexibility and optimization of public resources, often lead to poor governance, lack of transparency
Argentina: exploding funds Source: Argentina PER, 2003
State Owned Enterprises • Often represent a large percentage of public investment in infrastructure • May or may not be consolidated into fiscal accounts • May be net contributors or drains on the public purse • Operate in restricted environments that limit their autonomy and commercial orientation • Management may be guided by macroeconomic concerns
Colombia: drains vs. cash cows Source: REDI Colombia, 2004
Public Private Partnerships • Potential for PPPs varies substantially across sectors • Key criterion for judging whether extra-budgetary is extent of risk transfer • However, unless 100% risks can be transferred contingent liabilities remain • Complex fiscal accounting issues arise regarding the treatment of • Contingent liabilities • Private investment • Committed future public subsidies
LAC: private relative to total Source: Calderon, Easterly and Serven, 2003
Colombia: new policy after $4.4 Bn bailouts • New policy guidelines on risk allocation between public and private partners • Mandatory estimation of contingent liabilities using Monte Carlo (continuously updated) • Required payments to cover liability are ‘smoothed out’ into a Deposit Plan • Deposits are made from budget to Contingency Fund in individual accounts • Aggregate estimates reported annually to parliament (infrastructure >0.5% GDP)
Budgetary challenges • Project selectiondeficiencies in technical capacity for project evaluation, plus political attraction of ‘white elephants’ • Multi-year planninglong term projects required multi-year budget envelope to assure execution • Implementation bottleneckscomplex procurement plus unforeseen delays [cash budgeting!] make it difficult to execute budget
Peru: project selection • SNIP • MinFin unit does (pre-)feasibility studies • CBA methodology with min. IRR 14% • Declares viability without prioritization • Coverage • 2/3 of projects with regulated exceptions • Smaller local projects with domestic financing • Projects supported by Supreme Decree • Too many projects leads to budget constraints, delays and declining IRRs
Conclusions • Cost structure of infrastructure services leads to fiscal complications • Wide variety of potential funding sources for infrastructure • Tendency for infrastructure to be on the boundaries of the budget • Infrastructure poses challenges from a budgetary perspective