Risk Management and Redefining Airmanship

1. Risk ManagementandRedefining Airmanship Authored by Gary K. Woodsmall, HQ CAP Chief of Safety Modified by Lt Colonel Fred BlundellTX-129th Fort Worth Senior Squadron For Local Training Rev 6.0 10-Jan-2014

2. This Training Slide Show is a project undertaken by Lt Colonel Fred Blundell of the TX-129 Fort Worth Senior Squadron, Fort Worth, TX for local use to assist those CAP Members interested in advancing their skills. The information contained herein is for CAP Member’s personal use and is not intended to replace or be a substitute for any of the CAP National Training Programs. Users should review the presentation’s Revision Number at the end of each file name to ensure that they have the most current publication.

3. SGS 2-33 Accident • 1998 Washington Flight Encampment • 14 year-old cadet on first solo (2 hours flight experience) • Excess airspeed, hard/bounced landing • Pilot panicked and let go of the controls • People on the ground could hear her scream • Left wing and nose struck the ground • Cadet suffered whiplash injury • Wings, fuselage and empennage substantially damaged

4. Blanik L-13 Accident • PIC was a 52 year old private pilot with approximately 450 hours total time and 4 hours in the L-13. • Pilot was giving a young person his first aircraft ride. • At 1100 feet AGL the tow plane signaled the glider that his spoilers were out. • He released and returned to the airfield. • Landed hard. • No injuries - Aircraft substantially damaged.

5. PIC Comments • Pilot was in the cockpit checking his controls. • “ wing runner raised the wing.” • tow pilot saw wings level and him moving his rudder. • Takeoff started without him finishing his checklist. • At approximately 1,000 feet tow plane signaled a glider problem.

6. Pilot’s Comments (Continued) • Mistook tow plane signal and released. • At 900 to 1000 ft. AGL he headed directly to the airfield and “did GUMPS check”. • GUMPS? • Feels he “touched the flap handle” to confirm spoilers closed. • At mid-field he was 600 AGL, decided to fly a normal downwind.

7. Pilot’s Comments (Continued) • He noted he was “losing altitude faster than expected and turned base sooner than planned.” • He “decided to land cross runway.”

8. The Mishap Chain • A series of events leading up to the accident. • One break in the chain could have prevented the accident. 1. Wing runner raised the wing. • Was he properly trained? • Did he give the take-off signal? • Was the PIC using him as an excuse?

9. The Mishap Chain 2. Tow pilot procedures. • Highly experienced. • In a hurry? • Radio backup to the signals? • Did the towplane signal ready?

10. The Mishap Chain 3. Pilots decision to continue the takeoff. • PIC has the ultimate control - Release handle. 4. Tow plane airborne signal. • PIC responsible to known the Standard American Soaring Signals. 5. GUMPS check. (How’d he get past G?) • What happened to USTALL? • 600 feet above ground level at mid-field. 6. Touchdown.

11. Mishap Anatomy • Distraction - Count on them. • Lack of Discipline - Do things methodically and correctly. • Lack of Knowledge - Knowledge is Life Insurance. • Lack of Training - Identify your weak areas and fix. • Lack of Proficiency - Skills have to be recharged. • Preparation is the key. When you’re totally prepared, flying is more FUN.

12. SGS 2-22 Accident • PIC was 16 years-old with nearly 9 hours of flight time. • Pilot’s second solo sortie of the day. • While practicing steep turns, the pilot lost consciousness. • Regained consciousness while approaching power lines, flew under power lines and landed in a field. During rollout the wing struck a pipe and spun the glider around. • Wing substantially damaged - no injury.

13. PHYSICIAN’S REPORT • Dehydrated and the victim of Vasovagal Syncope. • Vasovagal Syncope. • Fainting occurring as a physiological response to stress. (physical and/or emotional) • Reported hyperventilation played a role.

14. PILOT COMMENTS • The pilot stated “The winds were not bad enough to where I could not solo.” • The tow was “fairly rough.” • Stated he was “being frustrated” by the turbulence and “having trouble controlling the plane.” • He began to get “frustrated and nervous.” • He was “breathing really hard because (he) was scared.” • He began to “feel strange” and his face and hands “felt numb”, he saw “a lot of little dots” and “passed out.”

15. QUESTIONS • Circumstances leading up to the accident. • Rested? Hydrated? • Winds “were not bad enough”, does this mean they were marginal? Pilot’s opinion.

16. QUESTIONS • Was his anxiety noticeable prior to the flight? • Did the instructor notice? • Did fellow pilots notice?

17. QUESTIONS • “Having trouble controlling the plane”, was proficiency where it should have been for the conditions?

18. STRESSORS • Physical - environmental conditions - heat, noise, vibration, and lack of oxygen. • Physiological - fatigue, lack of sleep, physical fitness. • Psychological - mental workload, social, emotional.

19. TRUST THE FORCE

20. Risk Controls • The cadet solo accidents got our attention! • Our game plan: • Can’t solo without 30 instructional flights • First-time encampment attendees can’t solo • Can, however, achieve Pre-solo Qualification • Took a lot of heat from CFIGs • Took the pressure off of the instructors and students • Still let them achieve a level of success • Efforts to redefine airmanship • Wing Runner Course (In conjunction with SSF) • Continuation Training Program modules • Additional funding for Flight Clinics

21. The Foundation ofAirmanship(Redefining Airmanship, Tony Kern, 1997, McGraw-Hill) • Uncompromised discipline • Zero tolerance of flight discipline violations – personally and organizationally. • Flight discipline violations are contagious and insidiously degrade good judgment. • “There is only one kind of discipline – perfect discipline”… General George Patton

22. The Foundation ofAirmanship(Redefining Airmanship, Tony Kern, 1997, McGraw-Hill) • Skill • Level 1: Safety – Reached after a formal training program and checkout. • Level 2: Effectiveness – Reached after becoming comfortable in the aircraft. Airmanship paralysis usually occurs here. • Level 3: Efficiency – Advanced techniques that save time and money – i.e. thermalling techniques. Taken too far, can compromise the first two. • Level 4: Precision – Refined self assessment and motivated to continuous improvement – i.e. cross-country soaring.

23. The Foundation ofAirmanship(Redefining Airmanship, Tony Kern, 1997, McGraw-Hill) • Proficiency • Flying an aircraft is not like riding a bike. • If you’re not proficient, you’re likely to get hurt. • We can mandate currency, but proficiency is a personal responsibility. • Pilots know when they’re not proficient • Cognitive piloting skills decline as fast or faster than physical skills • Pilot confidence is critical – proficiency builds confidence

24. Preparing for FutureChallenges • Start with a solid foundation of airmanship • Uncompromised discipline • Adequate margins of safety • Eliminate the “cowboy” mentality • Skill • Don’t settle for the minimum standard • Proficiency • Just because it’s legal, doesn’t mean it’s safe • Desired outcome • Consistent good judgment • High situational awareness • All of these require a personal commitment

25. QUESTIONS? Always think safety!