1587: COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 1 Introduction to Security

1. 1587: COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 1Introduction to Security Dr. George Loukas University of Greenwich, 2013-2014

5. FORCED TO SUBMERGE DURING ATTACK, DEPTH CHARGES. LAST ENEMY LOCATION 08:30, NAVAL GRID AJ 9863, 220 DEGREES, 8 NAUTICAL MILES I AM FOLLOWING THE ENEMY BAROMETER 1014 MILLIBAR TENDENCY FALLING, NORTH NORTH EAST 4, VISIBILITY 10. NCZW VUSX PNYM INHZ XMQX SFWX WLKJ AHSH NMCO CCAK UQPM KCSM HKSE INJU SBLK IOSX CKUB HMLL XCSJ USRR DVKO HULX WCCB GVLI YXEO AHXR HKKF VDRE WEZL XOBA FGYU JQUK GRTV UKAM EURB VEKS UHHV OYHA BCJW MAKL FKLM YFVN RIZR VVRT KOFD ANJM OLBG FFLE OPRG TFLV RHOW OPBE KVWM UQFM PWPA RMFH AGKX IIBG

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10. Cryptography 500 BC Skytale 1976 (Public-Key cryptography) 9th century Al-Kindi 1918 (enigma machine) CRYPTOGRAPHY

11. Single-key cryptography = logical XOR XOR 0 1 1 = XOR 1 1 0 = XOR 0 0 0 Also known as symmetric cryptography. A binary message is encrypted and decrypted using the same secret key. The simplest type of binary encryption/decryption is to XOR each bit of the message with the secret key. Message 1010100101010011010110 XOR Key 0110011001010100110001 Encrypted message 1100111100000111100111

12. Cryptographic exercise = logical XOR XOR 0 1 1 = XOR 1 1 0 = XOR 0 0 0 A hacker intercepts a 56-bit encrypted message between two YouTube users. He already knows the key: 01110101. What was the message? 00010010 00010100 00011011 00010010 00011011 00010100 00011000 XOR 01110101 01110101 01110101 01110101 01110101 01110101 01110101 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 01101110 01100111 01101110 01100001 01101101 g a n g n a m

13. Confidentiality CONFIDENTIALITY

14. Integrity June 2010: Stuxnet Jan. 2010: Spanish PM’s website defaced A computer program that altered the motor speeds of an Iranian nuclear facility’s centrifuges. A common method is to use Cross-site Scripting (XSS) <script>document.body.background="http://your_image.jpg";</script> INTEGRITY CONFIDENTIALITY

15. Common countermeasures Detect and remove malicious software Protect real users by attracting attacks to fake users Block/filter connections to critical systems Detect unauthorised access Set strict rules for users to reduce security breaches INTEGRITY CONFIDENTIALITY

16. Availability 2000: Canadian teenager knocks offline Amazon, yahoo, CNN, eBay …. 2004: US businessman hires hackers to launch Denial of Service attacks against competitors. $2 million in losses. 2007: Estonian parliament, newspapers and banks are knocked offline by Russian hacktivists over a political issue 2002: UK teenager disables Port of Houston web systems accidentally, while trying to take cyber-revenge over a girl. Lately: The group Anonymous have been launching availability attacks for political purposes 2008: Georgia accuses Russia of coordinated availability attacks, coinciding with military operations in South Ossetia. A Denial of Service attack (DoS) is any intended attempt to prevent legitimate users from reaching a specific network resource. G. Loukas and G. Oke. Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks: A Survey. Comp. Journal, 53(7): 1020-1037, 2010 INTEGRITY CONFIDENTIALITY AVAILABILITY

17. Example DoS: Reflector attack • Send packets to several computers pretending to be the target • When they reply, they all send ACK packets to the target A Denial of Service attack (DoS) is any intended attempt to prevent legitimate users from reaching a specific network resource. G. Loukas and G. Oke. Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks: A Survey. Comp. Journal, 53(7): 1020-1037, 2010 INTEGRITY CONFIDENTIALITY AVAILABILITY

18. Availability Attack Countermeasures • Replace network components with greater capacity ones • Redundancy and diversity (more servers, links, nodes etc.) • Detect attack traffic and filter it out • Honeypots (to redirect attack to fake targets) INTEGRITY CONFIDENTIALITY AVAILABILITY

19. Causes and motivation behind attacks Technical causes Outdated OS / applications with known vulnerabilities Insecure software Insecure network Insecure network protocols, poor network design etc. Physical Easy physical access to devices, data etc. Human causes Perception of workload Vs.benefit e.g. not bothered to change password or use different PINs Social engineering Experienced hackers may manipulate less experienced users Lack of knowledge Being unaware of risks Motivation Bragging Political Financially and politically motivated attacks are on the rise Testing Financial Revenge Accidental INTEGRITY CONFIDENTIALITY AVAILABILITY

20. CASE STUDY: The Theme Park Technical causes • The “hacker” (Chris Hadnagy) • calls as a software salesperson and finds out the theme park computers’ version of PDF reader • takes his family to the theme-park and convinces an employee to open a pdf of his coupon (because he has forgotten to print it out). The pdfcontains malicious code • his accomplice gains access to the employee’s computer, which includes data on all card payments Insecure software Insecure network Physical Human causes Perception of workload Vs.benefit Social engineering Lack of knowledge Motivation Bragging Political Testing Financial Revenge Accidental INTEGRITY CONFIDENTIALITY AVAILABILITY

21. CASE STUDY: The Theme Park • There was a flaw in PDF that the hacker exploited to install malware • The accomplice connected to the theme park’s network • Malware was installed through USB • The park’s IT department had not updated their computers against this vulnerability • The hacker used social engineering twice: to find out the version of PDF reader and to convince the employee to run a PDF • The employee did not follow the policy (of accepting coupons only as printouts) and was not aware of the potential dangers Technical causes Technical causes Insecure software Insecure software Insecure network Insecure network Physical Physical Human causes Human causes Perception of workload Vs.benefit Perception of workload Vs.benefit Social engineering Social engineering Lack of knowledge Lack of knowledge Motivation Motivation Bragging Bragging Political Testing Testing Financial Financial Revenge Accidental INTEGRITY INTEGRITY AVAILABILITY CONFIDENTIALITY CONFIDENTIALITY AVAILABILITY

22. Underlying causes of security failures Cyber Security graduate jobs ____________ Monopolies present juicy targets. A single vulnerability affects millions of people Very limited security budgets Deficit of computer security experts in the market