The Kenya Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Process

1. The Kenya Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Process Prof. KimaniNjogu Africa Health and Development Interntl (AHADI), Nairobi.

2. Context • The KNDR Process • KNDR Agenda Four Items • Lessons Learnt • In Concluding…

3. Context • Re-introduction of multiparty political participation • Removing Daniel Arap Moi in 2002 • High level of optimism in 2003 • But old wine in new bottles! • The 2005 Referendum on the Constitution • The high stakes 2007 election and weaknesses in governance institutions, media and civil society • Mobilizing through ethnic platform

4. A correction… • Contrary to mainstream perceptions, large scale political violence has occurred in Kenya around elections. • 1992: Human Rights Watch reported that approx 1500 were killed and 300,000 displaced • 1997: Large scale violence especially on the Coast and Rift Valley regions • 2002: Low scale violence • There have been gross human rights violations by governments since the colonial era

5. On 27th December 2007,Kenyans went to the polls. According to (contested) official election results 9,886,650 Kenyans came out to vote.

6. CONTEXT • This figure is equivalent to 69% national voter turnout and represents the highest turnout ever experienced in Kenya. • On the evening on 27th December vote counting commenced in most constituencies and the media started announcing the results for presidential and parliamentary seats. • Early signs: Media reports of rigging the parliamentary vote • In some constituencies violence erupted over alleged rigging.

7. CONTEXT • By the evening of 28th December, Raila Odinga’s (presently Prime Minister) lead widened to over a million votes. • In the early morning of 29th December, anxiety heightened among party agents and election observers at KICC over delays in submission of results. • The Vice President Moody Awori together with 18 Cabinet Ministers in the immediate Kibaki Government had lost their parliamentary seats.

8. CONTEXT • On the third day of counting and tallying, results from the densely populated Central and Eastern provinces were missing. • The Electoral Commission of Kenya Chairman announced that he could not reach some of his officers on mobile phone. • Questions were raised about integrity of votes: Claims of rigging, casualness of the ECK chairman and unprofessionalism at ECK headquarters heightened emotions. • Delay in transmission of the results and the analysis at the ECK headquarters did not help matters.

9. CONTEXT • Some of the results submitted to HQs had significant alterations which were not explained to the satisfaction of voters and politicians. • Sunday 30 December 2007 the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was controversially declared the winner and sworn in by the Chief Justice.

10. A Glimpse of Hell…

11. KNDR stakeholders • Issues surrounding the the KNDRprocess • The Agreements

12. The Beginnings… • The KNDR process began in earnest on January 22nd, 2008 three weeks after the post election violence erupted across the country. • The goal of the process was to: • Achieve sustainable peace, stability and justice through the rule of law and respect for human rights.

13. Key Players • The African Union • whose mandate was to engage in the KNDR process as part of peacemaking in the African continent. • The general secretary, Kofi Annan was chosen to lead the process.

14. Players… • Panel of Eminent African Personalities (PEAP): The panel consisting of: • Former President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, • Former South African First Lady GracaMachel • Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as Chairperson. Role: • Became facilitators by listening to both sides and building bridges across political divides.

15. Players iii. The Negotiating Team Drawn from Government/PNU and ODM. Four Negotiators per Team with a Liason Officer Role: • Negotiate and reach consensus on the Agenda items. • Brief the principals

16. Players • International Community : • the United Nations Development Program(UNDP), • the United Nations Office in Nairobi(UNON) and • the Geneva based Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Center). Role: • Exerting pressure through PEAP for the political leaders to avoid brinkmanship and reach a census for the sake of the country

17. Players • The Kenyan people through - • civil society organizations, private sector, religious groups and community based organizations • Media Role: They owned the process by putting pressure on the political elite to engage in dialogue and reach consensus

18. Some KNDR Issues • The ripeness of the moment: It was clear that the conflict was ripe for national dialogue, as parties had reached a mutually hurting stalemate. • Involvement of Third parties : The third parties needed leverage, enjoy esteem and respect from the protagonists. • The notion of leverage and impartiality: AUPEAP and Kofi Annan, former UN secretary general had leverage, esteem, respect and commanded international support.

19. Agreements • 29th January,2008 KNDR talks amid much tension • On 1st February 2008, during Third Session KNDR parties agreed on the agenda for the dialogue:

20. Agenda No. 1: Immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties of individuals. • The focus was to identify and agree on the modalities of implementation of immediate action aimed at: • Stopping the wave of violence • Enhancing the security and protection of the population and their property; • Restoring the respect for the sanctity of human life • Ensuring that freedom of expression, press freedom and the right to peaceful assembly were upheld

21. Agenda No. 2: Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promotion of reconciliation and healing process; The aim was to: • Ensure that the assistance to the affected communities and individuals was delivered more effectively; • Ensure that impartial, effective and expeditious investigation of gross and systematic violations of human rights and that those found guilty were brought to justice; • Ensure that the process of national healing, reconciliation and restoration were started immediately.

22. Agenda No. 3: How to overcome the current political crisis. The team would discuss power sharing, constitutional review and reform of the electoral commission of Kenya. Parties involved aimed at: • making fundamental review to the constitutional, legal and institutional frameworks. • Subsequently, have the effect of redistributing power and ensuring more accountability and credibility in governance institutions.

23. Agenda No. 4: Long-term issues and solutions. Conducted to examine and propose solutions for long-standing issues such as, inter lia: • Undertaking constitutional legal and institutional reform; • Tackling poverty and inequity, as well as combating regional development imbalances; • Tackling unemployment, particularly among the youth; • Consolidating national cohesion and unity; • Undertaking land reform; • Addressing transparency, accountability and impunity;

24. Signing the National Accord • President Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga on 28th February 2008 and looking on is His Excellency Kofi Annan and President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania.

25. Ensure quick, sustained and focused pressure before and during the negotiations: • Confidence and patience is paramount and PEAP stayed focused until then National Accord was signed. • They also maintained presence in the country and continued monitoring the progress made on the Agenda items.

26. Involve a credible intermediary: • The peaceful management of conflict may involve litigation, arbitration, negotiation and mediation. • Engage stakeholders deliberately and genuinely: • PEAP brought everybody on board from the civil society and religious groups to media. Kenyans were able own the process leading to its success. • Only one mediating team: • PEAP was the only body mandated by the African Union to lead

27. Culturally sanctioned narratives of forgiveness can be activated to address the contemporary problem. E.g. Amongst the Kalenjin practice there is Kebasta in which communities donate livestock to aggrieved parties as a show of reconciliation • More urgent, is citizen education on rights and responsibilities as well as non-violent expressions of dissent • Entrenchment of the rule of law and an accountable and transparent leadership fully committed to democratic practice and social justice for all.

28. In Concluding… • Five years later, there are IDPs living in camps • Political and ethnic gangs have not been disarmed BUT …there is … • A coalition government • A liberal Constitution • A Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission • A National Cohesion and Integration Commission • A robust civil society and media

29. In Concluding • A judicial process (local and international) triggered by Agenda 4 (CIPEV 2008 Recommendation on Special Tribunal … the ‘secret’ envelope and the Hague option) • Institutional Reform (Judiciary, IEBC, CIC) triggered by Agenda 4 (Kriegler Report, Constitutional Reform…) • Infrastructure development (roads, electricity, new media) • Global interest in Kenyan elections

30. In Concluding… On Governance • Most conflicts in Africa result from (a) poor quality of leadership and (b) the failure of institutions of governance. • The impetus to tensions is fed by: • a sense of inequitable distribution of resources • fear of marginalization from power • Ethnic interests generate institutional environment that feeds ethnic consciousness. • Few institutions have a national ambience.

31. Discussion

32. In Concluding • Nationalism thrives in an environment of economic opportunities for citizens • The nation is yet to be born…but the process has begun

33. THANK YOU! kimani.njogu@gmail.com