Labour Regulation in the Liberalized Casino Economy: Croupiers in Macau

1. Labour Regulation in the Liberalized Casino Economy: Croupiers in Macau Alex H. Choi & Eva Hung University of Macau

2. Introduction • Casino as a development strategy in the neo-liberalized economy of global consumption • Casino explosion • Job creation as critical for casino legalization • Jobs are low-skill, part-time, temporary, and poorly paid • Tend to employ women, migrants and ethnic minorities

3. Macau’s croupiers as an exception • Well paid, full-time with good benefits, and career-oriented; reserved only for local residents

4. Questions • Why casino capital appears to have delivered on their promise in Macau? • What have made the otherwise inept and captured Macau government concern about labour welfare?

5. Argument • How the unique mode of accumulation in Macau gives rise to a particular preference for labour regulation • Key regulation strategy • The creation of an aristocratic labour elite subservient to the state

6. Mode of Accumulation • Tourist players from China • To pop up the prosperity of Macau, China opened the floodgate allowing its residents easier visit to the gambling Mecca • Corrupted cadres and nouveau-riche as the key clients of VIP rooms, accounting for over 60% of total casino revenue

7. Transnational casino capital • Scrambled to find a base in Macau, where they can have direct access to the lucrative Chinese market • Casino gambling is still criminalized inside China proper

8. Local state / local capital • The local state is under the tight control of a small number of local families • Ability to cut political deals and to be compradors for the transnational • Their economic position is contingent on its hold onto political power • The provision of local labour power • Increase of labour import however stirred up political instability

9. The symbiosis • Casino state and casino capital contingent on each other • 70% of the state revenue comes directly from casino taxes • Hence, a labor regulation regime which on the one hand provides the necessary labour force and on the other hand lends political legitimacy to the local state

10. From Enterprise Paternalism to State Regulation • Before liberalization, STDM was the sole purchaser of croupier labour power in Macau • Croupiers tightly controlled in a paternalistic and authoritarian labour regime • Well paid, but promotion by connections • Punishment by public humiliation (下野) • Seniority counted in pay and status (實位); and position could be sold • If fired, end of their career

11. Ending of the monopoly means the need to create a new regime • To expand the supply of croupiers • Gaming tables: from 339 (2002) to 4017 (2008) • No. of croupiers (2008): 18,196 • To prevent shortage from escalating into even higher labour costs • To impose discipline at the supra-enterprise level • A task the government has actively engaged since 2002

12. New Mode of Labour Regulation • Aristocratization and politicization of croupiers • Lowly educated people can become a croupier and earn a middle class income • A way to escape from the job insecurity and depressed wage created by the migrant worker program in the wider labour market • Migrant workers account for more than 25% of working population in Macau

13. A government policy of not allowing migrant workers in the card dealing occupation • Reiterated verbally many times but never found in any government policy papers • Croupiers thus serve as a safety valve for the regime • The unemployed could wait for their turn for a croupier position • Croupiers become an aristocratic labour class whose existence is vulnerable to the whim of the authoritarian state

14. Embourgeoisement of the croupiers • Croupiers as the newly emerged “middle class” • Based on the amount of disposable income rather than other middle class characteristics • The public display of consumption power exerts tremendous influences on the youngsters; kids are quitting school to join their rank • Croupiers are celebrated as model for a prosperous Macau society

15. Control and disciplinization • Croupiers as subjected to a very rigorous regime of regulation (strict adherence to protocol), and monitored by surveillance cameras and superiors • But collusion with players and stealing of chips do happen • Misbehaviors caused by gambling addiction and the owing of huge amount of debts • A licensing system to prevent croupiers from gambling in other casinos • More government control on who can have access to these lucrative jobs • Hence the disciplinary effect even more prominent

16. Compliant unionism • Macau FTU monopolized the trade union sector; part of the ruling coalition • Macau Gaming Industry Labourers Association • Run like a family business by its boss, Joao Bosco Cheang • Key function: the operation of a croupier training centre; financed by the government • An electoral machine for Cheang and his team • Macau Gaming Enterprises Staff’s Association • Set up in 2007 • Recruits members not only from croupiers but also from all kinds of workers in the entire casino industry • More active in voicing out labour concerns

17. Both unions espouse labour-capital harmony and shun radical action • They will voice out labour concerns, but none dare to back them up with labour action • Hence, a kind of “press conference unionism”

18. A racial hierarchy • A multinational workforce • The job of croupiers reserved for local Macau residents but not other casino positions • A racial mix and hierarchy • Lowest rank: from mainland China and SE Asia • Well paid croupiers, cage workers: Macau residents • Management positions: from Hong Kong and developed countries • Racial mix not an unintentional consequence • The employment of well paid Macau croupier is exchanged with a large quota of low paid migrant workers in other positions

19. Conclusion • Macau croupiers as “aristocratic labour” • Politically constructed in order to stabilize the casino regime; central to a labour regulation system created for the post-liberalization economy • Hence a tolerance of its obvious irrationality and negative impacts • Limited promotion opportunities because higher-up positions are filled up by professional migrant workers • High pay for low skill work encourages school drop- outs, and is bad to the future of Macau

20. Croupiers used as pawns in political fights • E.g. croupiers were fired en masse in 2008 to create the political pressure to push China to relax the restriction on tourist visiting Macau • Croupiers are constructed as objects in the present political environment • Its wellbeing are linked to the necessities for creating a legitimacy for the regime • Could be put on the chopping block any time if an alternative is found • Thus, well paid croupiers is a nice creation out of unique conditions