A Potent Brew? Illegal Drugs, Politics, and Armed Conflict in two provinces in the ARMM

1. A Potent Brew? Illegal Drugs, Politics, and Armed Conflict in two provinces in the ARMM By RufaCagoco-Guiam Davao City 19 March 2012

2. Outline of Presentation • Introduction • The Research Questions • Literature Review • Hypotheses • Methodology • Evidence • Conclusions

3. Introduction • The Philippines as a significant source of shabu (metamphetamine hydrochloride) since 2007 – both for domestic and export consumption (East and SEAsia, Oceania) (World Dev’t Report, 2011) • 5 regions in Mindanao –with most number of drug dens (PDI July 28, 2011 report) • ARMM – 10 drug dens neutralized – in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur • Region 9 – 2 drug dens • Regions 10, 11 and 12 (one each)

4. Research Questions • Why has the illegal trade in shabu in the two provinces in the ARMM not led to massive breakdown of violence? • How does the incentive structure in engaging in the shabu trade play into the weak governance structures in the region? • What are the links between local politicians and the illegal drug trade? • What is the relationship between the shabu trade and violent conflict?

5. Literature Review • Crime – rebellion nexus: studies on the deadly interface between illegal drug trade (cocaine and opium) and armed conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, etc. (Cornell, 2007) • Illegal drugs are “honey pots” providing incentives for profit-seeking groups to “engage in violent actions, as in a rebellion. (Collier, 2000 • Engaging in illegal markets is not directly linked to the outbreak of violence : “excessive violence can be bad for business” ; when state-sponsored predation rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful…”(Snyder, Duran-Martinez 2009) et. al

6. Hypotheses • The incentive structure for engaging in the drug trade is attractive, starting with substantial commissions for “rovers” and “strollers” (interviews with pushers and users) • Drug money is the currency of acquiring political leverage, and in turn, one’s political position protects the local government official’s interests in the drug trade. (PDEA-ARMM director interviews) • Engaging in the illegal drug trade does not necessarily lead to massive violence. Engaging in legal exercises like the elections can even be more violent. (see data from Chua, et.al. Democracy at Gunpoint)

7. Methodology • Desk review of related literature • Analysis of news reports on drug related crimes from The Mindanao Cross (2000 to 2010) and through the Notre Dame Broadcasting Corporation’s radio stations in Central Mindanao (Jan 2011 to February 2012) • One on one conversations • Drug pushers (2) - community organizers (2) • Drug users (2) - academics (2) • Media persons (2) - former parish priest of Parang • Top ARMM official (former exec secretary) • PDEA ARMM regional director • LCE (Parang municipal mayor) • CSO/NGO officers (4) • Bank manager (1- Cotabato City)

8. Evidence • Engaging in drug trafficking as a family or clan’s mechanism for social protection (CSO informant and corroborated by MSU prof and community organizers) • “Narco-politics” in Lanao del Sur’s “Lucky Seven” club (PDEA ARMM director interviews) • Maguindanao-based drug lords keep the entire process of the trade within family members, although trusted “retailers” can be made part of the business(ARMM officials and Parang municipal officials, former Parang parish priest) • Usually, drug lords have legal businesses to mask their illegal business, and can get away from detection because there are no direct evidence of their engagement in the drug trade (interviews with bankers) • Relationship with rebel groups: tenuous; circumstantial, and silence of ulama groups on the problem of illegal drugs trafficking in the ARMM (newspaper and radio reports that MILF leaders quickly deny this link, even cite they had executed alleged drug pushers in the past)

9. Lanao del Sur: The Lucky 7 Club + 1(Sketched by PdEA ARMM director) Centre of financial transactions LCE 3 Drug trafficking LCE 2 gunrunning LCE 1: Kidnapping Text LCE 4: illegal items at customs “The Godfather” LCE 7: all illegal activities LCE5: robbery , hold up LCE 6: carnapping

10. From NDBC news reports from Jan 2011 to Feb 2012

11. From The Mindanao Cross, January 26, 2008

12. Election-related violence, from 2009 to 2010, Democracy at Gunpoint, 2011

13. “Drug families” or groups/ “conglomerates in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur (multi-million “corporation” Depositing 5-10 million pesos in banks in Cotabato City daily Wholesaler – One kg= 3 m; but can be processed to 3 kg, with 6 m profit (mini-laboratories Rover – 20-50 pesos per sachet Repacker –Retailer 100 or double that of rover From interviews with drug pushers, users, PDEA director, ARMM top official, bank manager, MSU prof

14. On the role of state-sponsored predation rackets • The Five Pillars of the Justice System: • Law enforcement: ordinary police officers who provide protection to rovers and retailers • Prosecution: Fiscals ask for bribes from apprehended rovers and retailers and delay filing of charges or dismissal of charges • Community: people are scared to report to PDEA or to law enforcement • Courts: order dismissal of some cases • Correction: PDEA detention cells are like pigpens or chicken coops Collated from interviews and conversations with informants

15. Conclusions • Illegal drug trade consists of an elaborate, complicated network of transactions that remain shadowy despite its huge financial “portfolio” (10 m a day is conservative) • Operating this huge ‘drug conglomerate’ is made smooth and easy with modern communications equipment in a political context that has weak regulatory mechanisms, with state-sponsored protection rackets in place • Drug money is the currency for acquiring political power and political power becomes the clout of protection for the drug trade to thrive • While violence is a possibility in the illegal drug trade and politics, it is not always the consequence. Even without the illegal drug trade thrown into the equation, political power plays have become already violent in the ARMM. • Legal mechanisms and legal trade can mask the shadow economies of illegal trade, especially in the trade of shabu. • Armed conflict is a background and a condition that contributes to the “enabling” environment for the illegal drug trade to continue unabated • Weak government regulatory mechanisms, combined with state protection rackets and the messy conditions spawned by the active armed conflict in the region provide the enabling environment for the illegal drug trade to thrive in the ARMM.

16. Policy implications • Creation of special drug courts; reforming the five pillars of the Justice System, from law enforcement, prosecution, courts and correction systems • Review Anti-Money laundering Act; RA on dangerous drugs • Review incentive structure of government regulatory mechanisms • Intensified community-based information, education and communication strategies to address the “demand” side of illegal drugs, esp. shabu • Illegal drug trafficking as part of the agenda for the GPH-MILF peace talks, especially in putting in place comprehensive reforms in the ARMM • Security sector reforms, including the option for community policing strategies