Sustaining Social-Ecological Systems: An Ontological Approach

1. Sustaining Social-Ecological Systems: An Ontological Approach Elinor Ostrom Indiana University Karl F. Schuessler Lecture November 6, 2008

2. Sustaining Social-Ecological Systems is a Struggle • A central theme of this talk is Social-Ecological Systems are complex. • Understanding SES’s is a challenge -- BUT IT IS WORTH IT! • Without understanding, we can recommend policies that may things worse rather than better • Two tasks for today • A brief overview of recent research that draws on both ecological and social sciences • A brief overview of a new framework that may help us to integrate our research by providing a common tiered language

3. Diversity is Important for Sustainability • Two types: • Biological diversity – extensive scientific findings – well accepted • Institutional diversity – importance not yet accepted • Simple institutional solutions are frequently recommended as universal panaceas • Government ownership • Privatize land • Co-management • Imposing simple policy blueprints reduces institutional diversity and ecological sustainability • Our research finds variations of all 3 succeed & fail • Lets review findings from our multi-country, multi-disciplinary forestry research network using remote sensing & field studies. • First to Maya Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala

4. Maya Biosphere ReserveMultitemporal Color Composite (Dietz, Ostrom, Stern, 2003, Science SOM)

5. Maya Biosphere Reserve • Four National Parks (NPs) in close proximity • Tikal NP has large budget to pay for extensive fences and guards • El Mirador protected by nature • Laguna del Tigre severely overharvested • Sierra del Lacandón severely overharvested • Same formal institution: • Two are sustainable, but different causal process • Two are vulnerable to massive illegal harvesting

6. Now to Uganda • An example of sustainable Government Forest Reserves • West Mengo region located in earlier Buganda kingdom • In early 1900s, tough negotiations to settle private land and set up reserves in 1930s • Local forest users use NTFP and participate every two decades in boundary demarcation • Users value the forest and know the boundaries • Very stable from 1936 to 2000 • Recent decentralization is disrupting this stability

7. Uganda Forest Reserves

8. Now to India • Todoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve • An under-funded national wildlife reserve with multiple outcomes • Stable forests in the core • Park guards are not able to control harvesting along sections of the borders • Complementary field studies find • Consistent harvesting of non-timber forest products • Existence of considerable conflict between guards and local people • Nagendra & Ostrom, PNAS, 2006

9. Clearing Regrowth Stable forest Clearing TADOBA-ANDHARI TIGER RESERVE Regrowth Interior villages Multi-temporal Landsat color composite, 1972-1989-2001, landscape surrounding Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve, India.

10. Women harvesting thatch grass from within the TATR - while the forest ranger accompanying our research team looks on helplessly.

11. Cattle entering the TATR boundary (marked by the yellow topped pillar in the background) on their daily foraging beat.

12. Bicycles and trucks confiscated from timber poachers stealing large logs

13. Are Protected Areas the “Only Way” to Sustain Forests? • While some Protected Parks are successful in protecting forests, others are not. • Depends on many factors • In a large cross-sectional IFRI study of 163 forests in 12 countries, no difference in forest density (scale assigned by forester on team after doing forest plots) is measured for Protected Parks compared to all other institutional arrangements (Non-Parks)

14. Comparison of Forester’s Field Evaluation of Vegetation Densities in 163 Parks and Non-Parks Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z score = 0.472, p = .979. No significant difference. Source: Hayes, Tanya, & Elinor Ostrom, “Conserving the World’s Forests: Are Protected Areas the Only Way?” Indiana Law Review 38(3) (2005): 607.

15. Findings from Repeat Visits to IFRI Forests • 2nd time research visit in 42 IFRI forests • India – 5 forests • Kenya – 3 forests • Nepal – 10 forests • Uganda – 18 forests • USA – 6 forests • Not a random sample of forests but based on a random sample of plots inside each forest and first study of this type • Can now assess: • Relative strength of formal institution on changes in DBH, basal area, and stem count • Strength of regular involvement of user groups in monitoring forests on same forest measures

16. Impact of Formally Designated Tenure and Forest Monitoring on Changes in Forest Condition: Assessment using ANOVA a Government, community, private b At least one user group is involved in regular monitoring of rules of forest use * Significant at .05 ** Significant at .01 Source: Ostrom, Elinor, & Harini Nagendra, “Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People from the Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory.” PNAS 103(51) (2006): 19230.

17. A Puzzle from Field Research: Why Do Users Monitor Others? • Voluntary effort to produce a “public good” of rule conformance • Game theoretic predictions – no one will voluntarily contribute to provide a public good • Earlier findings from field studies led to a series of laboratory experiments at IU and now replicated by others

18. Baseline experiment of complete anonymity and finitely repeated game Game theoretical prediction is substantial over-harvesting Prediction supported in the lab Adding the capacity to communicate – does not change prediction – in a social dilemma communication is only CHEAP TALK Subjects make good use of opportunity for cheap talk – especially when repeated They use it to agree on joint harvesting strategy & for verbal sanctions of unknown over-harvesters Harvesting Common-Pool Resources in the Lab

19. Aggregate Results of CPR Experiments aNash equilibrium for all designs is a net yield of 39% of maximum (Adapted from: Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992: p. 414)

20. What Have We Learned? • No single idealized type of governance structures is successful in all ecological and social settings • We should NOT eliminate institutional diversity to save biodiversity

21. Danger of Institutional Monoculture • Abstract concepts – government ownership, co-management • Tend to impose uniform rules • People living in or around forest frequently not involved in design • Few opportunities for experimentation and learning • Rules-on-paper confused for rules-in-use – don’t really know what rules are being used in field

22. Self Governance is Feasible • Resources & human uses can be monitored & the info verified & understood at relatively low cost (trees easier to monitor than fish) WHEN • Rates of change in key variables are moderate • Communities do have thick networks of social capital • Excluding outsiders is relatively low costs • Users consider rules legitimate & support monitoring and sanctioning activities

23. The Challenges Ahead • Need further investment in understanding complex social-ecological systems (SESs) • Developed a multi-tier, multi-disciplinary ontology for analyzing SES’s • For a Special Feature of PNAS September 2007 • A core set of 4 variable clusters at a focal level that together generate interactions and outcomes • Affected by, and affect larger and smaller ecosystems as well as social, economic, and political systems • Let’s look at the first tier

24. A Multitier Framework for Analyzing Sustainable Social-Ecological Systems

25. To Analyze Sustainable or Unsustainable Interactions and Outcomes • Need to dig down one or two tiers for several of main first tier variables • Lets dig down one level to an initial listing of 2nd tier variables • But – when you see 50 + variables at second level – do not panic! • Need to identify which second-tier (and potentially 3rd or 4th tier) variables are relevant to a particular question being examined • All 2nd (3rd or 4th) tier variables are not relevant for every theoretical or empirical study

27. Building Theories Based on this Framework to Address 3 Broad Questions • First question:What patterns of interactions and outcomes -- overuse, conflict, collapse, stability -- are likely to result from using one set of rules for the governance and use of a particular resource system and its units in a socioeconomic and political environment? • In other words – which rules generate sustainable outcomes for particular types of resources? • Why were the rules related to forest reserves in Uganda sustainable for many decades and recent changes now leading to deforestation • Hardin did not consider any rules in his analysis

29. Second Type of Question • For a particular resource in a particular setting, what is the likely endogenous development of different forms of governance, use patterns, and outcomes with or without external imposed rules or financing? • In other words – do national governments need to impose institutions from the outside? • Or, are well tailored rules likely to evolve from within in this type of setting? • May need 3rd or 4th tier variables to build theory to answer this type of question

30. Third Type of Question • How robust and sustainable is a particular type of configuration of users, resource system, resource units, and governance system to external and internal disturbances? • In other words – what kind of disturbances are likely to lead reduce the resilience of a particular cluster of SES variables? Population change? global warming? changes in prices? • All 3 questions need theoretical development and empirical testing by multi-disciplinary research teams • We all need to work on the challenge of developing this multi-tier framework and related theories and the empirical work to test our theoretical predictions

31. Questions that We Can Discuss Now?