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Evaluating Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program:. Do Local Governments Matter?. Pui Shen Yoong International Politics & Economics Honors Thesis April 20, 2012. Presentation Outline. Context: Brazil & the Bolsa Família Program Research Question Methodology Quantitative Findings
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Evaluating Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: Do Local Governments Matter? Pui Shen Yoong International Politics & Economics Honors Thesis April 20, 2012
Presentation Outline • Context: Brazil & the Bolsa Família Program • Research Question • Methodology • Quantitative Findings • Qualitative Findings • Conclusion
Brazil – A Country of Contrasts Mean per capita income (PPP US$ of 2005) Source: World Bank.
The Bolsa Família Program • Conditional cash transfer program • Cash in exchange for schooling/nutrition ‘conditionalities’: • Pregnant women : pre-natal care • Children aged 0 – 6 : vaccination, monitoring • Children aged 6 – 15 : minimum attendance 85 % • Teenagers aged 16 – 17 : minimum attendance 75 % • Families who earn <140 reais per capita (80 USD) a month • Allowances from 32 to 306 reais (20 – 180 USD) a month
Research Question • “How does local government capacity affect the program’s ability to improve beneficiaries’ health & education across municipalities?”
Methodology: Regression Analysis INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLE Effect on health/education -- % of beneficiaries complying with health/education requirements 853 municipalities in Minas Gerais state Municipal fixed-effects model (i=municipality, t=year) Administrative Capacity % of beneficiaries monitored for compliance with health/education requirements
Methodology: Case Studies Araçuaí Capelinha Belo Horizonte Contagem Human Development Index by Municipality, Minas Gerais, 2000
Quantitative Results • Monitoring rates have significant and positive effect on compliance rates, both for health & education. • Population size, degree of urbanization, program coverage rates, log of tax revenue – no significant effect. Neither do supply-side factors (health teams, social assistance centers) • But why/how do monitoring rates affect compliance rates?
Qualitative Results • Cross-sector collaboration – health, education, social assistance departments • Administrative Structure • Financial capacity does not explain differences in compliance rates
Conclusion Local government capacity matters! • Investment in building monitoring capacity (MDS & municipalities) • Incentives for horizontal collaboration among local-level agents
THANK YOU! Pui Shen Yoong psyoong@gmail.com Questions? Comments?