Fishery Cooperatives: What do They Achieve? What determines success?

1. Fishery Cooperatives:What do They Achieve? What determines success? Robert T. Deacon University of California, Santa Barbara Resources for the Future World Bank Workshop on Fishery Reform Dhaka, Bangladesh July 2011

2. Objective Why do fishery coops form, what do they do and what determines success? General benefit/cost framework for formulating questions Gain from coop formation = X = PV(rent from coordinated, cooperative harvesting) - PV(rent from independent, uncoordinated harvesting) – Transaction cost from forming coop Coops more likely to form when X is large.

3. Why do fishery coops form, what do they do, … Ecological considerations Externalities and life histories: Sedentary vs. mobile vs. larval dispersal; Rent gain most likely when resource is stationary; Coops most likely to emerge and succeed for sedentary species Discounting and life histories: Slow vs. fast growing species and time horizon for rent gains Ecology and ease of monitoring, management Near shore vs. open water habitat, ease of observation based on life history. Implication: Pay attention to life histories and ecology

4. Why do fishery coops form … Economic considerations Market power motive: If fish buyer is monopsony, coop may form to gain market power; This is irrelevant if catch is for own consumption; Coop formed for market power may take on management tasks. Potential cost reduction from economizing on search and information: Depends partly on gear, species, habitat. Gains and costs of coordinating effort: Heterogeneity in value of catch over time and space can make coordination more valuable. Number of harvesters affects costs of coordination Implication: Pay attention to economic context and technology.

5. Why do fishery coops form … Institutional and regulatory considerations Weak rule of law, non-democratic governance, corruption can enhance coop’s value: Coop may take on functions government would otherwise provide; Strong rule of law, democratic governance, absence of corruption may make coop function better : With strong institutions, government may facilitate exclusive rights. With rule of law, coop formation and coop coordination may be facilitated by contracting among fishers. Regulatory assignment of property rights: If regulations effectively assign rights, coop’s potential ‘value added’ is less. If regulations do not legitimize exclusion of non-coop members, coop may accomplish nothing. Implication: Governance institutions matter, but the relationship isn’t simple.

6. What do fishery coops do? Outcome variables: actions coops take Approach: develop an exhaustive list of potential coop activities by examining case studies of ‘extreme cooperation’. Challenger Scallop Enhancement Company (NZ); New Zealand paua harvester groups; Chignik sockeye salmon coop (U.S.) Examples for case study literature in Brazil, Turkey, elsewhere. Commonly observed actions : Allocate fishing sites or times among members. Develop schemes to mitigate conflicts due to different gear types, congestion. Provision of shared infrastructure (habitat modification, FADs, port facilities, etc.) Cooperation on sharing information, economizing on search. Cooperation on monitoring, enforcement, sanctioning violators. Adoption of conservation rules, e.g., size limits, catch limits. And the list goes on …

7. Goals and principles for developing survey questions Enable us to merge Bangladesh results with existing UCSB data base: Must include observations on variables we are already collecting; Exploit opportunity to collect on-site information not usually available: Fishery governance: detailed, fishery-specific info on government’s fishery policy. Socioeconomic context: detailed, local information on incomes, socioeconomic attributes. Institutional context: information on strength of regional and local government as it relates to coop success. Exploit opportunity to merge survey information with WB Fishery Performance Indicators. Performance information not available in our cross country data base.

8. UCSB data base on fishery cooperatives Gleaned from case study and empirical research literatures. Approximately 75 coops covered at present. ‘Context’ variables include ecological, economic and institutional situation. Outcome variables include those listed above. Not a representative sample of the universe of coops; selected on the basis of available information.

9. Attributes of sample

10. Attributes of sample

11. Attributes of sample

12. Actions sample coops undertake * Harvesting refers to coordinated harvesting among members.

13. Actions sample coops undertake * Harvesting refers to coordinated harvesting among members.

14. Work in progress …. Thanks!