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Standards In The Evaluation Of IT Security. Steve Randall & Scott Cadzow TC-MTS#39 20-21 October 2004 Sophia Antipolis 39TD025. Common Criteria. Products offering security features always carefully evaluated (particularly by government bodies)
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Standards In The Evaluation Of IT Security Steve Randall & Scott Cadzow TC-MTS#39 20-21 October 2004 Sophia Antipolis 39TD025
Common Criteria • Products offering security features always carefully evaluated (particularly by government bodies) • Mid-90s, evaluation bodies got together to define a single set of evaluation requirements, the “Common Criteria (CC)” in ISO/IEC 15408 • Part 1: Introduction and general model • Part 2: Security functional requirements • Part 3: Security assurance requirements • Rapidly growing interest in security and evaluation within commercial world • Key aspects of CC: • Formal evaluation process • Using trained evaluators • International recognition of results TC-MTS 39TD025
CC Terminology • Protection Profile (PP) • Abstract specification of required security functionality • Security Target (ST) • Concrete specification of a product providing required security functionality • Target Of Evaluation (TOE) • Actual product providing required security functionality TC-MTS 39TD025
Standards and CC [1] • CC generally used to evaluate product • Communications products often incorporate implementations of standards • Standards are rarely evaluated under CC • The question for TISPAN: • Can standards be written in a way that simplifies the evaluation of products implementing them? TC-MTS 39TD025
Standards and CC [2] • Protocol standards are spiritually close to PPs • Specify implementation independent requirements • Use formalized text to specify requirements (shall, may, should…) • Use specification languages for design, validation and testing (SDL, UML, MSC, ASN.1, TTCN) • Have traceability: • Title • Version numbering • Change control TC-MTS 39TD025
What is TISPAN Doing ?- Long Term - • Providing guidance to standards developers on standards preparation • To allow evaluation • To achieve higher quality standards • Introducing CC vocabulary • Requirements stated in terms of ISO/IEC 15408 Part 2 • Evaluation stated as a goal of standardisation TC-MTS 39TD025
What is TISPAN Doing ?- Short Term – • A guide to CC as it applies to standards • Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) • Functional requirements classes • Evaluation classes • Proforma for PP • Guidance on preparing a standard for CC evaluation: • Format • Content • Development process • Proforma for ST • Format and overview of developers’ responsibilities in preparing a product for evaluation TC-MTS 39TD025
Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL) • EAL 1: Functionally tested • EAL 2: Structurally tested • EAL 3: Methodically tested and checked • EAL 4: Methodically designed, tested and reviewed • EAL 5: Semiformally designed and tested • EAL 6: Semiformally verified design and tested • EAL 7: Formally verified design and tested TC-MTS 39TD025
CC Specification Structure • Functional requirements and evaluation requirements categorized as Classes, Families and Components. Class Class Class Family Family Component Component TC-MTS 39TD025
Functional Requirements Classes • FAU: Security Audit • FCO: Communication • FCS: Cryptographic Support • FDP: User Data Protection • FIA: Identification and Authentication • FMT: Security Management • FPR: Privacy • FPT: Protection of TOE Security Functions • FRU: Resource Utilization • FTA: TOE Access • FTP: Trusted Paths and Channels TC-MTS 39TD025
Example Families (FIA) • FIA_AFL: Authentication Failures • FIA_ATD: User Attributes Definition • FIA_SOS: Specification Of Secrets • FIA_USU: User Authentication • FIA_UID: User Identification • FIA_USB: User-Subject Binding TC-MTS 39TD025
Assurance Classes • APE: Protection Profile Evaluation • ASE: Security Target Evaluation • ACM: Configuration Management • ADO: Delivery and Operation • ADV: Development • AGD: Guidance Documents • ALC: Life Cycle Support • ATE: Tests • AVA: Vulnerability Analysis TC-MTS 39TD025
Example Families (ADV) • ADV_FSP: Functional Specification • ADV_HLD: High-Level Design • ADV_IMP: Implementation representation • ADV_INT: TOE Security Function Internals • ADV_LLD: Low-Level Design • ADV_RCR: Representation Correspondence • ADV_SPM: Security Policy Modelling TC-MTS 39TD025
Protection Profile • Although content similar, PP is written in a different way to a standard. It is, therefore: • unlikely (and undesirable) that ETSI will change the style of its standards; • unreasonable to expect ISO and the security community to change the way a PP is written; • unrealistic to expect an evaluator to find all PP information in an ETSI standard (or multiple standards); • inefficient to write out information twice (once in a standard and again in the PP). • “PICS” approach adopted where information is summarized in a table which includes references to text rather than the text itself. TC-MTS 39TD025
PP Header TC-MTS 39TD025
PP Security Environment TC-MTS 39TD025
PP Security Objectives TC-MTS 39TD025
PP Security Requirements TC-MTS 39TD025
PP Additional Information TC-MTS 39TD025